Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing as untimely plaintiffs’ complaints, alleging that defendant’s inferior vena cava (IVC) filters were defective, where: (1) plaintiff had directly-filed their cases in instant previously established multidistrict litigation in Southern District Court of Indiana; (2) Indiana applied two-year limitations period for personal injury actions; (3) plaintiffs' home states of South Carolina and Mississippi had three-year limitation periods for said actions; and (4) plaintiffs’ lawsuits would have been timely had they filed their cases in their home states and then had their cases eventually transferred to Southern District Court of Indiana as part of multidistrict litigation process. Record showed that under choice of law rules to which defendant had previously consented, plaintiffs’ lawsuits were governed by law of their originating jurisdictions, as opposed to law of Dist. Ct.’s forum state. Moreover, various case management orders issued by Dist. Ct. provided additional evidence that defendant had implicitly consented to have Dist. Ct. apply choice of law rules from properly identified originating jurisdictions for directly-filed cases. As such, defendant could not reverse course and seek dismissal under Indiana law for directly-filed cases from plaintiffs, whose causes of action had arisen from other jurisdictions and who had directly filed their cases with understanding that their cases would be governed by law of their originating jurisdiction.

Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in granting class action treatment to plaintiff’s lawsuit that raised due process challenges to defendant-City’s ordinance and procedures that allowed defendant to tow and dispose of plaintiff’s vehicle after making determination that said vehicle had been abandoned on defendant’s street. Dist. Ct. had failed to properly analyze plaintiff’s seven claims to determine whether there were common, individual and/or predominant issues regarding whether plaintiff had actual notice that her car would be towed or disposed of, and whether plaintiff’s claims were factual or as-applied challenges. Dist. Ct. further failed to clearly define proposed classes and claims and to properly analyze whether plaintiff, who received notice of defendant’s actions through her daughter, would be adequate representative for all proposed class members in view of Memphis Light, 436 U.S. 1.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider merits of appeal of Bankruptcy Ct.’s order remanding plaintiff-creditor’s foreclosure action to state court. Section 1447(d) provides that order that remands matter to State court from which it had been removed is generally not reviewable on appeal, and 28 USC section 1452(b) limits ability of Ct. of Appeals to review remand orders pertaining to matters relating to bankruptcy cases. As such, both sections 1447d) and 1452(b) precluded Ct. of Appeals from considering merits of remand order under circumstances where Bankruptcy Ct. had made finding that it lacked jurisdiction over foreclosure action because of prior finding that defendants-debtors’ prior bankruptcy discharge did not cover debt at issue in foreclosure action. Defendants also waived any argument on appeal of Dist. Ct.’s award of attorney’s fees and costs associated with remand order, where defendants’ argument against said award of fees and costs was different from their appellate challenge to said award.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s three FOIA requests seeking materials relating to university campuses in foreign countries, as well as documents relating to U.S. Agency for International Development. During course of instant lawsuit, defendant produced some complete and partial records, as well as withheld some documents based on national security and deliberative-process exemptions. Moreover, defendant conducted additional searches based upon agreed-upon keywords to filter already-identified universe of potentially responsive documents. While plaintiff registered objection seven months after defendant had produced its key-word search, Dist. Ct. could properly find that said objection was untimely. Also, Ct. of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s claim that defendant made inadequate search for relevant documents, where: (1) agency’s sworn statements regarding its efforts to satisfy document requests enjoys presumption of good-faith; and (2) defendant provided documentation regarding its extensive, good-faith efforts to satisfy plaintiff’s three FOIA requests. Moreover, fact that plaintiff’ gave suggestion of locations that should have been searched did not require different result, where said locations either: (1) did not exist; (2) were in fact searched; or (3) were unlikely to have contained relevant documents. Too, defendant could properly withhold certain documents under national security exemption, where requests concerned confidential information regarding harassment of education official, as well as information revealed in confidence and information that risked harm to U.S.-Qatari relations.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s qui tam lawsuit under False Claims Act, alleging that plaintiff’s former employer fraudulently billed Medicare and Medicaid for services performed by its anesthesiologists, who, according to plaintiff, regularly billed government using code for “medically directed” services when their services qualified for payment only at lower rate for services that were “medically supervised.” While magistrate judge ultimately found that plaintiff failed to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standards, Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff had satisfied said standards, when ten examples of subject bills provided sufficient particularity about alleged fraudulent billing to survive dismissal. Fact that plaintiff lacked access to relevant billing records and was unable to identify specific false invoices was not fatal to plaintiff’s lawsuit, where: (1) plaintiff alleged that he had direct knowledge of entry of false coding procedures; and (2) plaintiff provided examples of fraudulent billing that identified procedures from specific doctors that should not have been billed at higher medically directed rates.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-City and one of its officer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that officer used excessive force that included grab of plaintiff’s handcuffed arm that caused plaintiff to fall on his face and fracture vertebra. Record contained disputes as to whether officer forcibly grabbed plaintiff’s arm and whether inebriated plaintiff was resisting arrest. Thus, Dist. Ct. improperly concluded that plaintiff was non-compliant, and that officer’s force was minimal. Moreover, because of instant factual disputes, no determination could be made as to whether qualified immunity applied.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) action alleging that defendant-Department of Veterans Affairs was negligent in providing mental health treatment that began in 2011 and continued thereafter, which stemmed from 2011 breast reduction surgery that was performed on plaintiff, such that, according to plaintiff, she incurred permanent mental, emotional and physical injuries. Dist. Ct,. could properly find that plaintiff had improperly split her claim under circumstances, where: (1) plaintiff had previously filed medical negligence FTCA action arising out of same breast reduction surgery; and (2) both lawsuits rested on essentially same facts and concerned same alleged negligence and same transactions or series of related transactions. Ct. rejected plaintiffs contention that instant lawsuit addressed different conduct at different times, where first lawsuit was not confined to Department’s conduct in 2011 and 2012 regarding plaintiff’s breast surgery and was sufficiently aimed at plaintiff’s mental health treatment between 2011 and 2018 that was focus of instant lawsuit. As such, record showed that all requirements had been established for rule against claims splitting, which is subset of res judicata doctrine, where record showed existence of identity of parties and identity of causes of action between two instant lawsuits.

Record did not support jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff in plaintiff-prisoner’s action, alleging that defendants-two prison doctors and entity employing said doctors violated his 8th Amendment rights by being deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by failing to act promptly when he presented symptoms of kidney cancer, such that by time plaintiff had surgery to remove said kidney seven months later, plaintiff’s cancer had spread to his liver. While plaintiff’s claim against entity was focused on entity’s use of its “collegial review” policy, which required entity’s corporate office to pre-approve offsite care except in certain circumstances, and was based on submission of two Lippert reports that contained negative assessment of collegial review policy, both reports contained only hearsay information. And although Dist. Ct. admitted both reports for non-hearsay purpose of showing that entity had prior notice of said experts’ negative assessment of entity’s collegial review policy, second report could not give entity notice of anything, since it was drafted after treatment given to plaintiff. Moreover, first report was insufficient to hold entity liable under Monell, since: (1) plaintiff could only establish single-incident case with respect to entity’s use of collegial review policy, while Monell required plaintiff to show pattern of similar constitutional violations arising out of use of said policy; and (2) plaintiff failed to produce evidence that entity had knowledge that its use of collegial review policy constituted 8th Amendment violation. Also, with respect to defendant’s 8th Amendment claims against both doctors, plaintiff could only show that one doctor’s action in ordering ultra-sound as opposed to CT scan was exercise in medical judgment and was, at best, act of mere negligence. Moreover, plaintiff could not establish causation with respect to other doctor, where plaintiff could not show that said doctor was responsible for any of challenged delays. Defendants, though, did not challenge jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff on his medical malpractice claims. (Dissent filed.)

In underlying action seeking recovery by defendant-widow of individual who died after vessel owned by plaintiff capsized in Lake Superior, Dist. Ct. did not err in instant federal action by initially entering injunction that barred defendant from litigating her claim against plaintiff in any other forum, but then granting defendant’s motion pursuant to “Saving-to-Sailors Clause” in Limitation Act to allow defendant to pursue her claim in state court once defendant had agreed in instant action to limit plaintiff’s liability to $25,000, which plaintiff claimed was amount of its interest in capsized vessel. While plaintiff insisted that any action by defendant had to be litigated in federal court, there is nothing in section 30505(a) that entitles owner of vessel to have federal judge determine liability under instant circumstances, and court in Lewis, 531 U.S. 438, held that where, as here, there is only one claimant, whose claim arising out of capsized vessel does not exceed value of owner’s interest in said vessel, federal court may permit substantive claim to proceed in state court. Ct. further noted that defendant promised not to plead res judicata should plaintiff return to federal court to enforce liability limitation.