Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding plaintiffs-prisoners $52,357.50 in attorney's fees and $1,741.35 in costs incurred in seeking to enforce settlement with defendant-Dept. of  Corrections in class action lawsuit alleging that defendant unlawfully denied hard-of-hearing inmates assistance they needed to communicate and participate effectively in prison programs and services. Settlement required defendant to screen inmates and refer them to licensed audiologists, and defendant admitted to incorrectly sending 700 inmates to hearing-aid salesmen instead of audiologists. As such, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant was in substantial non-compliance with settlement agreement so as support instant fee award, where agreement allowed fee award for "any work" expended by plaintiffs' counsel in litigating any noncompliance with settlement terms. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in finding that defendant must ensure that audiologist evaluations be completed within specific timeframe, where no such obligation was contained in agreement. Ct. rejected plaintiffs' argument that deadline could be implied where no deadline was specified in agreement, and fact that there was no timeframe in agreement did not render agreement absurd, where plaintiffs eventually will receive their evaluations, and where plaintiffs received other benefits under agreement.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff-prisoner's motion for new trial after jury found in favor of defendants-prison officials in section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his 8^th Amendment rights by subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment by beating him and then parading him around naked in front of other prisoners. While plaintiff asserted that he was entitled to new trial, where Dist. Ct. allowed prison nurse to testify as undisclosed expert that there could be possibility of bruising on plaintiff if beating as he described actually occurred, and that she saw no such bruising, said testimony did not constitute expert opinion that was required to be disclosed prior to trial, since it represented only ordinary and percipient observations of nurse or other health care professional. Moreover, any error, if any, was harmless, where plaintiff opened door to such testimony when plaintiff's counsel had previously asked prison nurse if, in her view, it was possible to feel pain without showing visible symptoms. Also, Ct. of Appeals observed that  plaintiff did not establish prejudice in nurse's testimony, where plaintiff essentially lost his case because jury did not find plaintiff credible.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-union's motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-former union member's action, alleging that: (1) defendant's continued deduction of her union dues after she informed union she no longer wanted to be union member violated her First Amendment rights under Janus, 138 S.Ct. 2448; and (2) union's exclusive representation of her interests, even though she is no longer union member, also violated her First Amendment rights. Plaintiff cannot establish that deduction from her wages of union dues she voluntarily agreed to pay in consideration for benefits of her union membership violated her First Amendment rights under Janus, where plaintiff had previously agreed to union's ability to deduct dues unless she gave written notice of her desire to quit union during defined 15-day period, and record showed that although plaintiff gave said notice outside of said 15-day period, union withheld dues only until defined period arrived. Ct. rejected plaintiff's claim that her pre-Janus authorization to deduct dues was product of unconstitutional choice between paying union dues and paying fair share dues. Moreover, exclusive-bargaining-representative provisions of Ill. Public Labor Relations Act are constitutional regardless of whether plaintiff is member of union.

U.S. Supreme Ct. directed Ct. of Appeals to reconsider its prior decision that granted plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of new Indiana statutory restriction on minors' access to abortion, where Ct. of Appeals' prior decision was based, in part, on Whole Woman's Health, 136 S.Ct. 1292, and where U.S. Supreme Ct., in June Medical Services, 140 S.Ct. 2103, issued plurality decision that struck down Louisiana law regulating abortion providers, under circumstances where four dissenting Justices plus one concurring Justice disapproved of decision in Whole Woman's Health. Ct. of Appeals, in applying "narrowest ground" rule set forth in Marks, 430 U.S. 188, for assessing precedential force of Supreme Ct. decisions issued without majority opinions, found that dicta in non-majority opinion in June Medical Services did not overrule otherwise binding precedent in Whole Woman's Health relied upon by Ct. of Appeals in its prior opinion, and thus Ct. of Appeals reaffirmed its decision to affirm Dist. Ct.'s issuance of preliminary injunction to preclude enforcement of requirement that minor's parents be notified that she is seeking abortion through bypass procedure, i.e., court order finding either that abortion is in best interest of minor, or that she is sufficiently mature to make her own decision. (Dissent filed.)

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury's $4 million verdict in favor of plaintiff in plaintiff's section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-police officials violated his constitutional rights in arresting him on murder charge that resulted in his acquittal. Record did not support plaintiff's due process claim arising out of his pre-trial detention, since court in Manuel, 137 S.Ct. 911, abrogated any due process objection to pre-trial detention that had been approved by judge. However, plaintiff had viable 4^th Amendment claim, where jury could properly believe testimony of two eye-witnesses, who stated that defendants-detectives were lying when stating that they had identified plaintiff as one shooter in charged offense. As such, jury could find that plaintiff's arrest and detention were without support. Ct. rejected defendant's argument that plaintiff had no viable 4^th Amendment claim once there was judicial decision holding plaintiff in pre-trial custody.

Plaintiff-debtor lacked standing to pursue her action under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, alleging that defendant-debt collector violated section 1692c(a)(2) by directly communicating with plaintiff after plaintiff notified defendant that she refused to pay debt and/or told defendant to stop communicating with her. While Dist. Ct. granted defendant's motion for summary judgment based on finding that defendant lacked knowledge of plaintiff's cease-communication request, Dist. Ct. should have dismissed case for lack of standing for failure to allege concrete and particularized injury, where plaintiff merely alleged that defendant's dunning letter cause her stress and confusion, which, without any physical manifestation or qualified medical diagnosis, is not sufficient to establish Article III standing.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying request by two class members in instant class action to opt out of settlement of class action so as to allow them to continue in their parallel Ohio state-court action that raised same claims that were at issue in class action, under circumstances where: (1) class members made request to opt out after deadline for doing so; (2) notice of opt-out was sent to instant class members via first-class mail; and (3) instant class members' legal counsel in Ohio state-court action were aware of class action settlement. Ct. rejected class members' contention that notice sent by first-class mail was insufficient notice under due process clause of 5^th Amendment, where there was no evidence that said mail had been returned unopened. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly find that class members' delay in seeking opt-out of class was inexcusable, where their legal counsel was aware of class action settlement. Fact that class members continued their Ohio state-court action did not constitute "reasonable indication" of their desire to exclude them from class, and Dist. Ct. could rely on compliance with its own opt-out directives contained in notice when determining whether instant class members had done enough to opt-out of settlement agreement.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff's lawsuit, alleging that defendants' increase in tolls by 35 percent on heavy trucks traveling over Indiana Toll Road violated Commerce Commission, since said tolls discriminated against interstate commerce. Record showed that State of Indiana received $1 billion from third-party that operated Toll Road for right to raise tolls by 35 percent on heavy trucks, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that State of Indiana, as market participant as opposed to regulator, is exempt from rules ordinarily applied through commerce jurisprudence. Moreover, under Hughes, 426 U.S. 794, where, as here, state participates in marketplace, it is entitled to discriminate in favor of its own citizens. Ct. further found that: (1) instant toll increase is valid, even if treated as discriminatory against interstate commerce; (2) instant per-mile tolls are neutral with respect to truck's ownership since citizens of Indiana also pay said tolls to travel over Toll Road; and (3) plaintiffs are free to use non-toll roads to travel through Indiana.

Dist. Ct. erred in deciding merits of plaintiffs-union and others' section 1983 action, alleging that union's duty of fair representation in Illinois law, without corresponding ability to collect fair share fees from non-union employees, as set forth in Janus, 138 S.Ct. 2448, violated union's First Amendment right to free speech and association. Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring instant action, where plaintiff failed to allege existence of non-union member who demanded representation by union in grievance proceeding. Moreover, instant claim is not ripe for same reason. Fact that such demands by non-union employees are foreseeable in future did not require different result. Also, even if plaintiff had standing to bring instant lawsuit, plaintiffs sued wrong defendants (i.e., Attorney General and Executive Director of Ill. Labor Relations Bd.), where plaintiffs failed to allege that either defendant had threatened or brought any post-Janus enforcement proceeding against union for alleged violation of duty to fairly represent non-union employees.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-former House Speaker's motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-candidate's section 1983 action, alleging that defendant's plan to run two non-competitive candidates to split Hispanic vote in 2016 race for Illinois House District in which defendant and plaintiff were also candidates violated plaintiff's Equal Protection rights, where defendant won said election. Record showed that plaintiff would have lost to defendant without presence of said candidates, where defendant garnered 65 percent of vote, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that voters were not deceived by defendant's alleged plan to run said candidates, where plaintiff exposed said plan to voters prior to date of election. Ct. further observed that Constitution does not authorize judiciary to upset election outcome or to penalize politicians for employing alleged shady strategy that voters actually tolerate.