Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on pleadings plaintiff's section 1983 action, alleging that officer violated plaintiff's substantive due process rights when he drove through residential streets at speeds up to 98 m.p.h. to reach routine traffic stop and crashed into decedent's car, and where defendant-City failed to adequately train its police officers to avoid such encounters. Plaintiff seeking relief under section 1983 for violation of her substantive due process rights must plead sufficient facts to establish that officer acted with criminal recklessness. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts to permit inference that defendant-officer knew of danger he created and consciously disregarded it, Ct. of Appeals held that complaint adequately alleged viable substantive due process claim, where: (1) officer was never requested by other officers to assist them in apprehension of individual in otherwise routine traffic stop; (2) with no justification, officer chose to race through residential streets at speeds up to 98 m.p.h. and drove through red light to hit decedent's car, which was traveling in accordance with traffic lights; and (3) jury could find that officer displayed criminal recklessness to known risk. Also, plaintiff adequately alleged viable cause of action against defendant-City based on failure-to-train theory, where: (1) City was aware that officer had previously operated his vehicle at high rate of speed over 50 m.p.h. on three occasions in spite of telling all of its officers not to drive over 50 m.p.h.; and (2) defendant never reprimanded anyone for failing to abide by said directive or took steps to prevent this behavior.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs-father and his children's section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-DCFS personnel violated their First and 14^th Amendment rights by engaging in series of events that culminated in state court order in divorce proceeding that temporarily suspended father's visitation rights that, according to plaintiffs, infringed on their right to familial association. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring constitutional challenge to section 5/607.6(d) of Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, which bars all communications made in counseling session from being used in any manner in litigation, where plaintiffs failed to allege that named defendant, i.e. DCFS Acting Director, played any role in enforcing said section. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on abstention grounds plaintiffs' complaint alleging violations of plaintiffs' substantive and procedural due process rights arising out of DCFS report regarding agency's failed attempt to implement safety plan, which involved father and which led to limitation of father's visitation rights, since (1) plaintiffs filed instant complaint when state court proceeding regarding father's custody of his children was still pending; and (2) instant lawsuit constituted improper attempt to compel adjudication of claims that would inject federal court into contested and ongoing family court dispute.

In defamation action alleging that defendants made false statements to plaintiff's employer about plaintiff providing false statements to Colorado state court action involving plaintiff's husband, Dist. Ct did not err in refusing plaintiff's requests to allow her either to present closing argument herself or to hire new counsel, after her trial counsel, according to plaintiff, suffered "severe collapse of cognitive function" at time closing arguments were set to take place at trial. Some of plaintiff's arguments in this regard were akin to claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, where plaintiff asserted that her trial counsel was not prepared. However, plaintiff was not entitled to new trial, since: (1) civil litigants have no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel; (2) plaintiff's only remedy is malpractice action against trial counsel, as opposed to remand for new trial; and (3) Dist. Ct. had good reason to suspect that plaintiff would not follow rules if allowed to give her own pro se closing argument. Moreover, trial counsel's request to continue closing arguments over weekend was granted, and trial counsel eventually gave capable closing argument on behalf of plaintiff. Also, Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error in omitting jury instruction on her defamation claim against one defendant, where plaintiff failed to show that outcome of trial would have been different had said instruction been given to jury, where jury, which had been given appropriate instructions regarding defamation claim against other defendant, found that other defendant did not commit defamation in making exact same statements that formed basis of defamation claim against defendant at issue in omitted instruction.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction plaintiff's section 1983 and related Illinois state court actions, alleging that defendants-Indiana city and police official had subjected plaintiff to unreasonable seizure, when defendant-officer: (1) had mistakenly identified plaintiff as individual who had intimidated confidential informant; and (2) had taken actions that eventually led to plaintiff's arrest in Illinois and then release next day after error had been discovered. Dist. Ct. lacked personal jurisdiction over both defendants, where neither defendant had any meaningful contacts with Illinois, since: (1) in course of his duties, officer simply accessed database available to him to determine fairly basic biographical information on plaintiff; (2) officer simply entered existence of arrest warrant that officer had obtained from Indiana court into another database available to Illinois officials; and (3) all of officer's actions took place in Indiana and none of his actions were specifically aimed at Illinois in his efforts to arrest plaintiff. Fact that information officer procured from database was information plaintiff had given to Illinois Secretary of State or that officer had obtained arrest warrant for individual living in Illinois did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing with prejudice plaintiff-prisoner's 2017 section 1983 action, where plaintiff had filed in forma pauperis application that contained deliberate misrepresentations/omissions regarding his financial ability to pay filing fees for said case. Defendant submitted partial trust fund ledger that indicated that he had only $141.34 available to him, but omitted deposits totaling $1,692.10, as well as expenditures of $785.89 from prison commissary that included purchases of television and Reebok basketball shoes. As such, Dist. Ct. could find that plaintiff had not been honest about his ability to pay filing fee, and that said dishonesty warranted that his case be dismissed with prejudice. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in sua sponte dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's 2018 lawsuit on similar grounds, where: (1) Dist. Ct. had previously granted plaintiff's in forma pauperis application in which plaintiff had asserted that he had no income from prior 12 months and had failed to attach trust fund ledger; and (2) Dist. Ct. had failed to give plaintiff opportunity to explain any errors in his in forma pauperis application. Also, while Dist. Ct. had noted that plaintiff had failed to pay previously ordered partial filing fee, it was prison's responsibility to make said payment from plaintiff's trust fund.

Magistrate Judge did not err in finding that defendant-Clerk of Cook County violated two Shakman consent decrees entered in 1972 and 1991 that concerned defendant's hiring practices and in refusing defendant's request to vacate said decrees. Both decrees were designed to curtail practices that conditioned government employment on political patronage, and record supported plaintiffs' claims that defendant unilaterally changed list of political positions that were exempt from hiring oversight, hired new employees for non-exempt positions without publicly posting said positions and punished independent employees by assigning disfavored job assignment rotations, all of which were prohibited under said decrees. Also, Magistrate Judge did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant's motion to vacate 1972 and 1991 consent decrees under Rule 60(b)(5), even though defendant argued that said decrees involved political questions that were not fit for resolution by federal courts, where: (1) consent decrees addressed freedom of association rights protected by First Amendment; (2) legal rights and applicable standard are evident and judicially manageable; and (3) Magistrate Judge could properly find that defendant made no effort to conform her conduct to directives contained in consent decrees. Also, Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's appeal of order appointing special master to monitor defendant's future compliance with consent decrees, since said order was not final and appealable, and did not otherwise constitute modification of substance of consent decrees.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed as moot respondent-employer's appeal of Dist. Ct.'s order that granted petitioner's request for temporary injunction under section 10(j) of National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) that required respondent to cease and desist from certain unfair labor practices. Record showed that after petitioner had filed request for temporary injunction, administrative law judge had issued recommended order, concluding that respondent had violated sections 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of NLRA. Moreover, while respondent's appeal was under advisement, Board issued its decision on ALJ's recommended order. Thereafter, Ct. of Appeals granted NLRB Director's motion to dismiss as moot instant appeal of issuance of temporary injunction, since Board's resolution of unfair practices charge mooted appeal of issuance of temporary injunction that pertained to issues that had been fully resolved by Board. Fact that Board had severed one issue from case and retained it for further consideration did not require different result, since severed issue was not one that had been presented to Dist. Ct. as part of temporary injunction. As such, remand was required for Dist. Ct. to vacate its judgment that granted petition for issuance of temporary injunction and to dismiss said petition as moot.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action' alleging that defendant-officer used excessive force when apprehending plaintiff during incident in which officer shot plaintiff after plaintiff had shot twice at bystanders in street and turned toward officer while waving gun. Record showed that, after plaintiff was shot, associate of plaintiff picked up plaintiff's gun and shot at officer, and officer thereafter used plaintiff as human shield and pointed gun at plaintiff's head during standoff with associate until associate fled scene. Officer was entitled to qualified immunity, since his actions were objectively reasonable, where plaintiff posed imminent threat to safety of officer and bystanders, and since there was no Supreme Court precedent that clearly established that officer's split-second decision to shoot plaintiff was unlawful. Similarly, no Supreme Ct. case law showed that officer's subsequent conduct in using plaintiff as human shield and pointing gun at plaintiff's head to deter associate from shooting anyone violated clearly established law, especially where plaintiff repeatedly attempted to swat at officer's gun. Fact that, in hindsight, there was reasonable chance that plaintiff was about to get in his car and leave scene right when officer shot him does not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-Governor's motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated their First Amendment rights by denying them access to invitation-only press briefing held by Governor's office. Governor's office denied plaintiffs' access based on fact that plaintiffs' organization was not primarily news organization, and that plaintiffs' practices ran afoul of neutral factors contained in criteria established by Governor's office. Because plaintiffs wanted access to non-public forum, defendant's decision to limit access needs only to be reasonable, and criteria established by Governor's office are reasonably related to viewpoint-neutral goal of increasing journalistic impact of Governor's messages by inviting only media who had primary focus in news dissemination and had some longevity in journalism business, as well as possessed ability to craft newsworthy stories. Instant criteria also prioritized access to media journalists, whose reporting would reach wider audiences and disfavored media that engaged in advocacy or lobbying. In instant case, plaintiffs failed to produce evidence to support their claim that generation of instant criteria was ideologically motivated by their conservative viewpoint. Ct. also observed that First Amendment does not guarantee press constitutional right of special access to information not available to public generally.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officials' motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs' section 1983 action, after finding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, even though plaintiffs asserted that defendants falsely arrested plaintiff-father and used excessive force by handcuffing him, taking him to ground and applying pressure to father's head when attempting to place him in squad car. Record showed that: (1) plaintiffs' daughter had called police to make welfare check on plaintiffs because they were extremely intoxicated and were indicating that they would be driving their car; and (2) defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff-father on disorderly conduct and resisting officer charges, where father admitted in deposition that his conduct amounted to active resistance to police directives under circumstances where police used several techniques to try to keep father from hurting himself on street. Moreover, qualified immunity was appropriate because plaintiffs admitted that they could not identify any case law that clearly prohibited level of force used by instant defendants, especially where case law indicated that police are not required to simply walk away and permit possibly intoxicated individual to potentially harm himself and others.