Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiffs-pre-trial detainees’ request for issuance of preliminary injunction in their section 1983 action, alleging that defendant-Sheriff violated plaintiffs’ due process rights by failing to provide them with reasonably safe living conditions during COVID-19 pandemic. While Dist. Ct. could issue preliminary injunction that covered certain procedures relating to sanitation, diagnostic testing and personal protective equipment, Dist. Ct. could not issue preliminary injunction with respect to plaintiffs’ request to prohibit double celling and group housing/dormitory arrangements to permit adequate social distancing. In this respect, Dist. Ct. failed to consider said requests in view of defendant’s other actions that attempted to address said concerns and failed to give proper deference to defendant’s judgment in adopting policies necessary to ensure safety and security of jail. Moreover, Dist. Ct. cited to incorrect legal standard that required that plaintiff need only show better than negligible chance of success, as opposed to applicable “some likelihood” of success on merits of case, when evaluating request for preliminary injunction as to double celling and group housing concerns.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ request for issuance of preliminary injunction in action challenging under Free Speech Clause of First Amendment defendant-Governor’s issuance of executive order that recommended, but did not mandate that churches limit in-church gatherings, but required for others mandatory 50-person cap on gatherings. Instant executive order is designed to address serious public-health crisis stemming from COVID-19, and Ct. found that: (1) speech that accompanies religious exercise has privileged position under First Amendment; and (2) instant executive order permissibly accommodates religious activities. Moreover, nothing in Free Speech Clause of First Amendment barred defendant from making special dispensation for religious activities. Too, no case law compels defendant to treat all gatherings alike, and defendant could permissibly restrict secular gatherings and not religious gatherings. Fact that defendant had expressed sympathy for people who were protesting police violence and even participated on one protest did not have any effect on text of instant executive order, and record otherwise did not support claim that state-actors have played favorites in enforcement of otherwise valid response to COVID-19 pandemic.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-University officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-student’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his First Amendment rights when they did not select him for temporary student-government position in retaliation for his prior critical stances against members of University administration, including defendants, who worked with student government, and who were involved with instant application process. Defendants explained that plaintiff’s application was rejected because he had not been enrolled in either summer or fall classes at time of application, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, because federal law did not clearly establish that enforcing instant enrollment requirement for student-government position violated First Amendment. Fact that defendants allegedly violated state law in rejecting plaintiff’s application did not require different result, and plaintiff otherwise did not pursue public-employment theory at summary judgment stage of case.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officers used excessive force during plaintiff's arrest, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that plaintiff's gun fell from his body after plaintiff had fled scene, where said evidence was relevant as providing circumstance of arrest and was not unduly prejudicial. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in prohibiting defendant from arguing that defendants had racial bias, since plaintiff had failed to present any evidence that defendants' actions in arresting him were racially motivated. Finally, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for sanctions due to defendants' alleged error in failing to tender nine citizen complaints against one defendant, where: (1) four complaints had been filed beyond timeframe set forth by plaintiff in his discovery request; (2) defendants produced one complaint; and (3) remaining four complaints were not actually complaints, but rather were informational reports. Also, said documents would not have altered jury's verdict in favor of defendants.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-Park District and City's motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs' action seeking to halt construction of Obama Presidential Center in Chicago's Jackson Park, where plaintiffs alleged that defendants' alteration of use of Jackson Park and handing over control of Center's site to Barack Obama Foundation essentially took plaintiffs' property for private purpose in violation to Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment and denied plaintiffs' due process rights under 14^th Amendment. Plaintiffs cannot proceed on either claim, since they have no protected interest in public land, and plaintiffs could not rely on public trust doctrine under Illinois state law to create such interest. Moreover, City's judgment that instant transfer and use of property has public purpose is entitled to deference. Also, plaintiffs' due process claim fails, since plaintiffs failed to identify what greater process they were due, especially where City enacted four ordinances approving aspects of Center that followed multiple public hearings. Ct. further found that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to bring state claims alleging violation of public trust doctrine arising out transfer of park land to Center, where: (1) plaintiffs alleged only that govt. had failed to follow relevant law, while Article III required that plaintiffs to demonstrate injury to their "separate and concrete interests;" and (2) even if construction of Center would damage Jackson Park, relevant showing required plaintiffs to show injury to themselves as opposed to any injury to Jackson Park. Too, plaintiffs could not establish standing as municipal taxpayers, since they could not show that City actually spent tax revenues on any illegal action. Fact that Illinois law would find that plaintiffs had standing to proceed on public trust doctrine claim is irrelevant to any Article III inquiry.

Ct. of Appeals denied govt.-appellee’s motion for summary affirmance of Dist. Ct.’s order that had dismissed for failure to state valid claim plaintiff’s Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuit, alleging negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, where, according to plaintiff, lead attorney for U.S. Military Commission Defense Organization that, along with plaintiff, represented person charged as al-Qaeda enemy combatant, disclosed to client plaintiff’s gay sexuality and falsely told client that plaintiff was infatuated with client and was pursuing that interest. While plaintiff’s opening appellate brief failed to comply with Rule of App. Pro. 28 by failing to provide either adequate statement of case, legal citations or identification of legal errors associated with Dist. Ct.’s order in argument section, summary affirmance was not warranted, since: (1) sparse briefing alone is not reason to enter merits judgment; and (2) plaintiff’s brief did not rise to level of “incompressible or completely insubstantial” brief. Moreover, Ct. gave plaintiff seven days to request leave to strike his initial brief and file substitute brief that complies with Rule 28.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying U.S. govt.’s motion to dismiss relator’s claim under False Claims Act, where govt. sought to intervene and to dismiss instant qui tam action. Relator alleged that defendants illegally paid physicians for prescribing or recommending Cimzia to treat Crohn’s disease and provided said physicians with illegal kickbacks in form of free education services and free reimbursement support services. Under section 3730(c)(2)(A), govt. has right to dismiss instant action over relator's objection if relator is provided notice and opportunity for hearing, and govt., in its motion to dismiss, argued that dismissal was appropriate because relator’s claim lacked sufficient merit to justify cost of investigation and prosecution and was otherwise contrary to public interest. Ct. of Appeals has jurisdiction to consider denial of govt.’s request to intervene and dismiss, even after govt. had failed to intervene at beginning stage of litigation. Moreover, govt.’s motion to dismiss should have been granted with prejudice as to relator’s claim and without prejudice as to govt.’s claim, since: (1) govt. met all requirements set forth in section 3730(c)(2)(A), where relator received notice and opportunity to be heard at hearing; and (2) Dist. Ct. erred in applying arbitrary and capricious standard to govt.’s motion. Fact that govt. failed to make particularized dollar-figure estimate of potential costs and benefits of relator’s lawsuit did not require different result.

Plaintiff-pretrial detainee was entitled to new trial on his section 1983 action, alleging that defendant-prison officials violated his due process rights by failing to provide him with adequate medical care, where plaintiff presented defendants with suicide risk, and where defendants failed to prevent him from attempting suicide. Although jury found  in favor of defendants, Dist. Ct. gave erroneous jury instruction that required jury to ascertain defendants’ subjective belief as to whether they were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs, rather than requiring jury to determine whether defendants acted in objectively reasonable manner based on plaintiff’s conduct prior to his suicide attempt. Moreover, said instruction likely had determinative effect on jury’s verdict, where defendants based their defense on claim that they did not consciously fail to take reasonable measures to prevent plaintiff’s suicide attempt.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison doctors’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that said doctors were deliberately indifferent to pain he experienced after he had undergone surgery on his ankle, where, according to plaintiff, said defendants altered his schedule to receive pain medication that resulted in him not getting timely doses of said medication. Record showed that defendant prison health manager was unaware of either plaintiff’s treatment or her ability to intervene in it, and other doctors, who either based initial pain medicine dose on medical judgment or revised pain medicine order, did not know either that said change would cause plaintiff serious harm, or that plaintiff would incur delays in receiving said medication. However, Dist. Ct. erred in granting summary judgment for defendant-prison nurse, where there was factual dispute regarding whether on three occasions said defendant ignored plaintiff’s pain complaints and/or failed to consult prison doctor when plaintiff reported extreme pain after his original medication had run out.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider union’s appeal of Magistrate Judge’s order that granted plaintiff’s request for declaratory judgment to allow special master to observe union grievance meetings, where special master had previously been appointed to monitor defendant’s compliance with 1972 consent decree and 1983 judgment order precluding defendant from continuing to favor political allies in employment decisions. While union filed memorandum in opposition to plaintiff’s request for declaratory judgment, union could not appeal Magistrate Judge’s grant of plaintiff’s motion, since union was not party in instant lawsuit. Ct. rejected union’s argument that it should be treated as party because it is bound by Magistrate Judge’s order that allowed special master’s presence at union’s grievance meetings. Moreover, Ct. noted that union could have sought to intervene at Dist. Ct. level to gain requisite party status to file any appeal.