Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid claim, plaintiff’s action, alleging that defendants-holders of plaintiff’s investment accounts breached contract and breached fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff, where defendants honored certain withdrawals made on his investment accounts by plaintiff’s daughter pursuant to power of attorney that plaintiff had granted to her. Terms of power of attorney shielded defendant from liability on breach of contract claim, and although plaintiff asserted that contract required defendant to “supervise and direct investments” with respect to his investment accounts, contract imposed no duty to restrict withdrawals made by plaintiff or his attorney-in-fact. Moreover, same result applied to plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary claim, where plaintiff argued that defendant should not have allowed daughter to make certain withdrawals from his accounts, and where language of power of attorney shielded defendant from liability for daughter’s conduct. Also, defendant had no fiduciary obligation to refuse to carry out transactions authorized by power of attorney.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing plaintiffs’ action, alleging that uConnect infotainment system that was installed in defendants’ 2013-2015 Chrysler cars rendered said vehicles vulnerable to cyber attacks. Record showed that magazine article reported about successful hack via uConnect infotainment system into one of defendant’s vehicles, but no other Chrysler vehicle had been subsequently hacked, and plaintiff’s theory of case was that, although alleged defect never manifested itself after hack that was reported in magazine article, plaintiffs nevertheless suffered “overpayment” injury. Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to bring instant lawsuit, where: (1) defendant filed motion to dismiss after completion of discovery and argued, as factual matter, that plaintiffs lacked standing; and (2) plaintiffs failed to point to any evidence of legally cognizable injury to support their overpayment theory, but rather relied on allegations in complaint and legal argument. Fact that Dist. Ct. had previously denied defendant’s motion to dismiss that made facial challenge to plaintiffs’ lack of standing did not require different result, since facial challenges attack standing only on pleadings. Also, plaintiffs could not rely on expert who quantified loss of value related to information about hack to establish their standing, since plaintiffs failed to provide said evidence to Dist. Ct.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendants used excessive force by shooting and killing plaintiffs’ decedent during encounter at police station. Record showed that: (1) decedent was placed in rear seat of squad car and was handcuffed behind his back; (2) decedent was able to maneuver himself so that his hands were now in front; (3) decedent stuck both his hands under his shirt and implied that he had gun when he repeatedly stated that he would “do it;” (4) once officers arrived at police station defendant refused to come out of squad car; (5) officers broke out rear windshield of squad car to obtain better view of decedent, who looked like he was holding something to his chin; (6) decedent came out of squad car through rear windshield opening and kept right hand concealed under his shirt; (7) decedent refused officers’ requests to expose his right hand and began to run to exit door where other officers were standing; (8) K-9 dog grabbed hold of decedent, who was now lying prone on ground; and (9) officer shot decedent (who was unarmed) 8 times after officer heard what he thought was gunshot. Ct. of Appeals found that use of deadly force was reasonable, where decedent had intentionally communicated to officers that he was armed and not afraid to “do it,” and where decedent had rushed toward exit door. Moreover, plaintiff had failed to put forth any cases that established violation of decedent’s constitutional rights, and thus defendants-officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff-prisoner’s motion to amend his complaint for third time in section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-certain prison officials failed to protect him from assault by another prisoner. Plaintiff’s original complaint, as well as first two amendments asserted that plaintiff had told guards stationed in his housing unit that another inmate had threatened him, and plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed for failure of plaintiff to name correctional officers some two years after lawsuit had been filed. In his proposed third amended complaint, plaintiff changed his theory of the case and alleged that two intake clerks had obscured his report of his PTSD condition, and that said clerks had failed to make other officers aware of his PTSD condition that made him more vulnerable to attacks by other prisoners. Dist. Ct. could properly deny plaintiff’s request to file third-amended complaint, where third-amended complaint failed to allege viable theory of liability, where: (1) plaintiff could not plausibly allege that reasonable officers in intake officers’ position would have known about specific risk to plaintiff by other inmate at time of their purportedly wrongful conduct; and (2) first threat to plaintiff from inmate who assaulted him came after intake clerks’ involvement with plaintiff had ended. Fact that plaintiff was housed in general population while suffering from PTSD is not particular enough risk to support failure-to-protect claim.

Ct. of Appeals denied defendants’ request for costs as prevailing parties on appeal, where defendants made request that costs be assessed against plaintiffs’ next friends, instead of plaintiffs, who were children and actual appellees in instant appeal. Defendants’ request is improper, since Rule 39(a)(3) states that: “if a judgment is reversed, costs are taxed against the appellee.” Accordingly, because of children’s status as appellees, defendants could only seek costs against children and not against their agents, such as their lawyers, guardians ad litem and next friends.

Ct. of Appeals vacated Dist. Ct.’s Rule 54(b) partial final judgment that concerned Dist. Ct.’s dismissal of third-party plaintiff’s action against plaintiff’s employer, where third-party plaintiff sought damages for spoilation of evidence, under circumstances where: (1) plaintiff filed products-liability action against defendants-who had designed and installed winch system that plaintiff claimed had caused his personal injuries when cable within winch system broke; and (2) third-party plaintiff, who was also defendant in products liability action, asserted that employer had lost operative parts of winch system, which, according to third-party plaintiff, had hindered its defense in plaintiff’s products-liability action. Plaintiff’s products-liability action was still pending at time instant Rule 54(b) was entered, and Dist. Ct. dismissed spoilation action, after noting that plaintiff had settled his claim against employer and found that employer’s contribution payments to plaintiff were enough to discharge all of employer’s liabilities related to plaintiff’s injuries. Ct. of Appeals found that Dist. Ct.’s certification of appealability under Rule 54(b) of spoilation claim’s dismissal was improper, since plaintiff’s product-liability action and spoilation action were intertwined, and thus outside bounds of Rule 54(b), especially where spoilation claim depended on whether third-party’s defense in products-liability claim was actually hamstrung by loss of physical evidence. As such, third-party plaintiff must wait until products-liability claims are resolved before appealing dismissal of spoilation claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s personal injury action, arising out of 2004 injections of drug Lupron. Illinois’s two-year limitation period applied to plaintiff’s personal injury claims, and record showed that: (1) plaintiff filed her first complaint on April 20, 2010; and (2) variety of personal, legal and medical records showed that as early as 2004, plaintiff believed that Lupron had caused her negative side effects. As such, limitations period started as of that time.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s third-amended complaint, alleging that defendant violated 42 USC section 1981 by assigning contract with plaintiff-company to different company on account of plaintiff owner’s race. Dist. Ct. dismissed original complaint on ground that it was filed by plaintiff’s owner who was not licensed attorney. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, which named plaintiff-company and plaintiff’s owner as plaintiffs, was voluntarily dismissed. Second amended complaint, which named only plaintiff’s owner as plaintiff, was subject of motion to dismiss on ground that plaintiff’s owner was not party to any contract with defendant. Dist. Ct. thereafter granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, but granted plaintiff’s owner ability to file third-amended complaint based on owner’s new allegation that defendant had refused to allow assignment of contract to her. Dist. Ct. also conditioned the filing of the third-amended complaint on plaintiff being able to present proof of her new allegation. Plaintiff’s owner filed third-amended complaint that named different entity as plaintiff but made similar allegations against defendant as first complaint. Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss with prejudice third-amended complaint, where: (1) plaintiff’s owner did not comply with prior Dist. Cut’s order, allowing her to file amended complaint alleging failure to assign contract to plaintiff’s owner; (2) third-amended complaint was filed by plaintiff’s owner who was not licensed attorney; and (3) applicable 4-year limitations period for section 1981 actions had expired.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-prison medical personnel’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by delaying treatment for his ruptured appendix. With respect to defendant-prison doctor, defendant failed to present evidence that doctor was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, even though plaintiff asserted that he experienced delayed treatment for his ruptured appendix and experienced continued ineffective treatment that concerned giving him pain medication, where: (1) prison doctor modified treatment as plaintiff’s symptoms became worse; (2) plaintiff’s blood and urine tests were essentially normal, and plaintiff did not display symptoms associated with ruptured appendix; (3) doctor’s care was not substantial departure from accepted professional judgment; and (4) there was no evidence that prison doctor ever knew of and disregarded substantial risk of appendicitis. Also, defendants-prison nurses were entitled to summary judgment, where: (1) one nurse acted appropriately with respect to initial belief that plaintiff’s pain was caused by pre-existing hernia; and (2) other nurse diligently cared for plaintiff, checked his vitals and relayed necessary information to prison doctor.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying proposed intervenors’ motion to intervene in action by plaintiffs seeking vacatur of “Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds Rule (Rule),” that essentially expanded meaning of “public charge” to disqualify broader set of noncitizens from benefits than earlier policies had done, under circumstances, where: (1) in November of 2020 Dist. Ct. had granted plaintiffs’ relief by vacating said Rule under Administrative Procedure Act; (2) in March of 2021, federal government had dismissed appeals defending instant Rule in courts around country; and (3) in May of 2021, proposed intervenors (various States seeking to defend Rule) filed instant motion to intervene. Dist. Ct. could properly find that instant motion to intervene was untimely, where: (1) proposed intervenors were aware by February of 2021 that federal government was going to abandon defense of instant Rule and to seek to promulgate new rule, and yet waited until May of 2021 to file instant motion to intervene; and (2) by mid-March of 2021, Dist. Ct. could reasonably have determined that it was too late to create entirely new lawsuit through intervention of instant proposed intervenors. Ct. of Appeals also noted that: (1) instant proposed intervention would have exposed original parties to entirely new set of issues; (2) proposed intervenors had other avenues to vindicate their interests; and (3) there were no unusual circumstances to justify instant delay in filing motion to intervene.