Ct. of Appeals imposed $44,329.50 in attorney’s fees against defendant-appellant and its counsel as sanction for filing frivolous appeal in Lanham Act case. While plaintiff-appellee sought over $50,000 in attorney’s fees, Ct. of Appeals reduced instant request for time spent by plaintiff’s counsel after date of Ct. of Appeals’ opinion, including time spent by plaintiff’s counsel preparing sanctions motion. Also, scope of sanctions included defendant's counsel, where motion for sanctions sought sanctions against defendant's counsel, and where opinion cited to actions taken by defendant’s counsel in support for granting sanctions request.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-prison official’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-former prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated plaintiff’s 8th Amendment rights by refusing to give him 97-day sentencing credit for second, pre-trial detention on second drug charge for which defendant was convicted. Defendant believed that she could ignore 97-day credit for drug offense that was committed while defendant was on bail for first charged drug offense, since defendant had been in pre-trial custody for both drug charges at same time, and since she believed that Illinois law only applies greatest of multiple credits (plaintiff had received 255-day credit on first drug charge) when plaintiff was in pretrial detention on multiple charges at same time. However, even if defendant was wrong on instant release date calculation, plaintiff failed to present any evidence that defendant had acted with deliberate indifference when calculating his release date. Fact that defendant did her job by determining release date did not establish any intent to punish plaintiff excessively. (Dissent filed.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds plaintiffs-Deputy Assessors’ section 1983 action alleging that defendant-Township Assessor violated their First Amendment rights when defendant fired them shortly after he took office as Township Assessor on account of fact that they had supported his political rival and predecessor. Dist. Ct. could properly find under plausibility standard associated with motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity at this juncture of proceeding, where plaintiffs’ allegations stated claim of violation of clearly established law. Moreover, Ct. noted that: (1) no statutes or ordinances confirmed defendant’s claim that Deputy Assessor position involved policymaking input or access to Assessor’s politically sensitive or confidential thoughts so as to allow use of political affiliation to be factor in plaintiffs’ terminations; and (2) reasonable state actor would have understood that firing employee from position that lacked meaningful input into political decision-making violated employee’s First Amendment rights.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that his cell was searched in violation of his First Amendment rights in retaliation for having lodged disagreement over prison procedure regarding pending grievances, as well as threat to file another grievance. Record showed that while plaintiff’s cell was searched nine minutes after telling one official that he might file another grievance due to disagreement regarding status of prior grievances filed by plaintiff, record failed to show that defendant-officer who actually conducted search of plaintiff’s cell had been aware of said conversation to support finding that search was in retaliation for plaintiff’s protected conduct in having lodged disagreement regarding status of his prior grievances. Moreover, officer, who had conducted search, based said search on contraband mentioned in disciplinary report filed two weeks prior to search.
Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of Article III standing Plaintiffs’ (Democratic Party and several of its members) section 1983 action, alleging that defendants (members of Wisconsin legislature, current Wisconsin Governor and Attorney General and others) violated their rights under First Amendment, Equal Protection and Guarantee Clauses, where state legislature enacted two laws after 2018 election that stripped incoming Democratic Governor and Attorney General of various powers and vested Republican-controlled legislative committees with formerly-executive authority. Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue instant action, where: (1) instant Wisconsin laws did not restrict plaintiffs’ conduct in any way; (2) contrary to plaintiff’s contention, instant action did not dilute their votes, since they were able to vote in 2018 election and their votes were counted; and (3) plaintiffs’ abstract interest in powers of Governor and Attorney General is mere nonjusticiable general interest that is common to all members of general public. Also, Democratic Party lacked associational standing where its members lacked standing to sue in their own right, and where instant laws did not target Party or formally restrict its ability to raise finds or otherwise meaningfully participate in elections. Fact that instant laws were motivated by partisan politics did not constitute federal constitutional injury. Plaintiffs also lacked standing on their Guarantee Clause action, which did not otherwise apply to issues regarding balance of power among branches of state government, where claim did not involve existential threat to republican form of government.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-City’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant improperly withheld funds for plaintiff’s mixed-use commercial and residential construction project, where plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rule 56-1, which required party opposing summary judgment to provide statement identifying determinative facts and factual disputes. Statement submitted by plaintiff misrepresented evidence, contained inaccurate and misleading citations to record and presented improper arguments. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly strike entire statement rather than striking only improper portions of statement, since Dist. Ct. is not required to sift through improper denials and legal argument in search of genuinely disputed facts that would defeat summary judgment motion. As such, once statement was stricken, plaintiff’s claim lacked any evidentiary support, such that Dist. Ct. could properly grant summary judgment motion.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-arrestee’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants failed to properly respond to signs that he was at risk for suicide, and that said failure resulted in plaintiff sustaining personal injuries when he attempted to commit suicide in his jail cell. Under Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness test applicable to arrestees who had not yet had probable cause hearing, Dist. Ct. could properly find that prison doctor’s withholding of plaintiff’s depression medication was reasonable given possibility that plaintiff had recently overdosed on said medication, and testimony otherwise indicated that there was no linkage between withholding of said medication and plaintiff’s suicide attempt. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly grant summary judgment in favor of non-medical defendants, where record showed that: (1) as to some defendants, there was no evidence that said defendants overlooked signs of plaintiff’s intent to harm himself; (2) some defendants could defer to medical personnel when assessing plaintiff’s complaints of physical discomfort; and (3) call to jail by plaintiff’s brother indicating that plaintiff was suicidal could properly have been ignored, where recent observation of plaintiff indicated that plaintiff did not act distraught and had not reported any suicidal thoughts. Fact that plaintiff had reported that he was taking depression medication did not require different result.
In action alleging that defendant-employer failed to promote plaintiff-employee to investigator position on account of his race, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in precluding plaintiff from eliciting from witnesses information on topics that were not included in plaintiff’s responses to defendant’s interrogatories or information regarding any promotions or discipline that successful candidate experienced after date of his selection to investigator position. Plaintiff’s counsel told Dist. Ct. that he did not intend to ask witnesses about topics that exceeded scope of plaintiff’s responses to defendant’s interrogatories, and thus said representation constituted waiver of said issue on appeal. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly exclude post-selection evidence regarding discipline or promotion of successful candidate, since such testimony was not relevant to mindset of decision-maker and had potential to confuse jury in violation of Rule 403.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment alleging qualified immunity in plaintiff-decedent’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant used excessive force during traffic stop that eventually resulted in killing of plaintiff. Record showed that: (1) defendant stopped plaintiff after receiving report that plaintiff had just phoned in 911 call that did not make sense, where call was made during prior stop of plaintiff by defendant; (2) once defendant stopped plaintiff second time, plaintiff was unresponsive to defendant’s questions and subsequently attempted to flee in his car by driving wrong way on highway; (3) plaintiff eventually smashed into patrol car and pinned another officer between patrol car and opened door; and (4) defendant then shot plaintiff at time when plaintiff’s car was still running and pinning other officer after initial collision. Defendant could reasonably stop decedent’s vehicle to investigate circumstances of 911 call and could use deadly force in effort to protect other officer.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-pre-trial detainee’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights by conducting body cavity search at hospital after defendants had received tips from other inmates that plaintiff was telling others that she had drugs inside her body. Although no drugs were ever found, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred, since defendants had reasonable and particularized suspicion that plaintiff was hiding drugs in her body given two reports from inmates that bore several signs of reliability that were based on alleged first-hand observations and on recent events. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that instant search had to be supported by probable cause and conducted after issuance of warrant. Ct. further noted that search did not take long period of time to conduct, and that plaintiff was afforded some measure of privacy.
