Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-City’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant improperly withheld funds for plaintiff’s mixed-use commercial and residential construction project, where plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rule 56-1, which required party opposing summary judgment to provide statement identifying determinative facts and factual disputes. Statement submitted by plaintiff misrepresented evidence, contained inaccurate and misleading citations to record and presented improper arguments. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly strike entire statement rather than striking only improper portions of statement, since Dist. Ct. is not required to sift through improper denials and legal argument in search of genuinely disputed facts that would defeat summary judgment motion. As such, once statement was stricken, plaintiff’s claim lacked any evidentiary support, such that Dist. Ct. could properly grant summary judgment motion.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-arrestee’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants failed to properly respond to signs that he was at risk for suicide, and that said failure resulted in plaintiff sustaining personal injuries when he attempted to commit suicide in his jail cell. Under Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness test applicable to arrestees who had not yet had probable cause hearing, Dist. Ct. could properly find that prison doctor’s withholding of plaintiff’s depression medication was reasonable given possibility that plaintiff had recently overdosed on said medication, and testimony otherwise indicated that there was no linkage between withholding of said medication and plaintiff’s suicide attempt. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly grant summary judgment in favor of non-medical defendants, where record showed that: (1) as to some defendants, there was no evidence that said defendants overlooked signs of plaintiff’s intent to harm himself; (2) some defendants could defer to medical personnel when assessing plaintiff’s complaints of physical discomfort; and (3) call to jail by plaintiff’s brother indicating that plaintiff was suicidal could properly have been ignored, where recent observation of plaintiff indicated that plaintiff did not act distraught and had not reported any suicidal thoughts. Fact that plaintiff had reported that he was taking depression medication did not require different result.

In action alleging that defendant-employer failed to promote plaintiff-employee to investigator position on account of his race, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in precluding plaintiff from eliciting from witnesses information on topics that were not included in plaintiff’s responses to defendant’s interrogatories or information regarding any promotions or discipline that successful candidate experienced after date of his selection to investigator position. Plaintiff’s counsel told Dist. Ct. that he did not intend to ask witnesses about topics that exceeded scope of plaintiff’s responses to defendant’s interrogatories, and thus said representation constituted waiver of said issue on appeal. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly exclude post-selection evidence regarding discipline or promotion of successful candidate, since such testimony was not relevant to mindset of decision-maker and had potential to confuse jury in violation of Rule 403.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment alleging qualified immunity in plaintiff-decedent’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant used excessive force during traffic stop that eventually resulted in killing of plaintiff. Record showed that: (1) defendant stopped plaintiff after receiving report that plaintiff had just phoned in 911 call that did not make sense, where call was made during prior stop of plaintiff by defendant; (2) once defendant stopped plaintiff second time, plaintiff was unresponsive to defendant’s questions and subsequently attempted to flee in his car by driving wrong way on highway; (3) plaintiff eventually smashed into patrol car and pinned another officer between patrol car and opened door; and (4) defendant then shot plaintiff at time when plaintiff’s car was still running and pinning other officer after initial collision. Defendant could reasonably stop decedent’s vehicle to investigate circumstances of 911 call and could use deadly force in effort to protect other officer.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-pre-trial detainee’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights by conducting body cavity search at hospital after defendants had received tips from other inmates that plaintiff was telling others that she had drugs inside her body. Although no drugs were ever found, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred, since defendants had reasonable and particularized suspicion that plaintiff was hiding drugs in her body given two reports from inmates that bore several signs of reliability that were based on alleged first-hand observations and on recent events. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that instant search had to be supported by probable cause and conducted after issuance of warrant. Ct. further noted that search did not take long period of time to conduct, and that plaintiff was afforded some measure of privacy.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction plaintiff’s claims alleging misappropriation of trade secrets regarding plaintiff’s 183-pin connector and unjust enrichment arising out of defendants' alleged acquisition of plaintiff’s 183-pin connector designs from third-party. Record showed that: (1) none of instant defendants were headquartered in Illinois and only two defendants had office in Illinois, but that neither office was involved in production of instant connector; and (2) defendants sold connectors to third-party in China and Texas. Plaintiff conceded that defendants lacked sufficient relationship with Illinois to permit general jurisdiction over defendants, and Dist Ct. lacked specific personal jurisdiction over defendants. Fact that cars and parts containing defendants’ connectors were sold to Illinois consumers did not require different result under stream of commerce theory, since: (1) said theory generally applies only to products liability cases; (2) tort of trade secret misappropriation that involved defendants’ alleged interactions with third-party were not linked to any interactions with Illinois consumers; and (3) defendants’ alleged misconduct did not happen in Illinois.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ motion for issuance of preliminary injunction in their section 1983 action, alleging that State of Illinois’s signature requirements for placing initiatives and referenda on both local and statewide ballots were too onerous, and thus violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights given social distancing requirements adopted by Governor of Illinois in light of COVID-19 pandemic. Relevant statute allows 18 months for plaintiff to collect signatures, and record showed that one plaintiff waited until April 2020 (but prior to filing instant lawsuit) to seek said signatures, while other plaintiffs did not start seeking signatures until after filing of lawsuit. As such, since instant social distancing orders occurred prior to April 2020, plaintiffs were not entitled to any emergency relief, because they had plenty of time to gather requisite number of signatures prior to beginning of pandemic. Also, plaintiff failed to show how social distancing orders limited their speech.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-prison official's motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated his First Amendment rights by refusing to restore certain prison benefits in retaliation for plaintiff successfully appealing imposition of prison sanction. While plaintiff had engaged in protected activity when he filed grievance to appeal said sanction, and plaintiff had established causal connection between his grievance and his alleged deprivations, plaintiff failed to show that said deprivations, i.e., failure to return him to his former cell, failure to reinstate him to his former job, and failure to pay $11.48 in back pay, would likely deter "person of ordinary firmness" from continuing to engage in protected activity. Moreover, record showed that: (1) plaintiff was returned to cell on same cell block as former cell; (2) plaintiff was placed in job that had similar pay as former job; and (3) plaintiff actually received his back pay.

Ct. of Appeals acted on several challenges to recent Wisconsin changes in its election law regarding registration of voters and requirements for absentee voting. With respect to 2013 Wisc. Act 146, which restricted number of hours municipal clerks could offer in-person absentee voting, Dist. Ct. erred in finding that said restriction had improper impact on racial minorities, since said restrictions gave all voters equal opportunity to participate. Dist. Ct. did not err in invalidating Wisc. State section 6.34(3)(a)(7)(b), which required that college and university “dorm lists” include citizenship information, since 20 USC section 1232g precludes states from requiring educational agencies to include citizenship information on certified lists of students who reside in sponsored housing. Dist. Ct. improperly found that statute’s increase in durational requirement from 10 days to 28 days for voting purposes to be unconstitutional, since plaintiffs failed to show that instant 28-day window was more onerous than similar windows in other states. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that requirement that voters produce documentary proof of residence violated Constitution. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in: (1) finding as unconstitutional statute’s prohibition on election officials from sending absentee ballots via email or fax to certain voters; and (2) entering injunction that permitted voter to declare that reasonable efforts failed to yield acceptable voter I.D.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison guard’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant failed to take reasonable measures to abate threat to plaintiff, where; (1) plaintiff told defendant that while she was in shower house, another inmate threatened to beat her up; and (2) defendant took no action following plaintiff’s report, and two days later said inmate attacked plaintiff in dining hall. While Dist. Ct. found that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity because defendant could have reasonably believed that threat to plaintiff had abated once inmates left shower house on day of report, reasonable juror could find that defendant knew that plaintiff had faced ongoing risk of serious harm, where plaintiff had asked defendant not to allow inmate to shower with her and other transgender inmates. Also, defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity, where, under Farmer, 511 U.S. 825, defendant’s alleged inaction violated clearly established right.