Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to reopen his personal injury case, after his case was dismissed for want of prosecution, where counsel had missed series of scheduled court conferences, and where counsel was warned that failure to attend any future scheduled conference without providing timely notice would result in dismissal of instant case. Only denial of plaintiff's second post-judgment motion was properly before Appellate Court, since Dist. Ct. improperly granted plaintiff's section 2107(c) motion for extension of time to file notice of appeal from judgment dismissing case for want of prosecution, since plaintiff could not establish excusable neglect, where excuse for failing to file timely notice of appeal was misunderstanding of Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A). Also, counsel's claim that one of his staff members had repeatedly failed to calendar court conferences did not provide reasonable excuse for counsel's failure to attend said conferences, since counsel should have exercised his own diligence in monitoring disposition of instant case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-Sheriff and certain jail employees failed to protect him from severe beating he received from other prisoners, under circumstances where plaintiff had told three jail workers that he would be attacked by said prisoners and defendants failed to protect him from said attack. Relevant procedural rules required that plaintiff file grievance with jail prior to filing instant action, and while plaintiff had filed grievance alleging that one guard had failed to come to his aid during attack, said grievance was substantively distinct from allegations in instant complaint that defendants had failed to protect him prior to attack. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff’s Monell claim against County was time-barred, since it was filed beyond applicable two-year limitations period, where record showed that defendant filed instant claim almost three years after plaintiff learned that his appeal of prison grievance had been denied. Fact that County had subsequently initiated internal affairs investigation concerning attack on plaintiff did not toll limitations period, since plaintiff would not have obtained any remedy arising out of said investigation. Moreover, record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in favor of defendant-Sheriff in plaintiff’s ADA claim, alleging that defendant had discriminated against him based on his disability by failing to accommodate his disability, where, although plaintiff maintained that he was paralyzed and confined to wheelchair, jury could properly find that plaintiff had lied about his physical condition and/or his need for wheelchair given medical testimony indicating that plaintiff had no neurological injury.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison medical personnel’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that: (1) defendant-nurse was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical risk by directing him to take certain medication that was given to him under circumstances where said medication was actually prescribed for different prisoner, and where plaintiff had serious adverse reaction to said medication; and (2) defendant-health services manager failed to intervene on his behalf in violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff also asserted that defendants-nurses and officers responsible for giving him said medication were negligent under Wisc. law. While plaintiff did not file response to defendants’ summary judgment motion, Dist. Ct. erred in noting that defendants were entitled to summary judgment merely because plaintiff had failed to file response. However, plaintiff's failure to file response entitled Dist. Ct. to deem as admitted, facts contained in defendants’ motion, and, under said facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that defendant-nurse who directed plaintiff to take medication after defendant had adverse reaction, was deliberately indifferent to serious medical risk, where said nurse was not involved in plaintiff’s medical care. Moreover, same result applied to defendant-health services manager, where plaintiff failed to identify underlying constitutional violation that had occurred by failing to intervene on his behalf. Also, plaintiff failed to comply with Wisc. statute with respect to his negligence claim, since plaintiff failed to use defendants’ correct names in his notice of claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action, plaintiff's section 1983 action alleging that defendants-county prosecutor (in his official capacity) and two deputy prosecutors (in their individual capacities) maliciously prosecuted him in violation of his due process rights when they filed untimely amendment to his original charges and secured conviction on amended charge. While plaintiff requested $50 million in damages for his confinement and for past and future physical and emotional damages, plaintiff failed to state cause of action against county prosecutor, since: (1) county prosecutor was state official, and thus instant lawsuit, which was filed in prosecutor's official capacity, was in essence action against State of Indiana; and (2) instant lawsuit fell outside scope of section 1983 because State of Indiana is not "person" that can be sued under section 1983. Also, defendants-deputy prosecutors enjoyed absolute immunity from instant lawsuit for their conduct in filing untimely charging amendment, where filing and amending criminal charges against defendants are core prosecutorial functions. Ct. further observed that plaintiff's claim, which stemmed from prosecutors' decision to make untimely amendment in violation of Indiana law, did not trigger any federal claim that was addressable under section 1983.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing without prejudice plaintiff-debtor's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) action, alleging that defendant-debt collector sent letters to plaintiff that stated inconsistent debt amounts and unclearly identified plaintiff's creditor. Plaintiff lacked standing to sue defendant under FDCPA because she failed to allege that instant letters harmed her in any way. Moreover, plaintiff admitted that she did not pay anything extra on her debt, and that she properly disputed alleged debt that was not warranted. Also, plaintiff's alleged injury that she was confused and aggravated by defendant's letters did not constitute sufficient injury in fact to support Article III standing to pursue instant lawsuit. Too, plaintiff's mere allegation of FDCPA statutory violation alone does not cause injury in fact.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on pleadings plaintiff's section 1983 action, alleging that officer violated plaintiff's substantive due process rights when he drove through residential streets at speeds up to 98 m.p.h. to reach routine traffic stop and crashed into decedent's car, and where defendant-City failed to adequately train its police officers to avoid such encounters. Plaintiff seeking relief under section 1983 for violation of her substantive due process rights must plead sufficient facts to establish that officer acted with criminal recklessness. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts to permit inference that defendant-officer knew of danger he created and consciously disregarded it, Ct. of Appeals held that complaint adequately alleged viable substantive due process claim, where: (1) officer was never requested by other officers to assist them in apprehension of individual in otherwise routine traffic stop; (2) with no justification, officer chose to race through residential streets at speeds up to 98 m.p.h. and drove through red light to hit decedent's car, which was traveling in accordance with traffic lights; and (3) jury could find that officer displayed criminal recklessness to known risk. Also, plaintiff adequately alleged viable cause of action against defendant-City based on failure-to-train theory, where: (1) City was aware that officer had previously operated his vehicle at high rate of speed over 50 m.p.h. on three occasions in spite of telling all of its officers not to drive over 50 m.p.h.; and (2) defendant never reprimanded anyone for failing to abide by said directive or took steps to prevent this behavior.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs-father and his children's section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-DCFS personnel violated their First and 14^th Amendment rights by engaging in series of events that culminated in state court order in divorce proceeding that temporarily suspended father's visitation rights that, according to plaintiffs, infringed on their right to familial association. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring constitutional challenge to section 5/607.6(d) of Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, which bars all communications made in counseling session from being used in any manner in litigation, where plaintiffs failed to allege that named defendant, i.e. DCFS Acting Director, played any role in enforcing said section. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on abstention grounds plaintiffs' complaint alleging violations of plaintiffs' substantive and procedural due process rights arising out of DCFS report regarding agency's failed attempt to implement safety plan, which involved father and which led to limitation of father's visitation rights, since (1) plaintiffs filed instant complaint when state court proceeding regarding father's custody of his children was still pending; and (2) instant lawsuit constituted improper attempt to compel adjudication of claims that would inject federal court into contested and ongoing family court dispute.

In defamation action alleging that defendants made false statements to plaintiff's employer about plaintiff providing false statements to Colorado state court action involving plaintiff's husband, Dist. Ct did not err in refusing plaintiff's requests to allow her either to present closing argument herself or to hire new counsel, after her trial counsel, according to plaintiff, suffered "severe collapse of cognitive function" at time closing arguments were set to take place at trial. Some of plaintiff's arguments in this regard were akin to claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, where plaintiff asserted that her trial counsel was not prepared. However, plaintiff was not entitled to new trial, since: (1) civil litigants have no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel; (2) plaintiff's only remedy is malpractice action against trial counsel, as opposed to remand for new trial; and (3) Dist. Ct. had good reason to suspect that plaintiff would not follow rules if allowed to give her own pro se closing argument. Moreover, trial counsel's request to continue closing arguments over weekend was granted, and trial counsel eventually gave capable closing argument on behalf of plaintiff. Also, Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error in omitting jury instruction on her defamation claim against one defendant, where plaintiff failed to show that outcome of trial would have been different had said instruction been given to jury, where jury, which had been given appropriate instructions regarding defamation claim against other defendant, found that other defendant did not commit defamation in making exact same statements that formed basis of defamation claim against defendant at issue in omitted instruction.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction plaintiff's section 1983 and related Illinois state court actions, alleging that defendants-Indiana city and police official had subjected plaintiff to unreasonable seizure, when defendant-officer: (1) had mistakenly identified plaintiff as individual who had intimidated confidential informant; and (2) had taken actions that eventually led to plaintiff's arrest in Illinois and then release next day after error had been discovered. Dist. Ct. lacked personal jurisdiction over both defendants, where neither defendant had any meaningful contacts with Illinois, since: (1) in course of his duties, officer simply accessed database available to him to determine fairly basic biographical information on plaintiff; (2) officer simply entered existence of arrest warrant that officer had obtained from Indiana court into another database available to Illinois officials; and (3) all of officer's actions took place in Indiana and none of his actions were specifically aimed at Illinois in his efforts to arrest plaintiff. Fact that information officer procured from database was information plaintiff had given to Illinois Secretary of State or that officer had obtained arrest warrant for individual living in Illinois did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing with prejudice plaintiff-prisoner's 2017 section 1983 action, where plaintiff had filed in forma pauperis application that contained deliberate misrepresentations/omissions regarding his financial ability to pay filing fees for said case. Defendant submitted partial trust fund ledger that indicated that he had only $141.34 available to him, but omitted deposits totaling $1,692.10, as well as expenditures of $785.89 from prison commissary that included purchases of television and Reebok basketball shoes. As such, Dist. Ct. could find that plaintiff had not been honest about his ability to pay filing fee, and that said dishonesty warranted that his case be dismissed with prejudice. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in sua sponte dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's 2018 lawsuit on similar grounds, where: (1) Dist. Ct. had previously granted plaintiff's in forma pauperis application in which plaintiff had asserted that he had no income from prior 12 months and had failed to attach trust fund ledger; and (2) Dist. Ct. had failed to give plaintiff opportunity to explain any errors in his in forma pauperis application. Also, while Dist. Ct. had noted that plaintiff had failed to pay previously ordered partial filing fee, it was prison's responsibility to make said payment from plaintiff's trust fund.