Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiff’s ADEA action, alleging that defendant failed to hire him on account of his age, under circumstances where: (1) clerk of court returned plaintiff’s timely-tendered complaint, because Dist. Ct. had issued to plaintiff in 2012 litigation bar based on plaintiff’s history of frivolous lawsuits; (2) litigation bar required plaintiff to pay $5,000 sanction, prevented plaintiff from filing further lawsuits until sanction had been paid, but allowed plaintiff to file motion to lift bar after two years; (3) on 46th day of applicable 90-day EEOC period to file instant lawsuit, defendant asked Dist. Ct. to vacate bar based on frivolous claim that Dist. Ct. Judge who had issued litigation bar was biased; (4) Dist. Ct. denied motion to vacate, but plaintiff did not receive order until 30 days later and nine days after expiration of applicable 90-day period; and (5) two days later, plaintiff filed affidavit of indigence, and Dist. Ct. vacated litigation bar, but then denied plaintiff’s request for equitable tolling and dismissed plaintiff’s lawsuit as untimely. Dist. Ct. could properly find that equitable tolling did not apply, because plaintiff was not diligent in seeking to vacate litigation bar. Fact that clerk’s use of outdated address for plaintiff did not require different result, where plaintiff had otherwise frittered away 90-day period by initially ignoring litigation bar and initially seeking vacatur through frivolous argument of judicial bias. As such, plaintiff had responsibility to act diligently throughout limitations period to avoid risk of clerical error. Ct. further held that plaintiff’s history of filing frivolous actions justified order that he prepay all fees to file new lawsuits in Dist. Ct. and new appeals in Ct. of Appeals.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies plaintiff-prisoner’s action under Americans with Disabilities Act and section 504 of Rehabilitation Act, where: (1) plaintiff fell from upper-bunk in jail cell and incurred broken ankle and other injuries under circumstances, where, according to plaintiff, defendants-jail personnel knew that plaintiff suffered from occasional seizures, but failed to enforce plaintiff’s lower-bunk permit; and (2) plaintiff failed to file grievance within 15 days of his placement in cell that forced him to sleep in upper-bunk. Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies, where record showed that plaintiff had filed prison grievance within 15 days of his injuries, and instant prison rules allowed plaintiff to file grievance within 15 days of “incident,” which included occasion when plaintiff incurred his injuries. Ct. rejected Dist. Ct.’s rationale that plaintiff’s failure to file grievance within 15 days of risk of injury that occurred on day of his placement in cell blocked any complaint about his actual injuries that occurred 28 days later. Moreover, defendants failed to cite to any decision that held that when two events could be subject of intra-prison grievance, grievance filed only after second event always is untimely. As such, plaintiff actually did sufficiently exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing instant lawsuit.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants-State Public Service Commissioners’ motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds plaintiffs’ action that challenged construction of $500 million, 100-mile power line, where instant action, which sought to enjoin enforcement of permit to allow said construction, sued defendants in their official capacities. While sovereign immunity would normally apply, Ct. of Appeals found that Ex parte Young exception to application of sovereign immunity applied, since: (1) instant case sought only prospective relief in form of declaration that two out of three Commissioners who issued permit had labored under conflict of interest; and (2) instant case pertained to alleged ongoing violation of federal law. However, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants' request for abstention under Colorado River, 424 U.S. 800, which allows Dist. Ct. to await outcome of plaintiffs’ parallel state litigation, where there is substantial likelihood that state case would resolve federal claim. This is so, Ct. reasoned, since: (1) plaintiffs raised materially identical due-process recusal claims in both state and federal court; (2) instant case implicates serious state interests regarding operation of Wisconsin administrative law and judicial review of state-agency proceedings; and (3) state case had already advanced toward resolution of due-process claim.

Dist. Ct. did nor err in granting defendants-federal agencies’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s action under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), alleging that defendants released certain documents too slowly and had failed to reveal existence of other records altogether. Gist of plaintiff’s hundreds of FOIA requests lied in conspiracy theory that white-supremacist movement plaintiff had joined was really elaborate sting operation by government. Defendant-FBI, which had located almost 100,000 pages of potentially responsive records, could properly release only 500 pages per month due to finite resources that must be reasonably apportioned among different requesters. Moreover, FBI could properly furnish “Glomar” responses with respect to requests concerning specific individuals, which essentially state that agency would neither confirm nor deny existence of said records, if disclosure would threaten individuals’ privacy by connecting individuals to FBI, where plaintiff failed to provide either written waiver from said individuals, proof of their death, or showing that public interest in disclosing instant alleged conspiracy outweighed privacy interest of said individuals. Also, while defendant-Marshall’s Office delayed by 2 years in sending 1,500 pages of documents pertaining to plaintiff, Dist. Ct. could properly not sanction Marshall’s Office for said delay, where Marshall’s Office explained that delay was caused by staff turnover and staff errors.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that defendant’s removal of plaintiff’s class action claim under Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act was untimely and remanding matter back to state court, where defendant removed action two years after case was filed in state court under circumstances where: (1) defendant argued that plaintiff’s claims were preempted by Labor Management Relations Act due to her union membership; and (2) it removed instant case shortly after plaintiff confirmed her union membership in response to one of defendant’s interrogatories. Applicable 30-day window for exercising removal under 28 USC section 1446(b)(1) applies once pleading or other litigation document provides clear notice that predicates for removal are present, and instant 30-day window started when case was filed in state court or shortly thereafter, since defendant, as plaintiff’s employer, was aware of plaintiff’s union membership at that time. Also, Ct. rejected defendant’s contention that removal was proper under Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), since: (1) CAFA contains exception to CAFA jurisdiction for “home-state controversies,” where two-thirds or more of members of plaintiff’s proposed class and primary defendant are citizens of State in which action is filed; and (2) plaintiff’s class action was limited to citizens of Illinois who were employed by defendant.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss in plaintiffs-medical providers’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendant denied plaintiffs their procedural due process rights by retroactively recalculating their Medicaid reimbursement rates by lowering said rates for three-month period, where, according to plaintiffs, defendant conducted audits, where auditors did not provide plaintiffs preliminary results of audits and did not identify allegedly missing or deficient documents or provide plaintiffs with opportunity to respond prior to instant recalculation made by defendant. Plaintiffs further submit that procedure for reconsideration is inadequate for purposes of due process, because it prohibited them from providing any new evidence not provided to auditors at initial stage of audit to cure any perceived lack of evidence in their initial submissions. Plaintiffs had protected property interest in accurate payments for their services at legally prescribed rate, and plaintiffs sufficiently alleged violation of due process, where relevant Code provisions required that defendants provide plaintiffs with notice of alleged deficiencies and initial conclusions prior to rendering final decision. Moreover, plaintiffs' allegations of procedures used by defendants, including failure to allow plaintiffs to present additional evidence, sufficiently alleged due process violation, where alleged procedures used by defendant lacked basic and fundamental protection against unfair or mistaken findings.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants- prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by refusing his request for exemption from use of black box that defendants used to cover link between inmate’s handcuffs and lock to prevent inmate from picking lock, under circumstances where plaintiff alleged that use of black box caused him great pain. Record showed that: (1) exemptions were based on individual requestor’s medical needs and conditions; and (2) certain medical providers granted plaintiff's exemption while others did not. While plaintiff focused on one medical provider, who had denied all of his exemption requests, said provider nevertheless responded by examining plaintiff, giving him pain medication and referring plaintiff to physical therapy and other examinations. Plaintiff also failed to show that no minimally competent doctor could have made same assessment or that medical provider’s response was so outside of accepted professional standards. Fact that other medical providers granted defendant’s requested exemption did not require different result, and record did not show that any denials of exemption requests were motivated by desire to inflict significant discomfort or pain. Also, plaintiff, in his count against medial entity, could not show existence of per se policy against black box exemption requests, where record showed that plaintiff did receive exemption on certain occasions.