Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff-pension fund’s motion for summary judgment against defendants-owners of entity withdrawing from pension fund, where plaintiff sought to collect $221,932.55 in “withdrawal liability” from withdrawing entity, as well as from its owners, whom plaintiff claimed had participated in trade or business with withdrawing entity under circumstances where entity and its owners were under common control. Record showed that withdrawing entity was conducting its business rent-free on property owned by instant owners, and under Nagy, 714 F.3d 545, leasing property to withdrawing employer is categorically “trade or business” for purposes of establishing withdrawal liability under 29 USC section 1301(b)(1). Ct. also rejected owners’ claim that their ownership of property that was used by withdrawing entity was only passive investment that would not subject them to withdrawal liability, where Ct. found that owners’ rent-free leasing activity with withdrawing entity was simply extension of business operations of withdrawing entity and was means to fractionalize assets of withdrawing entity.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s legal malpractice action against defendants-her lawyer and others, even though plaintiff alleged that defendants duped her into disclaiming $1.5 million mutual fund account owned by her late husband. Late husband’s son had previously filed lawsuit against plaintiff that resulted in jury’s verdict that found that plaintiff had illegally obtained late husband’s assets, including instant mutual fund account, through undue influence. Dismissal of instant lawsuit was proper, where Indiana’s jury finding of undue influence showed that defendants’ advice for plaintiff to disclaim her illegally obtained interest in mutual fund account was neither negligent nor fraudulent, regardless of motive behind said advice. Also, plaintiff could not prevail, even if defendant attorney had wrongfully transferred mutual fund account to late husband’s son instead of late husband’s trust where mutual fund account had been originally held, since plaintiff had no right to said account.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-dog food maker’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-consumer’s action, alleging that defendant violated Wis. Deceptive Trade Practices Act and other related claims, where, according to plaintiff, defendant’s packaging of its dog food product falsely claimed that its dog food was biologically appropriate, was made with fresh regional ingredients that were never outsourced, where plaintiff asserted that defendant’s dog food contained non-fresh and non regional ingredients, as well as BPA and pentobarbital. Plaintiff failed to present evidence, such as consumer surveys, to establish that phrase biologically appropriate was likely to materially mislead reasonable consumer into believing that defendant’s dog food was BPA-free, and plaintiff’s testimony was not enough to establish his claims. Also, plaintiff could not base instant action on presence of pentobarbital in defendant’s dog food, where plaintiff could not show that he purchased dog food that contained pentobarbital. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant’s representation that its dog food was made with fresh and regional ingredients was not misleading, even though some ingredients were not fresh or regional, since: (1) defendant never claimed that all of its ingredients were fresh and regional; and (2) plaintiff failed to present evidence that reasonable consumer would have been misled by defendant’s representations. Too, plaintiff could not proceed on his fraud and negligence claims, where plaintiff failed to show that reasonable consumer would be misled by defendant’s representations about its dog food, or that defendant had duty to disclose risk that its dog food might contain BPA or pentobarbital.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials violated his 4th Amendment rights by keeping him in pre-trial detention based on fabricated evidence. Record showed that plaintiff was released on bond on March 29, 2014, and plaintiff filed instant action on July 18, 2018. As such, instant action was untimely, where: (1) plaintiff had two-year limitation period to file instant claim; and (2) plaintiff’s action accrued on date of his release on bond, as opposed to date that defendant was acquitted on charges at trial. Ct. also rejected plaintiff’s claim that his case was timely because his bond conditions, which required that he attend future court hearings and that he request permission prior to leaving Illinois, constituted “seizure” for time period leading up to his trial.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his 8th Amendment rights by assigning him prison cell over two-month period that had feces on walls, mattress covered in human waste, bunk bed with 100 dead flies and inadequate plumbing that caused him to develop rash. While plaintiff’s complaints were sufficient to establish 8th Amendment violation, record failed to support plaintiff’s claim that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his complaints with respect to his cell, where record showed that defendants attempted to promptly fix said complaints by providing new mattress, disinfecting solvent and gloves, as well as gave plaintiff three showers a week to accommodate him while he awaited repairs on cell’s faucet. Also, plaintiff’s skin condition, which concerned small clogged pore, was too insignificant to support 8th Amendment claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff employee’s action, alleging that defendant’s failure to rehire him into his former position constituted act of discrimination and unlawful retaliation. Dist. Ct. could properly find that doctrine of claim preclusion precluded plaintiff from proceeding in instant case, where: (1) plaintiff had previously filed 2017 claim against defendant, alleging that defendant terminated him from his position on account of his race, color, age and political speech and retaliated against him for making discrimination complaints; (2) plaintiff alleged in instant lawsuit that defendant failed to rehire him into his former position that was at issue in his 2017 action; and (3) plaintiff unsuccessfully asserted in his 2017 claim (that resulted in judgment in defendant's favor) that defendant’s failure to rehire him into his fomer position proved that defendant was attempting to cover up its discrimination and retaliation claims against plaintiff. Also, plaintiff conceded that 2017 action involved same parties as instant lawsuit and was resolved by final judgment on merits. Moreover, instant lawsuit fell within scope of 2017 claim for purposes of applying claim preclusion doctrine, where plaintiff explicitly raised in 2017 action same issue in instant lawsuit regarding defendant’s failure to rehire him in former position.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion under Colorado River abstention principles in staying instant action, where plaintiffs-debtors filed action alleging that defendants-bank and certain bank officials committed fraud during pending state foreclosure action against plaintiffs. Instant federal court action and state-court foreclosure action are sufficiently parallel, even though one bank is not in instant federal action, and another bank and certain individuals are not in state foreclosure action, where parties have similar interests and goals. Also, plaintiffs’ main contention in both lawsuits is that U.S. Bank lacked standing to bring foreclosure action because different bank had physical possession of plaintiff’s mortgage note. Fact that state court might determine that U.S. Bank is not legal holder of plaintiffs’ note, such that resolution of aspects of instant federal action might be needed does not require different result. Moreover, other factors under Colorado River also favored instant issuance of stay order, where: (1) state and federal forums are in close geographical proximity; (2) state foreclosure action would likely dispose of majority of factual and legal issues in federal case; (3) state foreclosure action began in 2011, and instant federal action began in 2019; (4) instant stay (as opposed to dismissal) will protect federal rights of plaintiffs; (5) state court’s proceedings are well-advanced; and (6) there is vexatious nature in instant lawsuit, since it was filed only after state court denied plaintiff’s motion to remove trial judge.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner estate’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant-prison supervisor was deliberately indifferent to prisoner's serious medical condition by acting with indifference to decedent’s symptoms of heroin withdrawal that ultimately led to his death. Record did not support plaintiff’s claim that prison supervisor was aware that prisoner was experiencing opiate withdrawal, where: (1) by 4:00 in afternoon after prisoner had ingested heroin prisoner was still not showing withdrawal symptoms; (2) prisoner was not stating she was experiencing withdrawal symptoms when prison supervisor spoke to her; (3) record showed that prisoner died of diphenhydramine toxicity that resulted in prisoner ingesting ills that were hidden on prisoner and were ingested after supervisor’s shift. As such, no reasonable jury could conclude that prison supervisor was aware that there was substantial risk that prisoner would die of diphenhydramine toxicity from ingesting smuggled pills. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss plaintiff’s Wrongful Death Action, where standard for assessing whether conduct was willful or wanton for purposes of establishing Wrongful Death Act claim is same as deliberate indifference standard that plaintiff did not establish in section 1983 action.

Dist. Ct. lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state-law defamation claims emanating from news stories published in fall of 2016. One named defendant was limited liability partnership, which citizenship status was based on citizenship of each individual partner. However, while none of said partners were citizens of plaintiff’s state, three partners were living in Shanghai or Beijing, China. As such, such partners were “stateless citizens” that could not be sued in diversity, and partnership made up of at least one stateless citizen is itself stateless. Accordingly, instant limited liability partnership cannot be sued in diversity, and its presence in case destroyed complete diversity and precluded Dist. Ct. from having authority to hear case. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that stateless partners should be ignored, and that diversity determination should be based on remaining partners who have state citizenship. Moreover, while Dist. Ct. found that dismissal was appropriate on ground of lack of personal jurisdiction, instant dismissal on ground of lack of diversity must be without prejudice.

In plaintiff’s prosecution in section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-police officials used excessive force and made false arrest on charge of animal cruelty that was ultimately dismissed, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion for mistrial, even though potential juror stated that she might have had negative experience with plaintiff and gave “thumbs up” to one defendant in presence of jurors, since said juror gave only equivocal statement regarding her recognition of plaintiffs, and since juror told Dist. Ct. that she had not discussed specifics of possible negative interaction with plaintiff with any other members of venire. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in disallowing plaintiff to testify about death of friend to explain why he was one minute late to trial, since Dist. Ct. could limit plaintiff’s testimony to issues relevant to substantive issues in instant case, which did not relate to death pf plaintiff’s friend. Too, defense counsel could accurately state that one defendant would be personally liable for any punitive damages award without making any reference to said defendant’s ability to pay, and any failure by Dist. Ct. to give instruction about source of punitive and compensatory damages did not require new trial, since plaintiff failed to show that he was prejudiced by said failure. Furthermore, Dist. Ct. did not err by giving animal neglect instruction with respect to plaintiff’s false arrest claim, even though defendant was arrested on animal cruelty charge, since question for jury was whether defendants had probable cause to make arrest on any offense, as opposed to whether defendants had probable cause to arrest defendant on charged animal cruelty offense.