Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in remanding instant case, alleging violation of Illinois Home Care Act, arising out of COVID-19 death of nursing home resident, even though defendant-nursing home removed instant case to federal court by arguing that case necessarily rested on federal law for purposes of removal under 28 USC section 1441(a), and that it was acting as federal officer for purposes of 28 USC section 1442(a)(1). Mere fact that defendant was subject to orders issued by Centers for Disease Control after pandemic began did not turn defendant, as private entity, into public actor, and Ct. of Appeals noted that plaintiff’s complaint under state law was not arguably preempted by any federal law. Moreover, plaintiff’s lawsuit, which alleged that defendant allowed members of its staff to work while ill and failed to isolate residents who had contracted COVID-19 had nothing to do with any federal statute, for purposes of section 1441. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act preempted all claims under state law related to COVID-19.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-school administrators’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs-students’ action, alleging that defendants’ actions in barring plaintiffs from wearing T-shirts bearing images of firearms violated their First Amendment rights. Dist. Ct. found that defendants’ actions were viewpoint neutral and reasonable under standard applicable for speech restrictions in nonpublic forum. Ct. of Appeals, though, found that Dist. Ct. should have used standard set forth in Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, which held that restrictions on student speech are constitutionally permissible if school officials reasonably forecast that speech would materially and substantially disrupt work and discipline of school or invade rights of others. Since standard under Tinker is stricter than test for speech restrictions in nonpublic forums remand was required for new consideration under Tinker test.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff-prisoner’s appeal of Magistrate Judge’s order that only partially granted plaintiff’s motion to unseal certain documents related to government’s application for wiretap warrant. Record showed that plaintiff never sought review of Magistrate Judge’s order with Dist. Ct., and neither plaintiff nor government used direct-appeal procedure under 28 USC section 636(c) by giving consent to entry of final decision by Magistrate Judge.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-University’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs-students’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendant breached contract by failing to remit entire students’ Mandatory Fee during period of time that University shifted to remote learning from in-person instruction during COVID-10 pandemic, even though plaintiffs asserted that failure to remit entire Mandatory Fee, which was used to cover cost of on-campus facilities and programs, violated both Takings Clause of 5th Amendment and Due Process Clause. Plaintiffs could not obtain any monetary award against University, since states and their agencies are not “persons” for purposes of section 1983. Fact that plaintiffs added two individual defendants (University President and Chairperson of its Board) did not require different result, since neither individual was responsible for repayment of Mandatory Fee. Moreover, plaintiffs’ allegations of violation of state-law contract is action lying under state law, and alleged breach of state-law contract does not violate U.S. Constitution.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint, alleging that Indiana Supreme Court decision in Gunderson v. State of Indiana, which held that State of Indiana had exclusive title to Lake Michigan and its shores up to high-water mark, constituted improper judicial taking of their property without compensation, where plaintiffs asserted that property-line should have been set at ordinary low-water mark. Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to pursue instant claim, where, although plaintiff had established personal injury in fact, they failed to show that defendants-state officials either caused their injuries or had ability to redress them, where establishment of relevant property-line arose out of judicial opinion. Ct. further observed that even if plaintiffs had established standing, instant complaint could have been dismissed for failure to state viable judicial taking claim, where plaintiffs failed to allege that low-water mark had been established as relevant property-line prior to Gunderson decision.

Record showed that: (1) Dist. Ct. had denied plaintiff’s motion to add two defendants to plaintiffs’ fraud and breach of contract claim; (2) plaintiffs’ lawsuit resulted in $905,000 judgment in plaintiffs’ favor, although defendants’ motion for new trial remained pending; (3) instead of waiting for lawsuit to become final and to appeal Dist. Ct.’s denial of their request to add two defendants, plaintiffs filed second similar lawsuit against said defendants; and (4) second lawsuit was assigned to different Dist. Ct. judge, who ultimately dismissed second lawsuit on claim preclusion grounds. In plaintiffs’ appeal of dismissal of second lawsuit. Ct. of Appeals, in noting Local Rule 40.4, which permits district court judges to consolidate related cases before single judge, found that: (1) plaintiffs should not be permitted to shop judges by filing second lawsuit; (2) defendants in second lawsuit should have asked for transfer to first lawsuit or stay action in second lawsuit until result in first lawsuit had become final; and (3) second Dist. Ct. judge should have taken steps to see that both lawsuits be handled by one judge. Ct of Appeals, in directing that second lawsuit be remanded for purposes of transferring second lawsuit to Dist. Ct. judge in first lawsuit, observed that second lawsuit was unnecessary, regardless of whether plaintiffs actually prevailed in first lawsuit, where, if plaintiffs did prevail in first lawsuit, they had opportunity to proceed against defendants in second lawsuit in any collection proceeding stemming from first lawsuit.

Ct. of Appeals found that Dist. Ct.’s entry of order dismissing without prejudice petitioner-prisoner’s habeas petition due to petitioner’s failure to exhaust his state-court remedies constituted final and appealable judgment and overruled two cases, Garcia, 792 F.ed 732 and Moore, 368 F.3d 754 that held to contrary. Also, instant appeal was not moot, even though petitioner had been released from prison, where petitioner remained on parole, and petitioner’s claim that he was wrongfully denied good-time credits, if successful, could affect time spent on parole. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing petitioner’s habeas petition, where record showed that petitioner could have pursued his good-time credit restoration claim in state court.

Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to pursue their claims, alleging that defendant-Governor issued series of COVID-19-related executive orders that required Illinois citizens to shelter in place at their residences, compelled non-essential businesses to temporarily cease or reduce their operations and prohibited gatherings of more than 10 people, which, according to plaintiffs, violated their First Amendment rights, as well as their due process and equal protection rights and violated 5th Amendment Takings Clause. Plaintiffs failed to allege type of concrete and particularized injuries required to establish standing, where plaintiffs only made vague allegations such as being subjected to “severe restrictions on their religious liberty,” as well as restrictions on their right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assembly that did not contain any allegation that was specific to particular plaintiff or that described concrete harm. Moreover, while business plaintiffs had standing to pursue Takings Clause claim, where said plaintiffs alleged financial harm arising out of defendant’s executive orders, said plaintiffs failed to allege viable Takings Clause claim, where plaintiffs failed to allege specific facts that showed that defendant’s orders deprived them of all or significant part of their economically beneficial use of their properties.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying class member’s objection to attorney fee award of 25 percent of class action’s $45 million settlement in instant security fraud case. While Dist. Ct. found that proposed 25 percent attorney fee for class counsel was reasonable based on contingent nature of litigation and successful result for class, remand was required for new determination of fee award, where, although class counsel was deserving of multi-million dollar fee, Dist. Ct: (1) did not consider existence of ex ante fee agreement between class counsel and third-party that concerned similar litigation, since said agreement could serve as useful guidepost for determining market rate with respect to instant lawsuit; (2) did not properly consider lower risk of nonpayment, where prior litigation concerning defendant on similar issues had resulted in substantial settlements; and (3) did not give sufficient weight to fact that instant settlement took place at early stage of case so as to warrant reduction in proposed fee.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioning intervenor’s motion to intervene in plaintiff’s civil rights case, under circumstances where: (1) plaintiff alleged that his civil rights were violated when he was detained overnight on out-of-county warrant for another person who had same name and was not permitted to post bail; and (2) petitioning intervenor filed intervention motion on same day that plaintiff had stipulated to dismissal of his case without prejudice and with leave to reinstate case. Dist. Ct. could properly find that motion to intervene was untimely, since: (1) plaintiff had brought case as individual claim and had never alleged case as class action; (2) Dist. Ct. had previously rejected plaintiff’s attempt to bring class action arising out of police treatment of similarly-situated individuals; and (3) petitioning intervenor could not have otherwise relied on plaintiff to protect his interests in instant case so as to excuse instant delay in filing intervention motion, where plaintiff had not brought his case as class action.