Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying request by two class members in instant class action to opt out of settlement of class action so as to allow them to continue in their parallel Ohio state-court action that raised same claims that were at issue in class action, under circumstances where: (1) class members made request to opt out after deadline for doing so; (2) notice of opt-out was sent to instant class members via first-class mail; and (3) instant class members' legal counsel in Ohio state-court action were aware of class action settlement. Ct. rejected class members' contention that notice sent by first-class mail was insufficient notice under due process clause of 5^th Amendment, where there was no evidence that said mail had been returned unopened. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly find that class members' delay in seeking opt-out of class was inexcusable, where their legal counsel was aware of class action settlement. Fact that class members continued their Ohio state-court action did not constitute "reasonable indication" of their desire to exclude them from class, and Dist. Ct. could rely on compliance with its own opt-out directives contained in notice when determining whether instant class members had done enough to opt-out of settlement agreement.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff's lawsuit, alleging that defendants' increase in tolls by 35 percent on heavy trucks traveling over Indiana Toll Road violated Commerce Commission, since said tolls discriminated against interstate commerce. Record showed that State of Indiana received $1 billion from third-party that operated Toll Road for right to raise tolls by 35 percent on heavy trucks, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that State of Indiana, as market participant as opposed to regulator, is exempt from rules ordinarily applied through commerce jurisprudence. Moreover, under Hughes, 426 U.S. 794, where, as here, state participates in marketplace, it is entitled to discriminate in favor of its own citizens. Ct. further found that: (1) instant toll increase is valid, even if treated as discriminatory against interstate commerce; (2) instant per-mile tolls are neutral with respect to truck's ownership since citizens of Indiana also pay said tolls to travel over Toll Road; and (3) plaintiffs are free to use non-toll roads to travel through Indiana.

Dist. Ct. erred in deciding merits of plaintiffs-union and others' section 1983 action, alleging that union's duty of fair representation in Illinois law, without corresponding ability to collect fair share fees from non-union employees, as set forth in Janus, 138 S.Ct. 2448, violated union's First Amendment right to free speech and association. Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring instant action, where plaintiff failed to allege existence of non-union member who demanded representation by union in grievance proceeding. Moreover, instant claim is not ripe for same reason. Fact that such demands by non-union employees are foreseeable in future did not require different result. Also, even if plaintiff had standing to bring instant lawsuit, plaintiffs sued wrong defendants (i.e., Attorney General and Executive Director of Ill. Labor Relations Bd.), where plaintiffs failed to allege that either defendant had threatened or brought any post-Janus enforcement proceeding against union for alleged violation of duty to fairly represent non-union employees.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-former House Speaker's motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-candidate's section 1983 action, alleging that defendant's plan to run two non-competitive candidates to split Hispanic vote in 2016 race for Illinois House District in which defendant and plaintiff were also candidates violated plaintiff's Equal Protection rights, where defendant won said election. Record showed that plaintiff would have lost to defendant without presence of said candidates, where defendant garnered 65 percent of vote, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that voters were not deceived by defendant's alleged plan to run said candidates, where plaintiff exposed said plan to voters prior to date of election. Ct. further observed that Constitution does not authorize judiciary to upset election outcome or to penalize politicians for employing alleged shady strategy that voters actually tolerate.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs-church members' request for preliminary injunction in section 1983 action, alleging that Governor's Executive Order that imposed 10-person limit on religious gatherings in order to curtail spread of coronavirus violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights and rights under Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act. While case law supported Dist. Ct.'s denial of request for preliminary injunction on ground that plaintiffs were not likely to prevail on merits of their claims, subsequent Supreme Ct. decision in Roman Catholic Diocese (415 S.Ct. 631 (2020)) suggests that plaintiffs may prevail on merits of their First Amendment claim. However, there is no compelling need at this juncture to issue preliminary injunction, even if plaintiffs are likely to prevail on merits of their claim, where: (1) Governor has rescinded said limitation and has not re-imposed said limitation for nine-month period; (2) instant limitation was created in context of State's attempt to protect public health in face of contagious virus; and (3) risk of irreparable injury to plaintiffs in failing to impose preliminary injunction is very low, even if plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their First Amendment claim. Ct. further noted that plaintiffs' state-law claims against Governor are barred by 11th Amendment, and while 11^th Amendment bar generally does not apply to counties or similar municipal corporations, record was unclear whether instant local defendants, who delivered to plaintiffs cease and desist order, were following state policy, which would immunize them under 11^th Amendment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on abstention grounds lawsuit filed by plaintiff-children participating in State of Indiana abuse/neglect proceedings, where Dist. Ct. found that state court should resolve plaintiffs' contention that U.S. Constitution entitled them to appointment of legal counsel, where State of Indiana automatically appoints legal counsel for parents in said proceedings. Unless there is principle requiring counsel in every case, state-court's procedures suffice to allow individuals to argue that lawyer is required in any particular case. As such, because children are not automatically entitled to lawyer in instant civil state-court proceeding, it would be inappropriate for federal court to resolve appointment-of-counsel question in any of plaintiffs' proceedings. Accordingly, state court may either appoint counsel, if it seems necessary, or explain why said appointment is unnecessary, and any ruling can potentially be reviewed by U.S. Supreme Court, if state judiciary ultimately rejects plaintiffs' constitutional arguments.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials' motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated plaintiff's 8^th Amendment rights by forcibly injecting him with antipsychotic drug Haldol to treat his mental conditions. Prison's Review Committee could properly have determined that involuntary administration of Haldol was in plaintiff best interests, where plaintiff had previously refused food and medications, threatened suicide and had history of violence during episodes of intense paranoia. While defendant asserted that defendants prescribed course of Haldol injections knowing that he was allergic to said medicine, plaintiff failed to support said contention with any medical evidence, and any side effects of Haldol were common effects that did not constitute excessive risk to plaintiff's health.  Also, defendants monitored plaintiff's condition, such that plaintiff could not establish that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, where plaintiff had demonstrated that he was danger to himself. Too, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff's requests for assistance of counsel, where, although plaintiff had mental condition, Dist. Ct. could have properly found that: (1) plaintiff's claims were not so complex so as to require assistance of counsel; (2) plaintiff demonstrated that he understood facts of his case and marshaled said facts into coherent arguments; and (3) presence of counsel would not have made difference in outcome of case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant breached terms of 2017 Settlement Agreement between parties by filing third-party complaint in Missouri state court action against plaintiff, alleging that plaintiff had violated terms of prior Marketing Agreement between parties that required that plaintiff adequately train its employees when selling insurance policies underwritten by defendant. Terms of 2017 Settlement Agreement provided that parties had agreed that all claims regarding Marketing Agreement that were filed in Cook County litigation or could have been filed in Cook County litigation were deemed to be settled and resolved, and record showed that third-party complaint that defendant filed against plaintiff in Missouri action could have been filed in Cook County action since: (1) it pertained to same allegations that plaintiff had violated Marketing Agreement; and (2) defendant had been aware of underlying Missouri claim prior to effective date of 2017 Settlement Agreement. Dist. Ct. also did not abuse its discretion in awarding plaintiff $108,445.10 in attorney's fees that represented 150 percent of $72,296.73 judgment in instant action, even though 2017 Settlement Agreement provided that any award of attorney's fees be reasonably proportionate to ultimate relief secured by prevailing party. Ct. of Appeals rejected defendant's argument that plaintiff's fee award was capped by one-third of ultimate recovery and further found that said award was reasonable and proportionate, where: (1) plaintiff had actually paid its counsel $210,476.25 in fees for representation in instant action; and (2) instant award was in keeping with fee awards granted under Prison Litigation Reform Act that capped such awards at 150 percent of judgment.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff's action alleging that defendant violated Wisconsin statute (Wis. Stat. section 146.83(f)(b)) by charging fees that were greater than permissible fee schedule set forth in said statute, where Dist. Ct. found found that: (1) language in statute imposed duty to charge permissible fees only on "healthcare providers;" and (2) defendant was not healthcare provider, but was only agent of healthcare provider. As such, Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff could only sue defendant's principal, which was healthcare provider. However, subsequent to Dist. Ct.'s holding, Wisconsin Appellate Court expressly disagreed with Dist. Ct.'s analysis in instant case and found that agents of healthcare providers have no greater power to charge fees that were in excess of permissible fee schedule. While Ct. of Appeals noted that Dist. Ct. offered sound reasons for rejecting liability for healthcare records companies such as defendant, since, although agents may fulfill principal's duty under statute, it does not follow that agent must be liable for statutory violations, Ct. of Appeals nevertheless found that it was required to defer to Wisconsin Appellate Court's interpretation of instant Wisconsin statute under circumstances of instant case. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff's unjust enrichment action, since plaintiff cannot seek equitable remedy, where she had remedy at law under Wisconsin statute.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed as moot plaintiff's appeal of Dist. Ct.'s order that rejected plaintiff's lawsuit alleging that Illinois statute (10 ILCS 5/7-10h), that required that plaintiff obtain 5,050 valid signatures from registered voters to run in March 2020 Democratic primary for position on Illinois Supreme Court, was unconstitutional as applied to him, since: (1) he fell 100 valid signatures short of obtaining 5,050 threshold, even though he submitted more than 5050 signatures; and (2) Constitution required that he be allowed to obtain position on ballot because falling within 100 signatures of relevant threshold was within margin of error for document examiners reviewing said signatures. Record showed that by time case had been briefed and argued, primary election had already occurred, and thus there was lack of live controversy in instant action that sought only injunctive relief. Moreover, plaintiff did not satisfy exception to mootness doctrine that instant dispute was capable of repetition, yet bound to evade review, where: (1) it was unlikely that plaintiff would run again and again come within margin of error of required threshold number of signatures; and (2) plaintiff always had adequate avenue of review in state court of any adverse decision regarding disputes regarding obtaining required number of valid signatures to obtain place on primary ballot. Accordingly, remand was required to vacate Dist. Ct.'s judgment on merits of case and to dismiss matter for lack of justiciable controversy.