Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on abstention grounds lawsuit filed by plaintiff-children participating in State of Indiana abuse/neglect proceedings, where Dist. Ct. found that state court should resolve plaintiffs' contention that U.S. Constitution entitled them to appointment of legal counsel, where State of Indiana automatically appoints legal counsel for parents in said proceedings. Unless there is principle requiring counsel in every case, state-court's procedures suffice to allow individuals to argue that lawyer is required in any particular case. As such, because children are not automatically entitled to lawyer in instant civil state-court proceeding, it would be inappropriate for federal court to resolve appointment-of-counsel question in any of plaintiffs' proceedings. Accordingly, state court may either appoint counsel, if it seems necessary, or explain why said appointment is unnecessary, and any ruling can potentially be reviewed by U.S. Supreme Court, if state judiciary ultimately rejects plaintiffs' constitutional arguments.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials' motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated plaintiff's 8th Amendment rights by forcibly injecting him with antipsychotic drug Haldol to treat his mental conditions. Prison's Review Committee could properly have determined that involuntary administration of Haldol was in plaintiff best interests, where plaintiff had previously refused food and medications, threatened suicide and had history of violence during episodes of intense paranoia. While defendant asserted that defendants prescribed course of Haldol injections knowing that he was allergic to said medicine, plaintiff failed to support said contention with any medical evidence, and any side effects of Haldol were common effects that did not constitute excessive risk to plaintiff's health. Also, defendants monitored plaintiff's condition, such that plaintiff could not establish that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, where plaintiff had demonstrated that he was danger to himself. Too, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff's requests for assistance of counsel, where, although plaintiff had mental condition, Dist. Ct. could have properly found that: (1) plaintiff's claims were not so complex so as to require assistance of counsel; (2) plaintiff demonstrated that he understood facts of his case and marshaled said facts into coherent arguments; and (3) presence of counsel would not have made difference in outcome of case.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant breached terms of 2017 Settlement Agreement between parties by filing third-party complaint in Missouri state court action against plaintiff, alleging that plaintiff had violated terms of prior Marketing Agreement between parties that required that plaintiff adequately train its employees when selling insurance policies underwritten by defendant. Terms of 2017 Settlement Agreement provided that parties had agreed that all claims regarding Marketing Agreement that were filed in Cook County litigation or could have been filed in Cook County litigation were deemed to be settled and resolved, and record showed that third-party complaint that defendant filed against plaintiff in Missouri action could have been filed in Cook County action since: (1) it pertained to same allegations that plaintiff had violated Marketing Agreement; and (2) defendant had been aware of underlying Missouri claim prior to effective date of 2017 Settlement Agreement. Dist. Ct. also did not abuse its discretion in awarding plaintiff $108,445.10 in attorney's fees that represented 150 percent of $72,296.73 judgment in instant action, even though 2017 Settlement Agreement provided that any award of attorney's fees be reasonably proportionate to ultimate relief secured by prevailing party. Ct. of Appeals rejected defendant's argument that plaintiff's fee award was capped by one-third of ultimate recovery and further found that said award was reasonable and proportionate, where: (1) plaintiff had actually paid its counsel $210,476.25 in fees for representation in instant action; and (2) instant award was in keeping with fee awards granted under Prison Litigation Reform Act that capped such awards at 150 percent of judgment.
Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff's action alleging that defendant violated Wisconsin statute (Wis. Stat. section 146.83(f)(b)) by charging fees that were greater than permissible fee schedule set forth in said statute, where Dist. Ct. found found that: (1) language in statute imposed duty to charge permissible fees only on "healthcare providers;" and (2) defendant was not healthcare provider, but was only agent of healthcare provider. As such, Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff could only sue defendant's principal, which was healthcare provider. However, subsequent to Dist. Ct.'s holding, Wisconsin Appellate Court expressly disagreed with Dist. Ct.'s analysis in instant case and found that agents of healthcare providers have no greater power to charge fees that were in excess of permissible fee schedule. While Ct. of Appeals noted that Dist. Ct. offered sound reasons for rejecting liability for healthcare records companies such as defendant, since, although agents may fulfill principal's duty under statute, it does not follow that agent must be liable for statutory violations, Ct. of Appeals nevertheless found that it was required to defer to Wisconsin Appellate Court's interpretation of instant Wisconsin statute under circumstances of instant case. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff's unjust enrichment action, since plaintiff cannot seek equitable remedy, where she had remedy at law under Wisconsin statute.
Ct. of Appeals dismissed as moot plaintiff's appeal of Dist. Ct.'s order that rejected plaintiff's lawsuit alleging that Illinois statute (10 ILCS 5/7-10h), that required that plaintiff obtain 5,050 valid signatures from registered voters to run in March 2020 Democratic primary for position on Illinois Supreme Court, was unconstitutional as applied to him, since: (1) he fell 100 valid signatures short of obtaining 5,050 threshold, even though he submitted more than 5050 signatures; and (2) Constitution required that he be allowed to obtain position on ballot because falling within 100 signatures of relevant threshold was within margin of error for document examiners reviewing said signatures. Record showed that by time case had been briefed and argued, primary election had already occurred, and thus there was lack of live controversy in instant action that sought only injunctive relief. Moreover, plaintiff did not satisfy exception to mootness doctrine that instant dispute was capable of repetition, yet bound to evade review, where: (1) it was unlikely that plaintiff would run again and again come within margin of error of required threshold number of signatures; and (2) plaintiff always had adequate avenue of review in state court of any adverse decision regarding disputes regarding obtaining required number of valid signatures to obtain place on primary ballot. Accordingly, remand was required to vacate Dist. Ct.'s judgment on merits of case and to dismiss matter for lack of justiciable controversy.
Dist.Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff-prisoner's multiple request for appointment of counsel in plaintiff's section 1983 action, alleging that his filthy cell conditions and constant hallway lighting violated his 8th Amendment rights. Dist. Ct. properly applied standards set forth in Pruitt, 503 F.3d 647, when denying plaintiff's request for counsel, by noting that plaintiff had prior experience with litigation process and had demonstrated through his pleadings in instant case, which included filing successful amended complaint and prevailing on defendant's motion for summary judgment, that he understood his burden of proof and was fully capable of assembling evidence and marshalling arguments to support his claim. Plaintiff also failed to demonstrate reasonable likelihood that presence of counsel would have made difference in unsuccessful outcome of jury trial, where there was little evidence supporting his allegations of deliberate indifference to his conditions of confinement.
In section 1983 action brought by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that defendants (prison doctor and prison guards) were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in denying several requests by plaintiff for recruitment of counsel and then erred when granting defendant-prison doctor’s motion for summary judgment on merits of claim. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff was competent to prosecute his case based on content of plaintiff’s pleadings, Dist. Ct. failed to conduct particularized assessment of plaintiff’s ability to adequately litigate tasks ahead of him, especially where: (1) jail-house lawyer, who assisted plaintiff in drafting his pleadings, was no longer in plaintiff’s facility; and (2) plaintiff was transferred to different facility, which precluded him from investigating case and interviewing potential witnesses. However, entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants-prison guards was still appropriate in spite of absence of recruited counsel, where plaintiff failed to show that there was reasonable likelihood that presence of counsel would have made difference in case against said defendants, since: (1) plaintiff had history of various mental illnesses that resulted in episodes where plaintiff would self-harm himself in cell; (2) while plaintiff asserted that defendants had failed to protect him from himself, said defendants monitored plaintiff every 10 minutes; (3) on both occasions when plaintiff had self-harmed himself, he received prompt medical care; and (4) plaintiff failed to show that said defendants knew that plaintiff would continue to self-harm himself. With respect to plaintiff’s claim against defendant-prison doctor, record showed that presence of counsel could have made difference in outcome of case (and thus remand was required), where: (1) there was incomplete picture of plaintiff’s medical condition, especially where plaintiff could not take any depositions; (2) plaintiff asserted that prison doctor withheld pain medicine in effort to teach plaintiff lesson about self-harming himself; and (3) recruited counsel could have obtained deposition of prison doctor to explore intent of prison doctor. (Dissent filed.)
Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant-police officer’s appeal of Dist. Ct. order that rejected defendant’s claim for qualified immunity in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated decedent’s 4th amendment rights when defendant fired four shots into car in which decedent was passenger in car that attempted to flee scene of drug sting organized by police. While defendant argued that his actions were reasonable, since his intent when firing into vehicle was to stop threat that vehicle was coming to him, Dist. Ct. identified number of genuine issues of fact regarding what defendant was shooting at when firing his gun and determined that reasonable jury could find that defendant was unreasonable if he intended to hit vehicle or anyone in it, rather than defendant’s claim that he intended to only target driver. Moreover, Dist. Ct.’s finding regarding existence of material facts precluded defendant from appealing Dist. Ct.’s order, where, as here, defendant had not fully accepted plaintiff’s version of facts, when resolving qualified immunity issue.
Dist. Ct. erred in rejecting Magistrate Judge’s pre-trial recommended finding that plaintiff-prisoner had exhausted his administrative remedies for purposes of allowing him to proceed on his complaint that challenged his conditions of confinement. Record showed that: (1) Magistrate Judge held evidentiary hearing and made credibility findings that accepted plaintiff’s version of facts; and (2) Dist. Ct. reviewed record and transcripts, but, without holding hearing, found prison employee’s testimony to be more credible. While Dist. Ct. need not hold separate hearing when accepting Magistrate Judge’s credibility findings, Dist. Ct. must hold de novo evidentiary hearing if it is rejecting Magistrate Judge’s material credibility findings. As such, plaintiff was entitled to remand for new evidentiary hearing before Dist. Ct. to resolve administrative exhaustion issue.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for judgment as matter of law filed by defendant (entity providing medical services to prison) after jury rendered $25,000 in favor of plaintiff-prisoner in section 1983 action alleging that 20-month delay in plaintiff’s obtaining surgery to reconstruct damaged ACL violated his 8th Amendment rights. Dist. Ct. could properly exclude plaintiff’s proffered evidence regarding delays in medical care attributed to defendant in four other prisoner cases, since circumstances in those cases either did not concern defendant’s “collegial review process” that required off-site physician review of medical file of prisoner seeking off-site treatment, or lacked evidence that requested services were medically appropriate. Moreover, defendant’s collegial review process was not unconstitutional on its face, and instant delay was attributable to medical judgment of off-site physician who initially recommended against surgery until it became absolutely necessary. As such, instant delay cannot be attributable to deliberate indifference, especially when off-site reviewing doctor regularly assessed whether it was medically appropriate for plaintiff to received ACL surgery.
