Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officers and plaintiff’s neighbors’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants subjected him to false arrest on disorderly conduct charge, after plaintiff had dispute with neighbors about branches that plaintiff had cut down from tree that was on border of plaintiff’s property. Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss false arrest claim, since police officers had probable cause to arrest him on disorderly conduct charge, where: (1) one officer heard from witnesses to disturbance that plaintiff had been causing disturbances that included plaintiff calling another individual “a coward,” and attempting to start fight; and (2) officer documented his assessment that plaintiff could pose risk to others. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that officer made warrantless arrest through nonconsensual entry into plaintiff’s home, where Ct. noted that plaintiff had walked out of his home to his porch when arrest was made. Moreover, defendants-police officers could properly invoke qualified immunity on plaintiff’s claim that they had improperly threatened to arrest him on resisting arrest charge if he did not come out of house, where, at time of plaintiff’s arrest, case law was conflicting as to whether police could make such threats.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials and prison medical officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that his nearly 3-year placement in solitary confinement with no-yard privileges violated his 8th Amendment rights. Plaintiff also asserted that he was placed in unsanitary cell with poor ventilation and excessive heat and noise, and that defendants provided inadequate mental-health treatment. Plaintiff’s claim about placement in solitary confinement was waived due to his failure to raise issue in Dist. Ct. Moreover, record showed that lengthy withholding of yard privileges was sanction based on sheer volume of plaintiff’s misconduct, and defendants could properly impose consecutive 90-day periods of no-yard privileges based on separate misconduct violations, where said violations, which included beating guard, spitting on guard, setting fire to cell property and throwing bodily fluids at medical technicians, were not trivial. Also, plaintiff failed to provide evidence regarding frequency, severity or duration of unsanitary cell condition to support said claim, and plaintiff failed to show state-of-mind as to each defendant regarding each of complained about cell conditions. Too, record did not factually support plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference as to his mental-heath treatment, where defendants evaluated plaintiff’s mental condition, developed treatment plan for his mental illness, continuously monitored his condition and adjusted his medication as needed. (Partial dissent filed.)

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider Dist. Ct.’s orders that denied plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel and to seal case file, under circumstances where Dist. Ct. had also granted plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss instant case. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff filed instant case alleging that defendant-University violated Americans with Disabilities Act when it dismissed him from its law school; (2) plaintiff had previously filed unsuccessful similar state-court actions; (3) Dist. Ct. entered order that observed that claims in instant case were precluded by Rooker-Feldman doctrine and were untimely, where dismissal from law school occurred 16 years earlier; and (4) plaintiff took advantage of Dist. Ct.’s option to have him voluntarily dismiss case to avoid potential sanctions under Rule 11. Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal did not result in adverse final judgment from which plaintiff could appeal instant interlocutory rulings he wished to challenge. Fact that Dist. Ct. had granted plaintiff’s motion “with prejudice” did not require different result.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction defendants-police officer’s appeal of Dist. Ct.’s order denying their summary judgment motion in plaintiff’'s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants used excessive force by shooting him three times in effort to apprehend him following high speed car chase through residential area. Dist. Ct. order did not qualify as final order for purposes of seeking appeal, and exception to final decision rule for appeals concerning denial of motion seeking dismissal on qualified immunity grounds did not apply, where Dist. Ct. rightly found existence of multiple questions of material fact on issue as to whether plaintiff was complying with defendant’s directives at time of shooting, and whether plaintiff was reaching for what appeared to be firearm in his waistband at time of shooting. Moreover, defendants’ arguments on appeal required Ct. to resolve said issues based only on defendants’ version of facts.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion to certify proposed class action in plaintiff’s Telephone Consumer Protection Act lawsuit, seeking statutory penalties for itself and on behalf of class of recipients of purportedly unsolicited facsimile advertisements sent by defendant. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff failed to carry its burden of demonstrating predominance, where there was no generalized proof that could be used to resolve issue of prior permission to send faxes on class-wide basis across various methods that defendant used to obtain fax numbers. This is so, Ct. of Appeals found, where defendant demonstrated that it had large variety of contracts, relationships and personal contacts with recipients of instant fax, and that entities such as plaintiff signed franchise contracts in which they agreed to use approved vendors like defendant to stock and furnish their hotels. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that defendant was required to present evidence of permission given by significant percentage of proposed class to defeat class certification.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds plaintiff’s lawsuit alleging that defendant bribed Mexican government officials to sell unregistered medical products in Mexico. Record showed that Mexico was available alternative forum, where defendant consented to service of process and personal jurisdiction in Mexico, and where there was no risk that plaintiff would be wholly deprived of remedy by litigating case in Mexican courts. Moreover. Dist. Ct. could properly conclude as favoring dismissal of case in favor of litigating case in Mexico, fact that: (1) Mexico had relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) availability of compulsory process and costs for attendance of witnesses favored Mexico, where relevant witnesses resided in Mexico; and (3) ease of enforcement of any judgment favored Mexico. Ct. further noted that: (1) purported contracts were executed in Mexico between Mexican parties; and (2) Mexican agents carried out alleged bribery scheme, and any injury occurred in Mexico. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that instant lawsuit presented only local controversy in Indiana, which was defendant‘s home state, and that United Nations Convention Against Corruption treaty altered forum non conveniens analysis, where Ct. held that said treaty did not constitute binding federal law.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion to remand her class action to state court, where plaintiff’s action had been removed by defendants to federal court under Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Plaintiff alleged that defendants had improperly charged her $61.23 in fees for making electronic copies of her medical records, under circumstances where said fees represented costs for making paper copies of her records. While plaintiff argued that defendants had failed to provide good-faith estimate that amount in controversy in instant case exceeded $5 million jurisdictional minimum for CAFA class actions, Ct. of Appeals found that allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, that there were “several thousand” class members, with each having multiple separate claims and with each having up to $25,000 in punitive damages, were sufficient to establish $5 million jurisdictional minimum. Moreover, Ct. looked to one defendant’s statement that said that defendant had fulfilled about 727,500 relevant requests for medical records, which would require proof of average compensatory damages of only $6.88 in overcharges to meet $5 million jurisdictional limit, which was substantially less than plaintiff’s alleged $61.23 compensatory damages. Also, instant matter did not qualify for local controversy exception to assuming jurisdiction under CAFA, where record showed that another class action had been filed within relevant three-year period that had raised similar allegations against one defendant in instant lawsuit. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that exception applied because prior class action was not filed by or on behalf of same purported class of plaintiffs in instant case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials' motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants denied plaintiff his Due Process rights, where defendants placed him in solitary confinement for period of four years without receiving any meaningful review of his solitary confinement status. Dismissal of plaintiff’s lawsuit was proper, where plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing instant lawsuit. Record showed that throughout relevant four-year period when plaintiff was held in solitary confinement, plaintiff failed to appeal any of 35 Reports of Classification Hearing or 21 “30-day reviews” that dealt with plaintiff’s continued need for being housed in solitary confinement. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that administrative exhaustion requirement did not apply to him because prison official has misled him regarding his ability to appeal any of 30-day reviews he had received from prison officials.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison guard and prison hearing officer’s motion for summary judgment, alleging that defendants’ seizure and destruction of papers found in third-party-inmate’s cell violated plaintiff-prisoner’s constitutional rights, under circumstances where third-party inmate was acting as plaintiff-prisoner’s jail-house lawyer in plaintiff’s attempt to file future lawsuit against prison authorities. While plaintiff argued that said seizure and destruction of said records amounted to denial of access to courts, plaintiff failed to show that said seizure and destruction of records created any meaningful impediment to claims plaintiff had sought to bring to court, given plaintiff’s personal knowledge with respect to contents of documents as they pertained to each claim. However, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison guard’s motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s retaliation claim that said seizure was motivated by belief that seizure would lessen chance of complaint being filed against defendant-prison guard, where two other prisoners submitted sworn affidavits indicating that: (1) defendant prison guard told third-party inmate that he intended on telling defendant-hearing officer that documents seized from third-party inmate’s cell were “contraband;” and (2) defendant-prison guard thereafter told plaintiff that “you can’t sue me now,” because of said seizure.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid cause of action plaintiffs’ RICO action against defendants-Church, College and Church leader, alleging that defendant-Church leader sexually harassed them in late 1970s, and that defendant-College conspired with other defendants to cover up said sexual abuse. Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss complaint, where plaintiffs had not alleged injury to their business or property as required for RICO civil actions. Moreover, although plaintiffs asserted that they satisfied injury-to-business or property requirement by alleging that defendants used plaintiffs’ fees and donations to fund sham investigation into their claims of sexual abuse, plaintiffs failed to plead connection between fees paid in 1970s and investigation that took place thirty years later. Also, fact that plaintiffs alleged some pecuniary consequences arising out of sexual abuse, said consequences did not qualify as business or property damages.