Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs-female prisoners’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendants’ conduct during mass strip searches of female prisoners as part of cadet officer training violated their 4th Amendment privacy rights, where searches were allegedly conducted in intrusive and degrading manner. While Dist. Ct. found no 4th Amendment violation because plaintiffs lacked privacy interest during visual inspections of their bodies while in prison, Ct. of Appeals, in en banc decision, found that Fourth Amendment protects in severely limited way inmate’s right to bodily privacy during instant visual inspections. As such, remand was required for determination as to whether defendants’ mass strip searches were reasonable in light of realities of incarceration, that include consideration of scope of particular intrusion, manner in which it is conducted, justification for initiating searches and place in which they were conducted. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in denying motion to intervene filed by two holders of permit to build $500 million electricity transmission line in lawsuit filed by plaintiffs-two environmental groups seeking to invalidate instant environmental permit issued by defendant-Commission. While Dist. Ct. based its denial of intervention motion on belief that defendant adequately represented intervenors’ interests in lawsuit because defendant and intervenors had same goal of dismissing plaintiffs’ lawsuit, defendant and intervenors had interests that were independent of each other, where intervenors had financial interests in maintaining permit and had obligations to their shareholders, while defendant had only obligation to general public. Moreover, defendant regulated transmission companies like intervenors, but did not advocate for them, and transmission companies cannot be forced to rely entirely on defendant to protect their investments in construction projects. As such, intervenors satisfied prerequisites for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2), where, under lenient default standard, intervenors established that they had interest in property at issue in lawsuit, that defendant’s representation of their interests might be inadequate, and that defendant and intervenors had different interests and different defenses to lawsuit.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying motion by one class member seeking disgorgement of $130,000 in settlement proceeds that three other class members received in compensation from proceeds that class had received in settlement of class action, where said class members had objected to terms of class action settlement, had appealed denial of their objections, and had dismissed said appeals in exchange for instant settlement payments. While Dist. Ct. found that objectors had not intended or committed illegal act nor taken money out of common fund by taking money in exchange for dismissal of their appeals, Ct. of Appeals, in reversing trial court, found that settling objections to proposed class action settlement where objections asserted class’s rights in return for private payment to objectors is inequitable, and that disgorgement is most appropriate remedy. Moreover, said objectors who settle their objections for amounts in excess of their shares as class members are not paid for anything they actually owned. As such, objectors’ settlement proceeds belonged in equity to class.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s class action alleging that defendant-insurance company, which issued group long-term insurance policy to plaintiff’s employer, breached its contract, committed torts and violated consumer protection laws by raising his premiums dramatically. While Dist. Ct. based its dismissal upon defendant’s affirmative defense that plaintiff could not prevail because Washington State Insurance Commissioner had approved instant premium, remand was required, where: (1) defendant failed to identify that instant rate-filed affirmative defense came from either state or federal law; and (2) Dist. Ct. failed to resolve instant choice-of-law issue, where record contained at least two potential (either Washington D.C. or State of Washington) laws that could apply to plaintiff’s claim. As such, there needs to be finding as to which forum’s law applies to plaintiff’s case before there could be any valid dismissal. Ct. further noted that there was presumptive rule in group insurance settings that would apply law of employer’s principal place of business (Washington D.C.) as opposed to plaintiff’s residence in State of Washington, and that there was no guarantee that court in Washington D.C. would defer to findings of Washington State Insurance Commissioner. Also, remand was required, since it was unclear as to whether filed-rate affirmative defense as recognized by State of Washington would apply to instant factual setting. 

Dist. Ct. erred in transferring back to Dist. Ct. of Eastern California portion of plaintiff’s action arising out of employment contract, where plaintiff alleged violations of Fair Labor Standards Act, as well as various violations of California Labor Code, and where said contract contained forum-selection clause providing that plaintiff must bring claims against defendant in either Indiana state court or Indiana federal court. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff had originally brought instant lawsuit in California state court; (2) defendant successfully removed action to Dist. Ct. of Eastern California, which granted defendant’s motion to transfer case to Dist. Ct. of Southern Indiana based upon forum selection clause; and (3) Dist. Ct. of Southern Indiana thereafter transferred portion of case back to Dist. Ct. of Eastern California. Ct. of Appeals, in granting defendant’s petition for writ of mandamus, found that Dist. Ct. of Southern Indiana should have retained entire lawsuit pursuant to forum-selection clause, which, according to Ct. of Appeals, should be given controlling weight in all but most exceptional cases. Moreover, Dist. Ct. of Southern Indiana improperly: (1) placed burden on defendant to justify keeping case in Indiana; (2) held belief that transfer was warranted because Dist. Ct. of Eastern California was more familiar with applicable California law; and (3) failed to acknowledge that delay in bringing instant case to trial was longer in California than in Indiana.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s $400,000 verdict in favor of plaintiff in plaintiff-school superintendent’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant-school board constructively discharged her in retaliation for registering complaint with police that member of board threatened her with physical violence. While defendant argued that plaintiff’s police report was personal grievance, as opposed to protectible matter of public concern, plaintiff’s report was legitimate subject of public concern that was protected under First Amendment, since potential for physical violence between public officials implies that instant public institution was not working properly. Moreover, instant threat, which was uttered shortly after plaintiff had requested audit of school district’s finances, was matter of public interest, especially where link between audit and threat was reported to police. Ct. noted, though, that defendant had waived any potential issue that report was not protected under First Amendment under Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410, because it concerned on-the-job speech based on plaintiff’s job duties. Ct. also affirmed Dist. Ct.’s  award of $190,000 in attorney’s fees, even though plaintiff had requested $485,000 in fees due to higher than normally charged hourly-rate and “bonus” enhancements, where said enhancements are not permitted under fee-shifting statutes.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officers' motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants used excessive force when they shot and killed decedent during incident in which decedent’s mother called police to conduct welfare check on decedent, who had indicated that he intended to kill himself, and where decedent and defendants eventually engaged in scuffle that resulted in decedent cutting one defendant with knife prior to said shooting. While plaintiff alleged that defendants acted unreasonably because defendants’ actions had agitated decedent and created conditions that precipitated violent encounter, decedent’s actions were intervening cause of deadly force, and situation requiring defendant's use of deadly force was not primarily of their own making, where decedent had cut one defendant twice with knife prior to instant shooting. Fact that plaintiff had alleged that defendant had violated departmental policies during encounter did not require different result, since section 1983 protects plaintiff only from constitutional violations and not violations of local police department. Also use of deadly force was reasonable, where both defendants were subjected to immediate threat of their safety at time of shooting.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-Village’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-Tribe’s action seeking to enjoin defendant from enforcing its ordinance requiring that plaintiff obtain permit to host plaintiff’s annual festival on land that was partially located in Village, but was entirely located on land that was part of Reservation that was formed by 1838 Treaty with Tribe. While defendant argues that said land was no longer part of Reservation, where Congress had allotted Reservation among individual Tribe members and allowed Tribe members to sell said land to non-Indians, Ct. of Appeals, in reversing Dist. Ct., found that under Solem, 465 U.S. 463, and McGirt, 140 S.Ct. 2452, Reservation could be diminished or disestablished only by Congress, and that Congress, through its statutory text, never articulated clear congressional purpose to diminish Reservation, even though it had allowed Tribe members to sell land to non-Indians. As such, entire Reservation as established through 1838 Treaty remained Indian country, such that defendant lacked jurisdiction to apply its ordinance to plaintiff’s on-Reservation activities.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s request for issuance of preliminary injunction in section 1983 action alleging that three policies of defendant-University impermissibly chilled free speech rights of student members of its organization. Specifically, plaintiff sought to enjoin: (1) defendant’s requirement prohibiting without prior approval posting of leaflets about candidates for non-campus elections; (2) defendant from using BARFT and BIP processes to investigate or punish students for bias-motivated incidents; and (3) defendant’s issuance of No Contact Directives (NCD) without procedures ensuring that said directives were consistent with First Amendment. Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge BART and BIP processes or imposition of NCDs, where plaintiff failed to show that any of its members faced credible threat of enforcement or that said policies had objective chilling effect on their speech. This is so, Ct. found, because: (1) bias-motivated speech alone is not student code violation; (2) plaintiff failed to identify specific statements that any student wished to make that defendant’s policies have chilled; and (3) students interactions with BART were optional and BART itself did not have any disciplinary authority. Plaintiff also failed to present any example of defendant issuing NCD  on basis of speech. Moreover, plaintiff’s challenge to prior approval rule was moot, where said rule is now abolished, and where there was no evidence that said rule was ever enforced. (Partial dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state viable claim plaintiffs’ (individuals who had been released on bail) section 1983 action alleging that defendant-Sheriff improperly detained them from three to fourteen days after entry of trial court’s bail release order because he essentially disagreed with trial court’s release order. Plaintiffs adequately alleged claim under Fourth Amendment for wrongful pre-trial custody, where: (1) plaintiffs alleged that in place of court-ordered release on specified terms, defendant substituted prolonged detentions, as well as significant restraints on pretrial release of his own devising; and (2) such decisions to delay release was not defendant’s to make. Moreover, Ct. found that instant alleged delays could not be justified on basis of administrative delay. Also, plaintiffs stated adequate equal protection claim, where plaintiffs maintained that defendant targeted plaintiffs for detention because of their race, and where defendant’s bail review policy disproportionately targeted African-American inmates. Plaintiffs also adequately alleged state-law claim alleging that defendant contumaciously refused to comply with trial court bail release orders that were legally issued to him. While defendant argued that bail orders requiring him to monitor plaintiffs on bail could not be binding on him because he had not agreed to said monitoring, defendant’s argument could not be resolved on pleadings.