Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-former girlfriend and two police officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully evicting him from former girlfriend’s home, where, according to plaintiff, said eviction constituted unreasonable seizure of his possessory interest in former girlfriend’s home. Plaintiff failed to adequately allege that he had possessory interest in former girlfriend’s home to support any Fourth Amendment claim, where plaintiff had paid no rent over six-year period, had no lease and asserted that he had no ability to prevent former girlfriend from going through and mingling with his property within her home. As such, plaintiff held only revocable license to remain in former girlfriend's home, and former girlfriend could revoke his license to remain in her home at any time, such that plaintiff was trespasser at time former girlfriend called police to remove him from her home. Fact that former girlfriend had previously been told by other police that she needed court order to remove plaintiff from her home did not require different result. Ct. of Appeals also entered order directing clerks from district courts to return plaintiff’s unfiled civil pleadings for two-year period as sanction for plaintiff having filed series of frivolous actions.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiffs’ request to enjoin defendants from enforcing Indiana rule that counted absentee ballots only if they were received by noon on Election Day. While Dist. Ct. found that said rule was unconstitutional because pandemic created risk that absentee ballots mailed close to Election Day would not be received on time, Ct. of Appeals found that there is no constitutional right to vote by mail, where, as here, state provided ability of voters to vote in person. Fact that some people are unwilling to vote in person did not make otherwise-valid voting system unconstitutional, and state had rational basis to require absentee ballots to be received by Election Day, just as in-person voting ends on Election Day. Ct. further noted that Dist. Ct. should not have entered injunction so close to Election Day.

Ct. of Appeals granted defendant’s-Wisconsin Legislature’s motion to stay injunction imposed by Dist. Ct. that essentially extended certain deadlines for online and mail in registration, enforcement of requirement that clerk mail all ballots and receipt of mailed ballots. Wisconsin Legislature has standing to represent State of Wisconsin’s interest in validity of state laws (as found by Wisconsin Supreme Court), and Dist. Ct. should not have entered instant injunction only six weeks prior to November election. Moreover, Ct. observed that: (1) although pandemic has had consequences on elections, instant extension of deadlines was difficult to justify, where voters have already had long time to cast ballots while preserving social distancing; and (2) decisions on how best to cope with difficulties caused by pandemic are principally reserved for elected branch of government as opposed to courts. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs-voters’ request for issuance of preliminary injunction in action alleging that Indiana statute’s extension of absentee ballots to elderly citizens, but not to all citizens, violated Twenty-Sixth Amendment by abridging younger citizens’ right to vote. Indiana’s absentee-voting regime does not affect plaintiffs’ right to vote, since all citizens can vote on election day or during early election period. Also, fact that COVID-19 pandemic might affect plaintiffs’ determination as to whether to cast in-person ballot on election day did not violate equal protection clause. Also, fundamental right to vote concerned only ability to cast ballot, but not right to do so in manner preferred by voter, and state had rational basis for extending right to cast absentee ballot to only elderly citizens.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing without prejudice under derivative jurisdiction doctrine, plaintiff’s amended complaint seeking to have defendants reinstate plaintiff as Social Security payee for his daughter. Plaintiff filed original complaint in state court, and defendants removed said action to federal court under federal officer removal statute (28 USC section 1442) and then moved to dismiss instant action under derivative jurisdiction doctrine, which provides that if state court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s complaint, federal court did not have subject matter jurisdiction upon removal. Moreover, plaintiff did not contest that state court lacked jurisdiction over his complaint, and fact that plaintiff filed amended complaint that invoked for first time federal jurisdiction under 28 USC section 1361 after case had been removed did not require different result. Ct. of Appeals further observed that party seeking to assert derivative jurisdiction doctrine must do so within 30 days from removal, which defendants did in this case.

Ct. of Appeals granted three motions seeking leave to file amicus curiae briefs in instant appeal concerning Dist. Ct.'s dismissal of plaintiff’s action alleging violations of Clean Water Act. While defendant opposed said motions, Ct. of Appeals found that each amicus curiae brief met requirement that brief offered content that was either different, new and/or important from content in parties’ briefs.  Specifically, contents of briefs addressed: (1) history of Illinois groundwater regulations; (2) alternative federal scheme in absence of Clean Water Act regulation; and (3) case law’s application into existing federal scheme involving pollutants at issue in instant case. Ct. further noted that amicus curiae briefs should not merely repeat party’s position.

Ct. of Appeals found that intervenors (Wisconsin Legislature, Republican National Committee and Wisconsin Republican Party), who defended certain statutes that pertained to registration of voters and conduct in this November’s election in action seeking extension of certain statutory deadlines, lacked standing to appeal Dist. Ct.’s order that extended deadlines for online and mail-in registration, as well as deadlines for delivery of absentee ballots and receipt of mailed ballots. Dist. Ct. did not order Republican National Committee or Wisconsin Republican Party to do or forbid them from doing anything, and neither entity argued that new deadlines would violate any constitutional rights of their members. Moreover, state legislature was not entitled to represent Wisconsin's interest in sustaining validity of enacted legislation, since such power belonged exclusively to Wisconsin’s executive branch.

Dist. Ct. did not err in ultimately denying request under 28 USC section 1782(a) by party in foreign private arbitration proceeding for Dist. Ct. to issue subpoena to compel U.S. entity to produce documents for use in London, England arbitration. Ct. of Appeals agreed with Dist. Ct. that section 1782(a) does not permit Dist. Ct. to order discovery for use in private foreign commercial arbitrations, where Ct. of Appeals found that term “tribunal” in section 1782(a) applied only to state-sponsored foreign and international tribunals.

Ct. of Appeals granted plaintiffs’ petition for writ of mandamus after determining that Dist. Ct. had erred in granting defendants’ motion to stay proceedings pending resolution of defendants’ petition for writ of certiorari that had yet to be filed in U.S. Supreme Ct. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff filed challenge to their pre-2008 property tax assessments; (2) Dist. Ct. dismissed said challenge, and Ct. of Appeals reversed, after finding that Dist. Ct. had jurisdiction to consider said challenge; and (3) Dist. Ct. granted defendants’ motion for stay, after reasoning that consideration of challenge would be without effect if U.S. Supreme Ct. had granted certiorari petition and found in defendants’ favor on merits of appeal. Dist. Ct.’s grant of defendants’ request for stay was in direct opposition to Ct. of Appeals’ mandate and conflicted with “mandate rule,” where Ct. of Appeals had reversed Dist. Ct. original judgment and remanded matter for further proceedings, since Dist. Ct. was required to comply with express or implied ruling of Ct. of Appeals’ decision. Fact that defendants had previously and unsuccessfully moved for stay of mandate with Appellate Ct. after said mandate had been issued did not require different result. As such, defendants’ only recourse was to seek stay with U.S. Supreme Ct.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s $13.3 million verdict in favor of plaintiff in his section 1983 action, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated where defendants: (1) used his coerced confession to obtain convictions on murder charges that were eventually vacated via state’s motion after plaintiff had served 21 years on life sentence; (2) fabricated evidence against plaintiff and conspired to violate his constitutional rights; and (3) failed to intervene to prevent certain constitutional violations. While defendants argued that case should have been dismissed as sanction for plaintiff giving two false statements in his deposition, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in not dismissing case, where plaintiff’s false statements about seeing third-party get arrested or about fact that he had never spoken to different individual did not concern core issues in plaintiff’s case and were otherwise fully exposed at trial. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting plaintiff's certificate of innocence, since said certificate was highly relevant to plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim, and jury was otherwise instructed not to decide whether plaintiff had committed charged offenses in criminal case. Also, while Dist. Ct. gave jury fabrication of evidence instruction that improperly failed to explain that plaintiff had burden to prove that said evidence was used at trial and was material to his conviction, said error was harmless, where record showed that plaintiff’s coerced confession and defendants’ fabricated line-up report were actually used at trial, and that said evidence was material to his convictions.