Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing with prejudice for failing to state viable cause of action plaintiffs’ state-court actions, alleging that defendants used deceptive labels that advertised their parmesan cheese as “100%” cheese, where ingredients list stated that product contained between four to nine percent added cellulose powder and potassium sorbate. While Dist. Ct. held that accurate ingredients list would dispel any confusion about contents of product, Ct. of Appeals found that accurate fine-print list of ingredients does not foreclose as matter of law claim that ambiguous front label deceives reasonable consumers, and that plaintiffs should have opportunity to show as matter of fact that ambiguous language in label actually misleads consumers, especially where plaintiffs alleged that 85 to 95 percent of consumers understood “100%” Grated Parmesan Cheese” to mean that product contained only cheese without additives. Fact that product was displayed on un-refrigerated shelf did not require different result. Ct. rejected defendant’s contention that instant state-law claims are preempted because federal law permits their labeling. Ct. further dismissed plaintiffs’ appeals with respect to their actions against two defendants, where: (1) Dist. Ct. dismissed all claims against said defendants without filing separate Rule 58(a) judgments as to said cases; (2) 150-day rule as set forth in Rule 58(c) applied so as to render said dismissals final orders 150 days after entry of said dismissal orders; and (3) plaintiffs failed to file notice of appeal within 30 days after 150^th day from dismissals.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison doctors and prison healthcare provider's motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his eye infection that resulted in loss of his eye. While plaintiff contended that defendants breached applicable standard of care by failing to promptly refer him to specialist and failing to provide medications on timely basis, plaintiff failed to show that one treating doctor acted with deliberate indifference, where: (1) plaintiff’s symptoms while in said doctor’s care were consistent with conjunctivitis and that said doctor acted within appropriate duty of care when treating said condition; and (2) expert evidence indicated that any indication of corneal infection that caused loss of eye would have appeared only after plaintiff last saw said doctor. Also, plaintiff’s failure to provide expert testimony about optometrist standard of care precluded him from proceeding on any medical malpractice claim against said doctor. Too, plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against another prison doctor failed, where said doctor timely referred plaintiff to eye specialist on urgent basis and acted appropriately in following recommendations and diagnosis received from other doctors. Moreover, plaintiff could not proceed under Monell theory against private provider of medical services to prison, where plaintiff failed to establish any indifference claim against prison doctor supplied by said private entity.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(2) motion for new trial in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-City and certain police officers had fabricated evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence that resulted in plaintiff’s murder conviction. Original trial resulted in $80,000 jury verdict in favor of plaintiff as to one police defendant and verdicts in favor of all other defendants. In support of said motion, plaintiff alleged that he learned within months after original trial in 2014 that key witness for defendants would not be incarcerated until 2027 as represented by defendants during trial, but rather was released from prison in 2014 pursuant to apparent agreement by witness to provide favorable testimony for defendants. As such, plaintiff’s newly discovered evidence regarding witness’s prisoner status cast doubt on credibility of said witness that would have cut at heart of defendants’ case so as to justify Dist. Ct.’s grant of new trial, which subsequently resulted in jury’s award of $22 million in compensatory damages at second trial against two police defendants and defendant City. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly set aside result of first trial under Rule 60(b)(3) based on finding of either fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct arising out of misrepresentation regarding witness’s prisoner status. Dist. Ct. also properly granted plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion for new trial with respect to defendant-City after finding that Dist. Ct.’s limitation on discovery unfairly prevented plaintiff from obtaining and investigating “street files” held by police department with respect to other defendants that could have supported plaintiff’s claim that City had custom of wrongdoing that withheld exculpatory evidence contained in said files not only in plaintiff’s case but for other defendants facing criminal charges. Too, record supported jury’s verdict against City in second trial, where plaintiff produced evidence that there was systemic underproduction of exculpatory materials to prosecutors and defense counsel. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant's (supervisor at Agency and Disability Resource Center of Marinette County, Wisconsin (ADRC)) motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant violated plaintiff’s due process rights by failing to include plaintiff’s residential care facilities in ADRC’s directory for potential residents to peruse. Record showed that Wisconsin’s ADRC Operational Practice Guidelines provided that directory could not include plaintiff's facilities that had been found in violation of state, federal or municipal law, and plaintiff failed to show that she had protected property interest in ADRC’s listing of her facilities in directory for purposes of asserting any due process rights. Moreover, plaintiff had only non, unilateral expectation that her facilities would be listed in ADRC’s directory. Also, plaintiff could not establish any violation of her equal protection rights, where plaintiff failed to present evidence either that her race played any role in decision to exclude her facilities from ADRC’s directory, or that defendant’s explanation that guidelines prevented her from including plaintiff’s facilities in directory was pretext for race discrimination.

Dist. Ct. erred in remanding to state court plaintiff’s claim under section 15(a) of Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, where Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff lacked Article III standing to pursue said claim. Plaintiff asserted that defendant failed to comply with section 15(a), which requires private entities in possession of biometric data to develop, publicly disclose and implement retention schedule and guidelines for destroying data when initial purpose for collecting said data had ended. Moreover, plaintiff’s section 15(a) claim sufficiently alleged legally protected privacy right so as to support Article III standing, where: (1) plaintiff did not allege mere procedural failure to publicly disclose data-retention policy, but rather asserted concrete and particularized invasion of her privacy interest in her biometric data, where defendant allegedly retained her biometric data after her employment had ended. As such, plaintiff could pursue her claim in federal court. Ct. further noted, though, that instant case raised issue as to whether plaintiff’s section 15(a) claim was preempted by Labor Management Relations Act as suggested in Miller, 926 F.3d 898.

Dist. Ct. did not err in vacating arbitration panel’s decision that reversed plaintiff’s award of contract to operate vending facilities at certain govt. facilities to third-party under Randolph-Sheppard Act, which provides blind persons with employment opportunities. In July of 2011, plaintiff awarded bid to third-party at two sites based on scores generated during interviews with all applicants. Defendant-applicant appealed plaintiff’s decision to arbitration panel. However, during said appeal, plaintiff invited applicants to re-interview for contract for both sites and eventually awarded contract to said sites in 2013 to same third-party, under circumstances where defendant-applicant did not participate in said process. Dist. Ct. could properly vacate panel’s decision, where: (1) panel used wrong standard of review, i.e., substantial evidence, instead of preponderance of evidence to reverse plaintiff‘s decision, where defendant-applicant had burden of proof to show that plaintiff’s bid award to third-party violated law; (2) panel’s findings of fact that plaintiff’s use of 2013 profitability data in bid awarding process, as well as plaintiff’s failure to consider defendant-applicant’s six-sentence letter of recommendation were prejudicial to defendant-applicant were not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) panel’s award of contract to defendant-applicant was arbitrary and capricious, especially where defendant-applicant had not participated in 2013 re-interviewing process.

Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing sanctions in amount of $271, 926.92 for defendants’ costs and fees spent in defending instant action seeking royalties under withdrawal agreement, under circumstances where various arbitrators had previously found that third-party alone was responsible for said royalties. Dist. Ct. could properly find that prior arbitration holdings were binding and final on plaintiffs, given fact that withdrawal agreement required that all disputes be submitted to arbitration and that instant lawsuit was premised on same foundational issues previously decided in arbitrations. Moreover, sanctions were proper, where instant lawsuit was precluded, and language in withdrawal agreement rendered instant lawsuit frivolous. Also, amount of sanctions was reasonable, where: (1) although hourly fees of defendant’s counsel, i.e., $973 and $1,092, were above median rate, record showed that counsel’s clients actually paid them; and (2) plaintiffs failed to overcome presumption that amount of time spent on matter was reasonable, where defendants actually paid counsel $271,926.92 at issue in instant sanctions order.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-employer and other police officials’ motion for summary judgment, alleging that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity in plaintiff-police employee’s action, asserting that defendants violated her Second Amendment rights by terminating her because she had shot third-party in self-defense during off-duty physical altercation with third-party. Defendants based termination on plaintiff’s violation of personnel rules prohibiting city employees from discharging firearm that result in injury to another person, and plaintiff claimed that her termination violated her Second Amendment right to use her firearm in self-defense. However, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, since, although relevant case law recognized constitutional right to possess firearm, no case law has recognized Second Amendment right to use firearm for self-defense. Ct. further rejected plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, where relevant collective bargaining agreement that allowed plaintiff to grieve her termination provided plaintiff with sufficient post-deprivation due process to address her termination.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated decedent's 4th Amendment rights by using excessive force when causing decedent’s death during encounter in which defendants attempted to detain decedent to protect himself and others and to take decedent to hospital for evaluation of his mental heath. On day of encounter in 2016, defendant police-officer held belief since 2010 that decedent had mental health problems, and decedent seemed disorientated and incoherent when officer approached decedent. After decedent began to flee, three officers gave chase and eventually subdued decedent by grabbing his shoulder, bringing him to ground, placing him in handcuffs and, after decedent continued to struggle, wrapping his legs. Shortly after decedent’s legs were subdued, officers determined that decedent was not breathing and attempted CPR, but decedent eventually died. Autopsy determined that decedent died from cardiac arrhythmia, and medical evidence showed no other cause of death that related to claim of excessive force. Defendants acted legally to detain decedent and used reasonable force in response to decedent’s continued resistance. Also, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, since defendants’ conduct was similar to use of force displayed in Estate of Philips, 123 F.3d 586, during similar encounter with mentally ill person. Too, while defendants’ use of force, when combined with decedent’s other health problems, resulted in decedent’s death, defendants’ use of force did not constitute “deadly force,” because force used by defendants did not carry substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm. Defendants were also entitled to absolute immunity under section 4-102 of Ill. Tort Immunity Act with respect to plaintiff’s state-law claims, since defendants were attempting to obtain mental health detention of decedent at time of encounter.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin defendants’ enforcement of Indiana statute that limited circumstances for extending election polls’ closing hours, even though plaintiff argued that said statute burdened right to vote by creating multiple step process that left voter unable to petition court to extend poll hours. Defendants were entitled to stay of injunction pending appeal, since there was likelihood that defendants would succeed on appeal, since: (1) instant statute did not place burden on any Indiana resident’s constitutional right to cast ballot; and (2) nothing in instant statute restricted voters’ right to file section 1983 action to seek redress for any constitutional right to vote. Ct. also observed that Dist. Ct. should not have entered any election-related injunction only five weeks prior to November election day, especially where instant statute had been enacted more than one year prior to filing instant lawsuit.