Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison medical officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs, where defendants failed to refer plaintiff for surgery to repair his hernia. Record showed that over period of several years, plaintiff’s hernia either was not detectable or, when detected, it was always small and reducible. Moreover, plaintiff could not show defendants’ deliberate indifference, where defendants prescribed over-the-counter pain medication and abdominal binders to manage plaintiff’s symptoms. Also, plaintiff’s medical expert did not have any criticism with respect to defendants’ treatment of plaintiff’s hernia, and evidence did not show that defendants persisted in treatment that they knew would be ineffective. Too, fact that plaintiff disagreed with defendants’ course of treatment did not establish his deliberate indifference claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing instant action and remanding matter back to state court under comity abstention doctrine, where plaintiffs-Indiana cities sought declaration in state court that defendants-video-streaming platforms owed them past and future franchise fees under Indiana statute, and where instant action had been removed to federal court. Dist. Ct. could properly base instant dismissal on comity abstention doctrine, where instant action concerned challenge to state taxation of commercial activity, and where instant attempt by plaintiffs to collect revenue is core function of state government. Fact that plaintiffs were local governmental units did not require different result. Also, under Levin, 560 U.S. 413, instant action qualified for application of comity abstention doctrine since: (1) defendants sought federal-court review of commercial matters over which state enjoyed wide regulatory latitude; (2) defendants were seeking federal court aid in endeavor to improve their competitive position vis a vis traditional cable carriers who pay franchise fee; and (3) state courts are better equipped to resolve instant dispute.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that portions of Indiana Statute (Act 334) was preempted by National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), since it allowed state to remove registered voters from its official list without following procedures mandated by NVRA under circumstances where it appeared that voter had moved. Subsection (f)(2) of Act directed county officials to cancel voter’s registration if there appeared to be duplicate registration in different state, and if non-Indiana registration postdated Indiana’s registration. As such, said subsection violated NVRA because it allowed Indiana to cancel voter’s registration either without having obtained direct communication from voter requesting that county remove voter from its voter rolls or without having complied with NVRA’s notice-and-waiting procedures. Dist. Ct.’s injunction, though, was overly broad, where it enjoined other subsections that did not violate NRVA, and where Dist. Ct. did not indicate that Indiana may cancel voter’s registration based solely on voter’s personal authorization of cancellation in Indiana that was first given to another state and then forwarded to Indiana.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated her 4th Amendment rights by entering her home, condemning her home and seizing her 37 cats without having procured warrant. Exigent circumstances supported defendants’ actions, where: (1) officer entered plaintiff’s home under belief that plaintiff was experiencing medical emergency after have received reports that plaintiff’s doctor and neighbor were unable to get in touch with plaintiff, and where plaintiff’s mail and garbage were piling up; (2) fire chief had reasonable basis to condemn plaintiff’s home, where fire chief received police report that home had noxious stench and had experienced said stench himself, such that fire chief could conclude that conditions in home posed danger to plaintiff and public; and (3) seizure of plaintiff’s cats was reasonable, where plaintiff, who was in hospital at time of instant seizure, could not take care of her 37 cats because of condemnation placard prevented her entry into her home. Ct. also rejected plaintiff’s claim that defendants used excessive force when capturing cats, since defendants used cat-catching tool to effectuate seizure. Fact that one cat died did not render said seizure unreasonable.

Dist. Ct. lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under federal question provisions set forth in 28 USC section 1331, where plaintiffs-heath and benefit funds filed lawsuit to hold defendant-newly formed, family-run plumbing company liable for existing ERISA judgment on basis that it stepped into predecessor family company’s obligations. While section 1331 states that Dist. Ct. has original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under Constitution, laws or treaties of U.S., plaintiffs’ action was not expressly recognized under ERISA or any other federal statute so as to supply jurisdiction for resolving instant lawsuit. Moreover, although plaintiffs invoked doctrine of successor liability as theory of recovery, which is recognized under federal common law, plaintiffs have not identified any implied federal right of action to impose successor liability on third-party. Also, plaintiffs could not look to section 1331 to supply jurisdiction, since section 1331 does not itself provide right of action. As such, plaintiffs had no vehicle to bring standalone claim for successor liability into federal court, as instant claim does not “arise under” federal law within meaning of section 1331.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff-pension fund’s motion for summary judgment against defendants-owners of entity withdrawing from pension fund, where plaintiff sought to collect $221,932.55 in “withdrawal liability” from withdrawing entity, as well as from its owners, whom plaintiff claimed had participated in trade or business with withdrawing entity under circumstances where entity and its owners were under common control. Record showed that withdrawing entity was conducting its business rent-free on property owned by instant owners, and under Nagy, 714 F.3d 545, leasing property to withdrawing employer is categorically “trade or business” for purposes of establishing withdrawal liability under 29 USC section 1301(b)(1). Ct. also rejected owners’ claim that their ownership of property that was used by withdrawing entity was only passive investment that would not subject them to withdrawal liability, where Ct. found that owners’ rent-free leasing activity with withdrawing entity was simply extension of business operations of withdrawing entity and was means to fractionalize assets of withdrawing entity.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s legal malpractice action against defendants-her lawyer and others, even though plaintiff alleged that defendants duped her into disclaiming $1.5 million mutual fund account owned by her late husband. Late husband’s son had previously filed lawsuit against plaintiff that resulted in jury’s verdict that found that plaintiff had illegally obtained late husband’s assets, including instant mutual fund account, through undue influence. Dismissal of instant lawsuit was proper, where Indiana’s jury finding of undue influence showed that defendants’ advice for plaintiff to disclaim her illegally obtained interest in mutual fund account was neither negligent nor fraudulent, regardless of motive behind said advice. Also, plaintiff could not prevail, even if defendant attorney had wrongfully transferred mutual fund account to late husband’s son instead of late husband’s trust where mutual fund account had been originally held, since plaintiff had no right to said account.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-dog food maker’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-consumer’s action, alleging that defendant violated Wis. Deceptive Trade Practices Act and other related claims, where, according to plaintiff, defendant’s packaging of its dog food product falsely claimed that its dog food was biologically appropriate, was made with fresh regional ingredients that were never outsourced, where plaintiff asserted that defendant’s dog food contained non-fresh and non regional ingredients, as well as BPA and pentobarbital. Plaintiff failed to present evidence, such as consumer surveys, to establish that phrase biologically appropriate was likely to materially mislead reasonable consumer into believing that defendant’s dog food was BPA-free, and plaintiff’s testimony was not enough to establish his claims. Also, plaintiff could not base instant action on presence of pentobarbital in defendant’s dog food, where plaintiff could not show that he purchased dog food that contained pentobarbital. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant’s representation that its dog food was made with fresh and regional ingredients was not misleading, even though some ingredients were not fresh or regional, since: (1) defendant never claimed that all of its ingredients were fresh and regional; and (2) plaintiff failed to present evidence that reasonable consumer would have been misled by defendant’s representations. Too, plaintiff could not proceed on his fraud and negligence claims, where plaintiff failed to show that reasonable consumer would be misled by defendant’s representations about its dog food, or that defendant had duty to disclose risk that its dog food might contain BPA or pentobarbital.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials violated his 4th Amendment rights by keeping him in pre-trial detention based on fabricated evidence. Record showed that plaintiff was released on bond on March 29, 2014, and plaintiff filed instant action on July 18, 2018. As such, instant action was untimely, where: (1) plaintiff had two-year limitation period to file instant claim; and (2) plaintiff’s action accrued on date of his release on bond, as opposed to date that defendant was acquitted on charges at trial. Ct. also rejected plaintiff’s claim that his case was timely because his bond conditions, which required that he attend future court hearings and that he request permission prior to leaving Illinois, constituted “seizure” for time period leading up to his trial.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his 8th Amendment rights by assigning him prison cell over two-month period that had feces on walls, mattress covered in human waste, bunk bed with 100 dead flies and inadequate plumbing that caused him to develop rash. While plaintiff’s complaints were sufficient to establish 8th Amendment violation, record failed to support plaintiff’s claim that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his complaints with respect to his cell, where record showed that defendants attempted to promptly fix said complaints by providing new mattress, disinfecting solvent and gloves, as well as gave plaintiff three showers a week to accommodate him while he awaited repairs on cell’s faucet. Also, plaintiff’s skin condition, which concerned small clogged pore, was too insignificant to support 8th Amendment claim.