Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that defendant’s removal of plaintiff’s class action claim under Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act was untimely and remanding matter back to state court, where defendant removed action two years after case was filed in state court under circumstances where: (1) defendant argued that plaintiff’s claims were preempted by Labor Management Relations Act due to her union membership; and (2) it removed instant case shortly after plaintiff confirmed her union membership in response to one of defendant’s interrogatories. Applicable 30-day window for exercising removal under 28 USC section 1446(b)(1) applies once pleading or other litigation document provides clear notice that predicates for removal are present, and instant 30-day window started when case was filed in state court or shortly thereafter, since defendant, as plaintiff’s employer, was aware of plaintiff’s union membership at that time. Also, Ct. rejected defendant’s contention that removal was proper under Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), since: (1) CAFA contains exception to CAFA jurisdiction for “home-state controversies,” where two-thirds or more of members of plaintiff’s proposed class and primary defendant are citizens of State in which action is filed; and (2) plaintiff’s class action was limited to citizens of Illinois who were employed by defendant.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss in plaintiffs-medical providers’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendant denied plaintiffs their procedural due process rights by retroactively recalculating their Medicaid reimbursement rates by lowering said rates for three-month period, where, according to plaintiffs, defendant conducted audits, where auditors did not provide plaintiffs preliminary results of audits and did not identify allegedly missing or deficient documents or provide plaintiffs with opportunity to respond prior to instant recalculation made by defendant. Plaintiffs further submit that procedure for reconsideration is inadequate for purposes of due process, because it prohibited them from providing any new evidence not provided to auditors at initial stage of audit to cure any perceived lack of evidence in their initial submissions. Plaintiffs had protected property interest in accurate payments for their services at legally prescribed rate, and plaintiffs sufficiently alleged violation of due process, where relevant Code provisions required that defendants provide plaintiffs with notice of alleged deficiencies and initial conclusions prior to rendering final decision. Moreover, plaintiffs' allegations of procedures used by defendants, including failure to allow plaintiffs to present additional evidence, sufficiently alleged due process violation, where alleged procedures used by defendant lacked basic and fundamental protection against unfair or mistaken findings.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants- prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by refusing his request for exemption from use of black box that defendants used to cover link between inmate’s handcuffs and lock to prevent inmate from picking lock, under circumstances where plaintiff alleged that use of black box caused him great pain. Record showed that: (1) exemptions were based on individual requestor’s medical needs and conditions; and (2) certain medical providers granted plaintiff's exemption while others did not. While plaintiff focused on one medical provider, who had denied all of his exemption requests, said provider nevertheless responded by examining plaintiff, giving him pain medication and referring plaintiff to physical therapy and other examinations. Plaintiff also failed to show that no minimally competent doctor could have made same assessment or that medical provider’s response was so outside of accepted professional standards. Fact that other medical providers granted defendant’s requested exemption did not require different result, and record did not show that any denials of exemption requests were motivated by desire to inflict significant discomfort or pain. Also, plaintiff, in his count against medial entity, could not show existence of per se policy against black box exemption requests, where record showed that plaintiff did receive exemption on certain occasions.

Ct. of Appeals granted defendants-federal officials’ motion to stay Dist. Ct.’s order that enjoined defendants from excluding plaintiffs-businesses that offered adult entertainment in form of nude or nearly nude dancing from second round of Paycheck Protection Program (Program), even though Congress excluded plaintiffs’ businesses and other categories of businesses from said Program. Ct. of Appeals found that defendants satisfied standards for obtaining stay of Dist. Ct.’s injunction pending appeal, where plaintiffs are unlikely able to show that denying them subsidized loans under Program violated Constitution. Ct. of Appeals further doubted plaintiffs’ claim that exclusion from Program violated their free speech, First Amendment rights, where Ct. observed that Congress’ exclusion of plaintiffs’ businesses from Program was not attempt to regulate or suppress plaintiffs’ adult entertainment businesses, but rather was choice not to subsidize them. Moreover, selective categorical exclusions from government subsidies do not offend First Amendment in absence of viewpoint or invidious discrimination. Also, defendant’s rationale for exclusion, i.e., to not subsidize deleterious secondary effects of sex-oriented businesses, satisfied rational-relation test and could provide rational basis for Congress to choose not to subsidize them.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant-police officer’s interlocutory appeal from Dist. Ct.’s order, denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment that alleged qualified immunity in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant used excessive force when arresting him. Although defendant’s dashcam captured defendant’s arrest of plaintiff, including moment when defendant tased plaintiff, record supported Dist. Ct.’s finding that when facts were viewed in light most favorable to plaintiff, one reasonable interpretation of dashcam video was that plaintiff was not actively resisting arrest when defendant tased him. Ct. of Appeals rejected defendant’s claim that dashcam video contradicted Dist. Ct.’s finding that video was open to interpretation, and while dashcam video could support defendant’s claim that plaintiff had actively resisted arrest moments before defendant had tased him, Ct. of Appeals’ review of dashcam video did not utterly discredit Dist. Ct.’s finding that there was factual dispute over whether plaintiff was actively resisting arrest when defendant had tased him. As such, instant factual dispute deprived Ct. of Appeals of jurisdiction to consider instant interlocutory appeal. Ct. further observed that Dist. Ct.’s finding did not foreclose availability of qualified immunity at trial.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in dismissing under Rule 4(m) plaintiff’s personal injury action, where record showed that: (1) plaintiff filed instant action two days prior to expiration of limitations period; (2) plaintiff was warned that his lawsuit would be dismissed on March 5, 2019 if plaintiff had not filed proof of service by that date; (3) instead of filing proof of service by March 5, 2019, plaintiff filed motion for change of venue to Northern District of Indiana on that day; (4) after change of venue motion was granted, plaintiff was directed to serve copy of venue order on defendants within five days; (5) plaintiff served venue order, but did not serve summons and/or complaint on defendants at that time; (6) three months later, one defendant filed motion to dismiss case for, among other things, plaintiff’s failure to timely serve summons and complaint; and (7) summons and complaint were served on all defendants between 238 and 244 days after filing of complaint. Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss complaint, where plaintiff missed three opportunities to serve defendant, that included plaintiff’s failure to serve defendants by (1) original 90-day period prescribed under Rule 4(m); (2) March 5, 2019 deadline set by original Dist. Ct.; and (3) three-month period following change of venue. Record also showed that Dist. Ct. methodically considered factors set forth in Cardenas, 646 F.3d 1001 that pertained to instant motion to dismiss and made no factual findings that were clearly erroneous. As such, Dist. Ct.’s dismissal ruling was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. Fact that instant dismissal essentially precluded plaintiff from filing any future complaint because limitations period had expired did not require different result.