Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ lawsuit, alleging that defendant played role in assisting Nazi regime during World War II in stealing possessions of individuals being sent to death camps. Dist. Ct. based dismissal on finding that comity-based abstention applied because plaintiffs should have filed instant lawsuit with French Administrative claims system, even though plaintiffs relied on expropriation exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) to provide jurisdiction for instant lawsuit. However, Ct. of Appeals found that dismissal was proper in instant triple-foreign lawsuit, i.e., plaintiffs alleged that nationals of country other than U.S. were injured by foreign entity in foreign nation, since: (1) Supreme Ct. decision in Nestle USA, Inc., 141 S.Ct. 1931, found that Alien Tort Statute, 28 USC section 1350, does not provide remedy for triple-foreign event and does not apply where wrongful acts are unconnected to U.S. or its citizens; (2) plaintiffs could not base their substantive claims on expropriation exception to FSIA; and (3) plaintiff failed to identify any other basis for their substantive claims. Ct. further noted that had plaintiffs articulated legitimate basis for their substantive claims, then abstention doctrine would have been appropriate basis to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims.

Ct. of Appeals denied plaintiffs-students’ request for injunction pending their appeal of Dist. Ct.’s denial of their request for issuance of preliminary injunction to prevent defendant-University from implementing its policy requiring that all students be vaccinated against COVID-19, or, if students qualified for exemption from vaccination due to either religious or medical concerns, said students would be subject to mask and testing requirements. While plaintiffs, who mostly qualified for vaccination exemption, argued that masking and testing requirements violated their due process rights, case law actually supported defendant’s right to impose on its students vaccine requirement and conditions for exemptions to said requirements to help students remain safe while learning. Ct. further noted that each university may decide what is necessary to keep other students safe in congregate setting.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in its action alleging that Indiana Senate Enrolled Act No. 340 (Act), which requires physicians to report to State any of 25 specified adverse physical or psychological conditions arising from induction or performance of abortion, was unconstitutionally vague. While Ct. of Appeals agreed that certain aspects of Act were not clear with respect to extent to which complications must be caused by abortion itself, and that Act lacked mens rea requirement despite carrying term of imprisonment, it nevertheless found that Act had discernable core that precluded Dist. Ct. from granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and issuing injunction with respect to enforcement of Act, where State agency had not yet issued guidance on Act's application and no state court had attempted to interpret it. Ct. further noted that core of listed abortion complications satisfied void-for-vagueness test applicable to instant facial, pre-enforcement challenge, since Act was understandable by persons of ordinary intelligence and not subject to arbitrary enforcement. Ct. also observed that future, as-applied vagueness challenge to instant Act may have different outcome. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs’ class action claim, alleging that defendant retailer violated Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act by giving customers who purchased extended warranty plan gift card as sole remedy, where defendant could not repair television purchased from defendant, and where said Act required that consumer be given choice between replacement of television or refund of purchase price less depreciation based on actual use. Dist. Ct. lacked federal-question jurisdiction under 28 USC section 1331, since: (1) Magnuson-Moss Act required that plaintiffs show amount-in-controversy of at least $50,000 in alleged damages and plaintiffs had only $5,000 in damages; and (2) plaintiffs failed to name any additional plaintiffs for purposes of aggregating their claims to meet amount-in-controversy threshold. Also, plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege amount-in-controversy that would satisfy Class Action Fairness Act jurisdiction requirement, where plaintiffs failed to make any factual allegations that class action contained at least $5 million in claims. Too, plaintiffs could not establish any diversity jurisdiction under 28 USC section 1332, where plaintiffs’ issues with its $3,000 television could not establish more than $75,000 in controversy between them and manufacturer of television.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state viable cause of action plaintiff-nursing home resident’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant-state-run nursing care facility violated Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA) by failing to keep plaintiff (who has dementia) free from chemical restraints imposed for purposes of discipline or convenience rather than treatment and discharging plaintiff to different facility without meeting certain criteria for doing so. While Dist. Ct. found that FNHRA does not provide plaintiff with private right of action that could be addressed via section 1983 action, Ct. of Appeals found that both provisions of FNHRA at issue in instant case conferred privately enforceable rights upon nursing home residents that were addressable via section 1983 action. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that FNHRA impliedly foreclosed any section 1983 claim because FNHRA provided federal and state enforcement schemes in addition to individualized mechanisms for recourse other than section 1983.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison medical officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs, where defendants failed to refer plaintiff for surgery to repair his hernia. Record showed that over period of several years, plaintiff’s hernia either was not detectable or, when detected, it was always small and reducible. Moreover, plaintiff could not show defendants’ deliberate indifference, where defendants prescribed over-the-counter pain medication and abdominal binders to manage plaintiff’s symptoms. Also, plaintiff’s medical expert did not have any criticism with respect to defendants’ treatment of plaintiff’s hernia, and evidence did not show that defendants persisted in treatment that they knew would be ineffective. Too, fact that plaintiff disagreed with defendants’ course of treatment did not establish his deliberate indifference claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing instant action and remanding matter back to state court under comity abstention doctrine, where plaintiffs-Indiana cities sought declaration in state court that defendants-video-streaming platforms owed them past and future franchise fees under Indiana statute, and where instant action had been removed to federal court. Dist. Ct. could properly base instant dismissal on comity abstention doctrine, where instant action concerned challenge to state taxation of commercial activity, and where instant attempt by plaintiffs to collect revenue is core function of state government. Fact that plaintiffs were local governmental units did not require different result. Also, under Levin, 560 U.S. 413, instant action qualified for application of comity abstention doctrine since: (1) defendants sought federal-court review of commercial matters over which state enjoyed wide regulatory latitude; (2) defendants were seeking federal court aid in endeavor to improve their competitive position vis a vis traditional cable carriers who pay franchise fee; and (3) state courts are better equipped to resolve instant dispute.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that portions of Indiana Statute (Act 334) was preempted by National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), since it allowed state to remove registered voters from its official list without following procedures mandated by NVRA under circumstances where it appeared that voter had moved. Subsection (f)(2) of Act directed county officials to cancel voter’s registration if there appeared to be duplicate registration in different state, and if non-Indiana registration postdated Indiana’s registration. As such, said subsection violated NVRA because it allowed Indiana to cancel voter’s registration either without having obtained direct communication from voter requesting that county remove voter from its voter rolls or without having complied with NVRA’s notice-and-waiting procedures. Dist. Ct.’s injunction, though, was overly broad, where it enjoined other subsections that did not violate NRVA, and where Dist. Ct. did not indicate that Indiana may cancel voter’s registration based solely on voter’s personal authorization of cancellation in Indiana that was first given to another state and then forwarded to Indiana.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated her 4th Amendment rights by entering her home, condemning her home and seizing her 37 cats without having procured warrant. Exigent circumstances supported defendants’ actions, where: (1) officer entered plaintiff’s home under belief that plaintiff was experiencing medical emergency after have received reports that plaintiff’s doctor and neighbor were unable to get in touch with plaintiff, and where plaintiff’s mail and garbage were piling up; (2) fire chief had reasonable basis to condemn plaintiff’s home, where fire chief received police report that home had noxious stench and had experienced said stench himself, such that fire chief could conclude that conditions in home posed danger to plaintiff and public; and (3) seizure of plaintiff’s cats was reasonable, where plaintiff, who was in hospital at time of instant seizure, could not take care of her 37 cats because of condemnation placard prevented her entry into her home. Ct. also rejected plaintiff’s claim that defendants used excessive force when capturing cats, since defendants used cat-catching tool to effectuate seizure. Fact that one cat died did not render said seizure unreasonable.

Dist. Ct. lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under federal question provisions set forth in 28 USC section 1331, where plaintiffs-heath and benefit funds filed lawsuit to hold defendant-newly formed, family-run plumbing company liable for existing ERISA judgment on basis that it stepped into predecessor family company’s obligations. While section 1331 states that Dist. Ct. has original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under Constitution, laws or treaties of U.S., plaintiffs’ action was not expressly recognized under ERISA or any other federal statute so as to supply jurisdiction for resolving instant lawsuit. Moreover, although plaintiffs invoked doctrine of successor liability as theory of recovery, which is recognized under federal common law, plaintiffs have not identified any implied federal right of action to impose successor liability on third-party. Also, plaintiffs could not look to section 1331 to supply jurisdiction, since section 1331 does not itself provide right of action. As such, plaintiffs had no vehicle to bring standalone claim for successor liability into federal court, as instant claim does not “arise under” federal law within meaning of section 1331.