Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his 4^th Amendment rights by holding him in pretrial detention without probable cause and by ignoring and fabricating evidence to detain him. Record showed existence of probable cause on armed habitual criminal charge, where: (1) defendant’s vehicle was stopped for traffic violation; (2) police found gun next to defendant in car he was driving; and (3) police were aware that defendant had been convicted of two or more felonies at time of his arrest. Police were not required to release defendant, even though defendant claimed that gun belonged to other individual in car. Fact that police may have seen other individual handle gun did not require different result, since police still had probable cause to believe that defendant and other individual jointly possessed said gun. Ct. also rejected plaintiff’s claim that police violated his due process rights by fabricating evidence to keep him confined, since 4^th Amendment, and not Due Process Clause, governs any claim for wrongful pretrial detention.

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that defendant-County’s Christmas display in front of its courthouse that contained nativity scene, as well as secular objects, including Santa’s sleigh, reindeer and striped poles violated Establishment Clause of First Amendment. Supreme Court’s recent case of American Legion, 139 U.S. 2067, displaces purpose and endorsement tests in context of Establishment Clause challenges to nativity scenes in passive Christmas displays on government property. Moreover, Ct. of Appeals found that under historical analysis test as set forth Lynch, 465 U.S. 668, instant nativity scene was constitutional in that it fit within long national tradition of using nativity scene in broader holiday displays that depicted historical origins of Christmas, as well as other symbols of Christmas, including origins of Christmas holiday. Ct. also noted that there was no evidence that government’s historical support of instant Christmas display was either intolerant or discriminatory towards differing views. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff-employee’s request for class action certification in plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant-employer failed to properly calculate overtime pay for its employees. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff’s proposed class of 37 co-workers failed to satisfy Rule 23’s numerosity requirement. While plaintiff’s proposed class came close to threshold number of 40 class members that court in Orr, 953 F.3d 490 recognized as sufficient to satisfy numerosity requirement, Dist. Ct. properly considered proposed class’s geographic dispersion, which indicated that all but two members lived within 50 miles of courthouse where plaintiff had filed lawsuit, as well as fact that plaintiff otherwise failed to produce any evidence indicating that joinder of proposed class members’ claim would be impractical. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly note that statutorily authorized attorneys’ fees would lower barrier to filing suit caused by small damage awards at stake in instant claims.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-prison medical personnel were deliberately indifferent to his medical condition, where plaintiff incurred injuries after defendants allowed him to personally apply caustic medication to treat his genital warts, where language on packaging for said medication advised that said medication should only be applied by physician. Plaintiff’s complaint contained no allegations that would draw inference that defendants actually knew about, but disregarded, substantial risk of harm to plaintiff’s health or safety, and plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that defendants had requisite state of mind were insufficient to state cause of action. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in dismissing on timeliness grounds plaintiff’s negligence claims in 2019 complaint against instant defendants, even though plaintiff failed to allege said negligence claim in original 2015 complaint. Record showed that plaintiff had previously filed motion for voluntary dismissal under 735 ILCS 5/13-217, and instant complaint was filed within one year of said dismissal. As such, plaintiff could bring instant negligence claim, since it arose out of “same transaction” at issue in his timely deliberate indifference claim in original complaint.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant-city manager violated plaintiff’s First and 14th Amendment rights by retaliating against it by recommending that city not go forward with Preliminary Development Incentive Agreement (PDA) that would provide plaintiff with $2.5 million in Tax Increment Financing for redevelopment of hotel property. PDA provided that all contingencies outlined in agreement had to be satisfied prior to city providing financial incentive, and defendant based his recommendation on plaintiff’s failure to complete project with any source of income other than $2.5 million at issue in PDA. Plaintiff based retaliation claim on contention that defendant blocked PDA because attorney member of plaintiff exposed unflattering information about defendant and named him in discovery in connection with unrelated 2017 lawsuit. While plaintiff asserted that member’s representation of client in 2017 lawsuit fell within First Amendment right to petition govt. for redress of grievances, plaintiff failed to state viable retaliation claim, since: (1)  client in 2017 lawsuit, as opposed to plaintiff, had engaged in protected activity; and (2) plaintiff could not rely on another plaintiff to support plaintiff’s own retaliation claim. Also, plaintiff could not establish viable due process claim because PDA and contract for purchase of hotel that was contingent on PDA provided only right to acquire property and not right in property itself. Too, plaintiff failed to establish viable class-of-one equal protection claim, where defendant stated rational basis for recommending that plaintiff not receive financing under PDA.

Dist. Ct. did not err in remanding back to state court plaintiff’s action, alleging that defendant violated section 15(c) of Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) that precluded defendant from selling, leasing, or otherwise profiting from person’s/customer’s biometric identifier or biometric information, where Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff lacked Article III standing to bring her case in federal court. Burden was on defendant to establish plaintiff’s standing in federal court, where defendant had removed action to federal court, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff alleged only bare statutory violation that did not demonstrate any kind of concrete or particularized injury that would support standing, and where complaint conceded that neither plaintiff nor any class member suffered any injury as result of violation of section 15(c) of BIPA. Fact that plaintiff could have alleged concrete injury arising out of defendant’s alleged sale of her data to others did not require different result. As such, plaintiff was entitled to have her case remanded back to state court, where Illinois standing requirements are more liberal, and choose to have her case rely exclusively on state law.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in action that challenged constitutionality of Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) requirement that plaintiffs (individuals who relocated to Indiana from other states) register as sex offenders, where: (1) plaintiffs were registered as sex offenders under other states’ SORAs; and (2) State of Indiana would not require that its own citizens with similar criminal histories register as sex offenders. Ct. of Appeals found that Indiana’s SORA, as applied to plaintiffs, violated their right to travel between states, where Indiana placed exclusive reliance upon another state’s decision to require plaintiffs to register under that state’s SORA, and where Indiana necessarily uses plaintiffs’ travel to Indiana as trigger for its own registration requirement. Moreover, Indiana’s SORA also imposes obligations on plaintiffs that are not imposed on individuals who committed their crimes as residents of Indiana prior to enactment of relevant portions of Indiana’s SORA, and who had maintained citizenship in Indiana. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in rejecting plaintiff’s claim against defendants-Wisconsin Elections Commission, Governor, Secretary of State and others, that defendants’ manner of appointment of presidential electors, as well as manner of administration of presidential election, including polling place operations, voting procedures and vote tallying violated Electors Clause of U.S. Constitution. Record showed no violation of Electors Clause, where: (1) Wisconsin expressly assigned to Elections Committee responsibility for administration of Wisconsin election law; and (2) Wisconsin lawfully appointed its electors in manner directed by its Legislature. Moreover, allegations regarding Commission’s exercise of its authority are matters of state law, and plaintiff’s delay in bringing instant action until after election day and after certification of votes precluded him from seeking instant relief at this juncture.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant’s motion for remittur or for new trial, after jury awarded plaintiff $1,000,000 in compensatory damages arising out of car accident in which plaintiff sought damages for his physical injuries, but no punitive damages, medical costs, lost wages or emotional damages. Record showed that Dist. Ct. had granted defendant’s motion and gave plaintiff choice of accepting $250,000 or new trial. Plaintiff thereafter accepted new bench trial, but then presented no evidence at second trial and requested award of $0 in damages, which plaintiff described as “verdict of silence.” Record at first trial showed that plaintiff potentially suffered just whiplash and mild concussion, and thus Dist. Ct. could properly find that remittur or new trial was appropriate remedy, since jury’s $1,000,000 verdict was outrageous given limited nature of plaintiff’s injuries and limited nature of his damages request. Fact that plaintiff ultimately received no damages did not require different result since plaintiff in essence requested zero damages at second trial.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff-pre-trial detainee’s request for class action certification of his lawsuit, alleging that defendant’s “paper triage” policy, that required pre-trial detainees to submit health service request form with respect to detainee’s request for dental services, but failed to provide any face-to-face assessment by jail medical personnel of pre-trial detainee’s dental pain prior to detainee receiving care from dentist that occurred between three and thirty days after said request for dental care, violated 14^th Amendment. Plaintiff failed to satisfy commonality requirement for class action treatment, where claims of every proposed class member would not rise or fall based on resolution of whether paper triage policy existed, and where consideration as to whether said policy was objectively unreasonable required individualized, plaintiff-specific assessments. Plaintiff also failed to satisfy typicality element of Rule 23(a)(3), since dental services request of each class action member presented fundamentally unique circumstances.