Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering injunction that required Indiana to treat children born into female-female marriages as having two female parents, who must be listed on original birth certificates. Under Indiana statute (section 31-14-7-1(1)(A), husband of birth mother is presumed to be child’s biological father who is listed on original birth certificate, and instant injunction provides similar treatment for both women in female-female marriages, so as to satisfy Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Ct. rejected state’s argument that birth mother must provide name of biological father on original birth certificate, and that any all-male or all-female married couples must use “adoption system” on amended birth certificates, where it would be proper to list both same-sex individuals as child’s legal parents. Ct. also noted that instant case did not decide what parental rights and duties biological fathers such as sperm donors have with respect to children of female-female marriages, and Dist. Ct. erred in invalidating section 31-14-7-1(1)(A) in its entirety.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-police officials’ motion requesting dismissal on qualified immunity grounds of plaintiff’s section 1983 action, where plaintiff alleged that defendants used excessive force on decedent by applying too-tight handcuffs behind decedent’s back during his arrest, and where cause of decedent’s death was lack of oxygen caused in part by his obesity, heart condition and placement of said handcuffs. Paramedics came to arrest scene and observed decedent telling them that he had no preexisting medical condition and speaking to them in clear sentences. Moreover, decedent never complained that handcuffs were too tight, and although decedent complained of trouble breathing, he never indicated that his troubled breathing was caused or exacerbated by said handcuffs. As such, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, where defendants were unaware that any handcuff tightness was causing decedent’s injury. Also, plaintiff could point to no prior case that held that decedent had constitutional right as out-of-breath arrestee to not have his hands cuffed behind his back after he had complained of difficult breathing.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state viable cause of action plaintiff-police officer’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-employer and certain police officials violated his due process and equal protection rights by allowing defendants’ “wives and paramours” to cheat on 2015 police lieutenants’ examination so as to deprive plaintiff of promotion to lieutenant. Plaintiff lacked protected property interest in “fair” lieutenants’ examination free from cheating or rigging, since while plaintiff had protected interest in retaining his current position, he had no such interest in unattained higher rank. Also, plaintiff failed to state viable equal protection claim, since, under Engquist, 553 U.S. 591, instant class-of-one equal protection claim is barred in public employment context. Moreover, plaintiff could not establish any protected gender claim, since, although plaintiff asserted that he was discriminated against because he was not in romantic relationship with defendants-executives who allegedly allowed others to gain access to test, any favoritism would not be based on plaintiff’s gender, since disadvantaged competitors could be either male or female who had not engaged in romantic relationship with defendants.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated 4th Amendment by using excessive force when shooting to death plaintiff’s decedent, during incident in which defendants attempted to arrest decedent after witnessing: (1) occupants in car in which decedent was driving fire gunshots at different car: (2) decedent speed through city streets and eventually crash into four cars before crashing into defendants’ unmarked squad car; and (3) decedent ignoring one defendant’s direction to stop before defendants fired shots into decedent’s car as decedent drove toward defendants in attempt to escape. Defendants’ use of deadly force against decedent did not constitute 4th Amendment violation, where use of deadly force was objectively reasonable means to prevent escape of armed and dangerous suspect, and where decedent’s extremely reckless driving supported defendants’ conclusion that decedent posed grave risk of danger to public located nearby. Moreover, defendants could have reasonably believed that there was still one gun in decedent’s car within decedent’s access at time defendants fired shots at decedent’s car.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment filed by certain defendants in plaintiff’s action alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy arising out of police investigation and arrest of plaintiffs-physicians and employees of company that treated individuals with opioid addiction with controlled substance prescriptions. Indiana courts issued arrest warrants for plaintiffs, and defendants otherwise had probable cause to arrest plaintiffs-physicians and certain non-medical employees of plaintiffs’ business, where police investigation revealed that said plaintiffs had dispensed Suboxone that was used to treat opioid addiction without having personally examined patients and in some circumstances issued said prescriptions without patient having seen any physician in contravention to Indiana law. However, reversal was required with respect to claims of one plaintiff, where said plaintiff was not medical provider, and where police lacked any evidence that said plaintiff, who worked in parking lot of instant business, had participated or was aware that other plaintiffs were dispensing prescriptions for controlled substance without patient having seen physician.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on res judicata/claim preclusion grounds instant action alleging that defendant-debt collector violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by failing to notify credit agency that plaintiff had disputed debt asserted by defendant, after defendant had reported to credit agency existence of debt. While plaintiff had previously filed and settled similar claim against defendant that alleged same violation of FDCPA regarding different debt, res judicata did not apply, since prior claim was not identical to instant claim, where defendant’s failure to notify credit agency with respect to each debt constituted separate wrong. Moreover, each alleged failure by defendant to notify credit agency could have caused additional harm to plaintiff’s credit score or peace of mind, and plaintiff was entitled to potential $1,000 statutory damages for each claim.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion to certify class action in plaintiff’s lawsuit alleging that defendant violated Illinois Right of Publicity Act (IRPA) by including without her permission her username on her Instagram account in third-party business’s web page located on defendant’s website. While plaintiff identified as common question whether individual's Instagram username categorically fell within IRPA’s definition of “identity,” Dist. Ct. could properly deny instant class certification request because IRPA, as applied to instant case, required Dist. Ct. to undergo username-by-username inquiry, such that common questions would not predominate over individual questions. Moreover, IRPA required comparative exercise that depended on both specific individual and specific appropriated attribute in question, which could not be solved categorically. As such, plaintiff could not develop for each class member common prima facie case under identity element of instant IRPA claim, and whether any username served to identify any individual required individual proof beyond category into which attribute fell.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment, after finding that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant used excessive force during his arrest while plaintiff was handcuffed, under circumstances where, according to plaintiff, defendant kicked him in leg that caused him to fall and suffer compound fracture in his leg. While videotape of arrest did not unambiguously establish what defendant did while attempting to return plaintiff to area near squad car, jury could conclude that defendant had delivered kick, as opposed to leg sweep as defendant had contended. However, defendant was still entitled to qualified immunity, where record showed that: (1) plaintiff was not under control when defendant attempted to use his knee to unbalance plaintiff; and (2) any kick by defendant was properly understood as attempt to regain control of plaintiff, who had previously told defendant that he wanted to run away. As such, while defendant’s attempt to control plaintiff caused plaintiff to incur injury to his leg, such attempt did not lead to liability.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ lawsuit seeking to overturn Illinois state law’s ban on political independent expenditure committees from making campaign contributions and from coordinating spending with candidates, even though Illinois Election Code (10 ILCS 5/9-8.5(h), (h-5)) allows individuals and certain entities to contribute to and coordinate with candidates without limits when self-funding or independent expenditures exceed threshold amount. Illinois Election Code never permits independent expenditure committees such as plaintiff to contribute to candidates, and while plaintiffs argued that by excluding independent expenditure committees from making such contributions and coordinating expenditures with candidates, Illinois had violated their First Amendment rights, as well as their protection under Equal Protection Clause when it allows others to do so, Ct. of Appeals found that Illinois could do so under intermediate scrutiny standard, since substantial risk of actual or apparent quid-pro-quo corruption would arise if instant ban would be lifted. Ct. further noted that partial lifting of instant ban would permit individuals to circumvent Illinois’s contribution disclosure regime.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on judicial estoppel grounds plaintiff’s action seeking $530,000 on theories of unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel, where plaintiff asserted that defendant had agreed to pay plaintiff directly for services that plaintiff rendered to third-party, whom defendant had hired to perform same services on behalf of defendant. While Dist. Ct. dismissed instant case because plaintiff had represented in third-party’s bankruptcy proceeding that third-party was sole debtor to plaintiff for claim in instant case, judicial estoppel did not apply, since plaintiff had not prevailed in bankruptcy proceeding by collecting instant debt from third-party’s estate in bankruptcy. Moreover, there is no authority to support Dist. Ct.’s belief that plaintiff’s claim as creditor in third-party’s bankruptcy’s proceeding necessarily abandoned all of plaintiff’s claims against other potentially responsible persons. Too, filing claim in bankruptcy proceeding did not foreclose related claims against non-bankrupt obligors.