Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff-police officer's 3^rd amended complaint, alleging that defendant-City and others violated her substantive and procedural due process rights when plaintiff's supervisor: (1) failed to intervene after dispatcher ignored calls plaintiff made for backup during plaintiff's response to armed robbery;  and (2) edited plaintiff's report of said incident by removing plaintiff's complaints about failure to respond to her calls for backup. Substantive due process protects only those fundamental rights and liberties which are objectively rooted deeply in history and tradition, and plaintiff failed to pinpoint what fundamental interest she sought to vindicate. Moreover, while plaintiff contended that she had property interest in her job, public employment is not fundamental right, and plaintiff's claim that her supervisor acted apathetically in listening to dispatcher did not shock conscious so as to support substantive due process claim. Also, plaintiff reference to state-created-doctrine was inapt, where plaintiff had agreed to do dangerous work, and where armed robber, as opposed to government, created instant danger. Too, editing of plaintiff's report did not rise to conduct that shocked conscious. Plaintiff's procedural due process claim also failed, where: (1) plaintiff was not denied any notice of intentional deprivation of her job or opportunity to be heard; and (2) plaintiff never tied her supervisor's actions to policy or custom of police department so as to render City liable under Monell.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff's section 1938 claims against defendants-police officers under circumstances, where: (1) defendants filed Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss; (2) plaintiff filed response that failed to contain signature in violation of Rule 11(a); Dist Ct. gave plaintiff six days to provide signature; (4) plaintiff failed to do so within said timeframe; and (5) Dist. Ct. thereafter struck plaintiff's response and granted defendants' motion to dismiss on sole basis that it was unopposed. While Ct. of Appeals rejected plaintiff's argument that signature requirement under Rule 11(a) was not mandatory, it also found that Rule 12(b)(6) prevented Dist. Ct. from granting unopposed motion to dismiss under said Rule solely because there was no response. As such, remand was required for ruling on merits of motion without benefit of plaintiff's response, since Dist. Ct. did not err in striking said response.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' legal malpractice action against defendant-attorney, where complaint alleged that: (1) defendant was plaintiff-company's former chief legal adviser; (2) in his role as chief legal advisor, defendant advised company and plaintiff-company's founder to enter into supplemental agreement with defendant and others that called for payment of back wages through identified source of future funds, as well as other unspecified sources of funds; (3) after defendant left company, he demanded arbitration of his claim for unpaid wages; (4) arbitrator found that defendant's wages had been illegally withheld throughout his employment and held plaintiffs liable for defendant's unpaid wages and penalties totaling $864,976; and (5) plaintiffs filed instant action, alleging that defendant's own legal malpractice caused them to take actions that triggered their liability to defendant under arbitration award. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff failed to adequately plead that defendant's legal advice proximately caused them to enter into defendant's supplemental agreement or to refuse independent counsel or forego any D & O insurance. Moreover, Ct. rejected plaintiff's contention that they need not allege such causation where instant supplemental agreement was illegal act, since arbitrator did not find that supplemental agreement was tantamount to illegal deferred compensation agreement, where entry into agreement did not aggravate or add to company's failure to pay defendant in timely manner. Moreover, plaintiffs needed to allege facts showing that if defendant had not recommended entering into his supplemental agreement, plaintiffs would have taken different course of action that would have avoided their liability such as timely paying defendant's wages.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison doctor's motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-prison doctor and others violated his 8^th Amendment rights by delaying medical treatment of his broken hand. Plaintiff presented evidence that defendant did not respond for 6 and 10 months to his requests for low-bunk permit to accommodate pain he experienced in broken hand, and defendant only began to process said request until after he saw plaintiff on unrelated medical matter. Also, material question of fact existed as to whether defendant acted with deliberate indifference by delaying plaintiff's referral to orthopedic specialist, which, in turn, caused plaintiff to experience nerve damage and prolonged pain. However, Dist. Ct. properly granted summary judgment to two other defendants (second prison doctor and entity employing prison doctors), where: (1) record showed that said doctor promptly renewed plaintiff's request for low-bunk permit and continued prescriptions for plaintiff's prostate condition; and (2) plaintiff failed to present evidence that said entity had custom or policy to explain either instant delays in treatment or lack of coordinated care.

Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding plaintiffs-prisoners $52,357.50 in attorney's fees and $1,741.35 in costs incurred in seeking to enforce settlement with defendant-Dept. of  Corrections in class action lawsuit alleging that defendant unlawfully denied hard-of-hearing inmates assistance they needed to communicate and participate effectively in prison programs and services. Settlement required defendant to screen inmates and refer them to licensed audiologists, and defendant admitted to incorrectly sending 700 inmates to hearing-aid salesmen instead of audiologists. As such, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant was in substantial non-compliance with settlement agreement so as support instant fee award, where agreement allowed fee award for "any work" expended by plaintiffs' counsel in litigating any noncompliance with settlement terms. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in finding that defendant must ensure that audiologist evaluations be completed within specific timeframe, where no such obligation was contained in agreement. Ct. rejected plaintiffs' argument that deadline could be implied where no deadline was specified in agreement, and fact that there was no timeframe in agreement did not render agreement absurd, where plaintiffs eventually will receive their evaluations, and where plaintiffs received other benefits under agreement.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff-prisoner's motion for new trial after jury found in favor of defendants-prison officials in section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his 8^th Amendment rights by subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment by beating him and then parading him around naked in front of other prisoners. While plaintiff asserted that he was entitled to new trial, where Dist. Ct. allowed prison nurse to testify as undisclosed expert that there could be possibility of bruising on plaintiff if beating as he described actually occurred, and that she saw no such bruising, said testimony did not constitute expert opinion that was required to be disclosed prior to trial, since it represented only ordinary and percipient observations of nurse or other health care professional. Moreover, any error, if any, was harmless, where plaintiff opened door to such testimony when plaintiff's counsel had previously asked prison nurse if, in her view, it was possible to feel pain without showing visible symptoms. Also, Ct. of Appeals observed that  plaintiff did not establish prejudice in nurse's testimony, where plaintiff essentially lost his case because jury did not find plaintiff credible.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-union's motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-former union member's action, alleging that: (1) defendant's continued deduction of her union dues after she informed union she no longer wanted to be union member violated her First Amendment rights under Janus, 138 S.Ct. 2448; and (2) union's exclusive representation of her interests, even though she is no longer union member, also violated her First Amendment rights. Plaintiff cannot establish that deduction from her wages of union dues she voluntarily agreed to pay in consideration for benefits of her union membership violated her First Amendment rights under Janus, where plaintiff had previously agreed to union's ability to deduct dues unless she gave written notice of her desire to quit union during defined 15-day period, and record showed that although plaintiff gave said notice outside of said 15-day period, union withheld dues only until defined period arrived. Ct. rejected plaintiff's claim that her pre-Janus authorization to deduct dues was product of unconstitutional choice between paying union dues and paying fair share dues. Moreover, exclusive-bargaining-representative provisions of Ill. Public Labor Relations Act are constitutional regardless of whether plaintiff is member of union.

U.S. Supreme Ct. directed Ct. of Appeals to reconsider its prior decision that granted plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of new Indiana statutory restriction on minors' access to abortion, where Ct. of Appeals' prior decision was based, in part, on Whole Woman's Health, 136 S.Ct. 1292, and where U.S. Supreme Ct., in June Medical Services, 140 S.Ct. 2103, issued plurality decision that struck down Louisiana law regulating abortion providers, under circumstances where four dissenting Justices plus one concurring Justice disapproved of decision in Whole Woman's Health. Ct. of Appeals, in applying "narrowest ground" rule set forth in Marks, 430 U.S. 188, for assessing precedential force of Supreme Ct. decisions issued without majority opinions, found that dicta in non-majority opinion in June Medical Services did not overrule otherwise binding precedent in Whole Woman's Health relied upon by Ct. of Appeals in its prior opinion, and thus Ct. of Appeals reaffirmed its decision to affirm Dist. Ct.'s issuance of preliminary injunction to preclude enforcement of requirement that minor's parents be notified that she is seeking abortion through bypass procedure, i.e., court order finding either that abortion is in best interest of minor, or that she is sufficiently mature to make her own decision. (Dissent filed.)

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury's $4 million verdict in favor of plaintiff in plaintiff's section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-police officials violated his constitutional rights in arresting him on murder charge that resulted in his acquittal. Record did not support plaintiff's due process claim arising out of his pre-trial detention, since court in Manuel, 137 S.Ct. 911, abrogated any due process objection to pre-trial detention that had been approved by judge. However, plaintiff had viable 4^th Amendment claim, where jury could properly believe testimony of two eye-witnesses, who stated that defendants-detectives were lying when stating that they had identified plaintiff as one shooter in charged offense. As such, jury could find that plaintiff's arrest and detention were without support. Ct. rejected defendant's argument that plaintiff had no viable 4^th Amendment claim once there was judicial decision holding plaintiff in pre-trial custody.

Plaintiff-debtor lacked standing to pursue her action under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, alleging that defendant-debt collector violated section 1692c(a)(2) by directly communicating with plaintiff after plaintiff notified defendant that she refused to pay debt and/or told defendant to stop communicating with her. While Dist. Ct. granted defendant's motion for summary judgment based on finding that defendant lacked knowledge of plaintiff's cease-communication request, Dist. Ct. should have dismissed case for lack of standing for failure to allege concrete and particularized injury, where plaintiff merely alleged that defendant's dunning letter cause her stress and confusion, which, without any physical manifestation or qualified medical diagnosis, is not sufficient to establish Article III standing.