Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff employee’s action, alleging that defendant’s failure to rehire him into his former position constituted act of discrimination and unlawful retaliation. Dist. Ct. could properly find that doctrine of claim preclusion precluded plaintiff from proceeding in instant case, where: (1) plaintiff had previously filed 2017 claim against defendant, alleging that defendant terminated him from his position on account of his race, color, age and political speech and retaliated against him for making discrimination complaints; (2) plaintiff alleged in instant lawsuit that defendant failed to rehire him into his former position that was at issue in his 2017 action; and (3) plaintiff unsuccessfully asserted in his 2017 claim (that resulted in judgment in defendant's favor) that defendant’s failure to rehire him into his fomer position proved that defendant was attempting to cover up its discrimination and retaliation claims against plaintiff. Also, plaintiff conceded that 2017 action involved same parties as instant lawsuit and was resolved by final judgment on merits. Moreover, instant lawsuit fell within scope of 2017 claim for purposes of applying claim preclusion doctrine, where plaintiff explicitly raised in 2017 action same issue in instant lawsuit regarding defendant’s failure to rehire him in former position.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion under Colorado River abstention principles in staying instant action, where plaintiffs-debtors filed action alleging that defendants-bank and certain bank officials committed fraud during pending state foreclosure action against plaintiffs. Instant federal court action and state-court foreclosure action are sufficiently parallel, even though one bank is not in instant federal action, and another bank and certain individuals are not in state foreclosure action, where parties have similar interests and goals. Also, plaintiffs’ main contention in both lawsuits is that U.S. Bank lacked standing to bring foreclosure action because different bank had physical possession of plaintiff’s mortgage note. Fact that state court might determine that U.S. Bank is not legal holder of plaintiffs’ note, such that resolution of aspects of instant federal action might be needed does not require different result. Moreover, other factors under Colorado River also favored instant issuance of stay order, where: (1) state and federal forums are in close geographical proximity; (2) state foreclosure action would likely dispose of majority of factual and legal issues in federal case; (3) state foreclosure action began in 2011, and instant federal action began in 2019; (4) instant stay (as opposed to dismissal) will protect federal rights of plaintiffs; (5) state court’s proceedings are well-advanced; and (6) there is vexatious nature in instant lawsuit, since it was filed only after state court denied plaintiff’s motion to remove trial judge.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner estate’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant-prison supervisor was deliberately indifferent to prisoner's serious medical condition by acting with indifference to decedent’s symptoms of heroin withdrawal that ultimately led to his death. Record did not support plaintiff’s claim that prison supervisor was aware that prisoner was experiencing opiate withdrawal, where: (1) by 4:00 in afternoon after prisoner had ingested heroin prisoner was still not showing withdrawal symptoms; (2) prisoner was not stating she was experiencing withdrawal symptoms when prison supervisor spoke to her; (3) record showed that prisoner died of diphenhydramine toxicity that resulted in prisoner ingesting ills that were hidden on prisoner and were ingested after supervisor’s shift. As such, no reasonable jury could conclude that prison supervisor was aware that there was substantial risk that prisoner would die of diphenhydramine toxicity from ingesting smuggled pills. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss plaintiff’s Wrongful Death Action, where standard for assessing whether conduct was willful or wanton for purposes of establishing Wrongful Death Act claim is same as deliberate indifference standard that plaintiff did not establish in section 1983 action.

Dist. Ct. lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state-law defamation claims emanating from news stories published in fall of 2016. One named defendant was limited liability partnership, which citizenship status was based on citizenship of each individual partner. However, while none of said partners were citizens of plaintiff’s state, three partners were living in Shanghai or Beijing, China. As such, such partners were “stateless citizens” that could not be sued in diversity, and partnership made up of at least one stateless citizen is itself stateless. Accordingly, instant limited liability partnership cannot be sued in diversity, and its presence in case destroyed complete diversity and precluded Dist. Ct. from having authority to hear case. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that stateless partners should be ignored, and that diversity determination should be based on remaining partners who have state citizenship. Moreover, while Dist. Ct. found that dismissal was appropriate on ground of lack of personal jurisdiction, instant dismissal on ground of lack of diversity must be without prejudice.

In plaintiff’s prosecution in section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-police officials used excessive force and made false arrest on charge of animal cruelty that was ultimately dismissed, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion for mistrial, even though potential juror stated that she might have had negative experience with plaintiff and gave “thumbs up” to one defendant in presence of jurors, since said juror gave only equivocal statement regarding her recognition of plaintiffs, and since juror told Dist. Ct. that she had not discussed specifics of possible negative interaction with plaintiff with any other members of venire. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in disallowing plaintiff to testify about death of friend to explain why he was one minute late to trial, since Dist. Ct. could limit plaintiff’s testimony to issues relevant to substantive issues in instant case, which did not relate to death pf plaintiff’s friend. Too, defense counsel could accurately state that one defendant would be personally liable for any punitive damages award without making any reference to said defendant’s ability to pay, and any failure by Dist. Ct. to give instruction about source of punitive and compensatory damages did not require new trial, since plaintiff failed to show that he was prejudiced by said failure. Furthermore, Dist. Ct. did not err by giving animal neglect instruction with respect to plaintiff’s false arrest claim, even though defendant was arrested on animal cruelty charge, since question for jury was whether defendants had probable cause to make arrest on any offense, as opposed to whether defendants had probable cause to arrest defendant on charged animal cruelty offense.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to reopen his personal injury case, after his case was dismissed for want of prosecution, where counsel had missed series of scheduled court conferences, and where counsel was warned that failure to attend any future scheduled conference without providing timely notice would result in dismissal of instant case. Only denial of plaintiff's second post-judgment motion was properly before Appellate Court, since Dist. Ct. improperly granted plaintiff's section 2107(c) motion for extension of time to file notice of appeal from judgment dismissing case for want of prosecution, since plaintiff could not establish excusable neglect, where excuse for failing to file timely notice of appeal was misunderstanding of Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A). Also, counsel's claim that one of his staff members had repeatedly failed to calendar court conferences did not provide reasonable excuse for counsel's failure to attend said conferences, since counsel should have exercised his own diligence in monitoring disposition of instant case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-Sheriff and certain jail employees failed to protect him from severe beating he received from other prisoners, under circumstances where plaintiff had told three jail workers that he would be attacked by said prisoners and defendants failed to protect him from said attack. Relevant procedural rules required that plaintiff file grievance with jail prior to filing instant action, and while plaintiff had filed grievance alleging that one guard had failed to come to his aid during attack, said grievance was substantively distinct from allegations in instant complaint that defendants had failed to protect him prior to attack. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff’s Monell claim against County was time-barred, since it was filed beyond applicable two-year limitations period, where record showed that defendant filed instant claim almost three years after plaintiff learned that his appeal of prison grievance had been denied. Fact that County had subsequently initiated internal affairs investigation concerning attack on plaintiff did not toll limitations period, since plaintiff would not have obtained any remedy arising out of said investigation. Moreover, record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in favor of defendant-Sheriff in plaintiff’s ADA claim, alleging that defendant had discriminated against him based on his disability by failing to accommodate his disability, where, although plaintiff maintained that he was paralyzed and confined to wheelchair, jury could properly find that plaintiff had lied about his physical condition and/or his need for wheelchair given medical testimony indicating that plaintiff had no neurological injury.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison medical personnel’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that: (1) defendant-nurse was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical risk by directing him to take certain medication that was given to him under circumstances where said medication was actually prescribed for different prisoner, and where plaintiff had serious adverse reaction to said medication; and (2) defendant-health services manager failed to intervene on his behalf in violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff also asserted that defendants-nurses and officers responsible for giving him said medication were negligent under Wisc. law. While plaintiff did not file response to defendants’ summary judgment motion, Dist. Ct. erred in noting that defendants were entitled to summary judgment merely because plaintiff had failed to file response. However, plaintiff's failure to file response entitled Dist. Ct. to deem as admitted, facts contained in defendants’ motion, and, under said facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that defendant-nurse who directed plaintiff to take medication after defendant had adverse reaction, was deliberately indifferent to serious medical risk, where said nurse was not involved in plaintiff’s medical care. Moreover, same result applied to defendant-health services manager, where plaintiff failed to identify underlying constitutional violation that had occurred by failing to intervene on his behalf. Also, plaintiff failed to comply with Wisc. statute with respect to his negligence claim, since plaintiff failed to use defendants’ correct names in his notice of claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action, plaintiff's section 1983 action alleging that defendants-county prosecutor (in his official capacity) and two deputy prosecutors (in their individual capacities) maliciously prosecuted him in violation of his due process rights when they filed untimely amendment to his original charges and secured conviction on amended charge. While plaintiff requested $50 million in damages for his confinement and for past and future physical and emotional damages, plaintiff failed to state cause of action against county prosecutor, since: (1) county prosecutor was state official, and thus instant lawsuit, which was filed in prosecutor's official capacity, was in essence action against State of Indiana; and (2) instant lawsuit fell outside scope of section 1983 because State of Indiana is not "person" that can be sued under section 1983. Also, defendants-deputy prosecutors enjoyed absolute immunity from instant lawsuit for their conduct in filing untimely charging amendment, where filing and amending criminal charges against defendants are core prosecutorial functions. Ct. further observed that plaintiff's claim, which stemmed from prosecutors' decision to make untimely amendment in violation of Indiana law, did not trigger any federal claim that was addressable under section 1983.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing without prejudice plaintiff-debtor's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) action, alleging that defendant-debt collector sent letters to plaintiff that stated inconsistent debt amounts and unclearly identified plaintiff's creditor. Plaintiff lacked standing to sue defendant under FDCPA because she failed to allege that instant letters harmed her in any way. Moreover, plaintiff admitted that she did not pay anything extra on her debt, and that she properly disputed alleged debt that was not warranted. Also, plaintiff's alleged injury that she was confused and aggravated by defendant's letters did not constitute sufficient injury in fact to support Article III standing to pursue instant lawsuit. Too, plaintiff's mere allegation of FDCPA statutory violation alone does not cause injury in fact.