Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-police officials' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' section 1983 action, alleging that defendants denied plaintiffs' constitutional right of access to courts when they engaged in cover-up to protect different defendant-police officer prior to and after plaintiffs began prosecuting said officer in underlying wrongful death claim. Plaintiffs are required to show in instant "backward-looking" access to courts claim that defendants' actions effectively precluded them from obtaining relief in wrongful death claim, and plaintiffs could not proceed at this juncture on their denial of access to courts claim, since: (1) defendants had not caused loss of and/or inadequate resolution of plaintiffs' wrongful death claim, which was still active and pending; (2) any contention that plaintiffs suffered concrete setback in wrongful death claim that was traceable to defendants' conduct was only speculation about event that might not come to pass; and (3) plaintiffs still had discovery process in wrongful death action that provided them with access to information/access to courts. As such, Dist. Ct should have dismissed without prejudice instant denial of court access claim pending outcome of wrongful death claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff's Rule 15 motion to reinstate his section 1983 action against defendants-police officials who had arrested plaintiff on criminal charges to which plaintiff had been convicted by time plaintiff had originally filed his section 1983 claim. Plaintiff's section 1983 claim could have been dismissed based on Heck bar due to fact that his underlying conviction had not been reversed or expunged, but Dist. Ct. dismissed with prejudice plaintiff's section 1983 action due to plaintiff's failure to prosecute his case. However, after plaintiff's conviction had been overturned, plaintiff filed instant motion to reinstate his section 1983 action, but Dist. Ct properly denied plaintiff's motion on ground that Rule 15 did not allow plaintiff to file amended complaint in instant terminated case. Moreover, although Rule 60(b) provided plaintiff with potential avenue to seek relief from terminated case, plaintiff waived any Rule 60(b) argument because he failed to raise it until he filed his reply brief. Also, it was unlikely that plaintiff could have prevailed if he had filed timely Rule 60(b)(6) motion, where plaintiff filed instant motion to reinstate more than one year after dismissal of his case.

Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in granting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint based on newly filed affirmative defense of res judicata, where defendants filed instant motion to assert said affirmative defense almost seven years after lawsuit had been filed. Dist. Ct. held erroneous belief that it was required under Massey, 196 F.3d 727, to allow defendants to assert instant res judicata claim as new affirmative defense where, as here, plaintiff filed amended complaint, and Dist. Ct. must exercise sound discretion under Rules 8 and 15 in deciding whether to allow late addition of new affirmative defense. Here, Dist. Ct. abused its discretion, where, although plaintiff was granted leave to file late motion to amend his complaint, plaintiff's amendments to complaint concerned only minor aspects of case that did not change theory or scope of case, and where said amendments had nothing to do with res judicata defense. Fact that Dist. Ct. had instructed defendants to "answer or otherwise plead" after it had granted motion to amend complaint did not require different result. Moreover, on remand, defendants will not be able to assert res judicata defense, since said defense was untimely, where defendants had waited six years to assert said defense, under circumstances where defendants had conducted discovery and asserted said defense prior to pending deadline for filing any summary judgment motion.

Ct. of Appeals granted plaintiff's motion for sanction under Fed. R. Pro. 38 based on plaintiff's contention that defendants' appellate court arguments that challenged Dist. Ct.'s entry of default judgment in plaintiff's Lanham Act claim were frivolous or destined to fail. Defendants' appellate arguments were contrary to well-established principles governing effect of default judgment and had virtually no likelihood of success. Also, defendants' appellate counsel failed to file complete jurisdictional statement and filed meritless motion to dismiss appeal asserting that appeal was "moot." Fact that defendants' counsel lacked experience in litigating federal appeals did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in vacating default judgment that had been entered in plaintiff's Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) against defendant-entity, where Dist. Ct. had previously granted summary judgment on merits to defendant-chief operating officer (CEO) of defendant-entity, and where Dist. Ct. held erroneous belief that there was legal inconsistency in granting plaintiff's default judgment against defendant-entity and granting defendant-CEO's motion for summary judgment. Dist. Ct. could properly grant defendant-CEO's motion for summary judgment, since he did not fit within definition of "sender" under TCPA, because: (1) he did not personally send any unsolicited faxes; (2) faxes were sent on behalf of defendant-entity; (3) any advertisements in faxes pertained to defendant-entity products; and (4) plaintiff could not base liability only on defendant-CEO's knowledge that defendant-entity was sending faxes. Also. Dist. Ct. had properly entered default judgment against defendant-entity based on entity's failure to obtain appearance from substitute counsel, and record did not show existence of any good cause to support vacatur of default judgment. Too, where, as here, plaintiff alleged joint and several liability against both defendants, entry of default judgment against one defendant and not against another was not precluded, and theories of liability under TCPA did not require uniformity of judgments.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff's request for $25,293.65 in costs after prevailing in Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claim, where Dist. Ct. had previously entered judgment for plaintiff under Rule 68 for $1,101 "plus costs to be determined by the Court." Plaintiff submitted as costs: (1) $24,137.50 as reimbursement under section 1692k(a)(1) of FDCPA for hundreds of hours plaintiff spent litigating instant action; (2) $156.15 in mailing costs under section 1692k(a)(3) of FDCPA; and (3) $1,000 in "additional damages" costs under section 1692k(a)(2) of FDCPA. Plaintiff also demanded $47,425.02 in punitive damages. Instant damages requested by plaintiff are not part of costs properly awarded under section 1692k(a) of FDPCA, and costs contemplated under FDCPA are simply those awardable under Rule 54(d). As such, costs under FDCPA do not include any kind of damages or compensation that plaintiff sought for his time and mailing expenses.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff's request for $25,293.65 in costs after prevailing in Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claim, where Dist. Ct. had previously entered judgment for plaintiff under Rule 68 for $1,101 "plus costs to be determined by the Court." Plaintiff submitted as costs: (1) $24,137.50 as reimbursement under section 1692k(a)(1) of FDCPA for hundreds of hours plaintiff spent litigating instant action; (2) $156.15 in mailing costs under section 1692k(a)(3) of FDCPA; and (3) $1,000 in "additional damages" costs under section 1692k(a)(2) of FDCPA. Plaintiff also demanded $47,425.02 in punitive damages. Instant damages requested by plaintiff are not part of costs properly awarded under section 1692k(a) of FDPCA, and costs contemplated under FDCPA are simply those awardable under Rule 54(d). As such, costs under FDCPA do not include any kind of damages or compensation that plaintiff sought for his time and mailing expenses.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on standing grounds plaintiff's section 1983 action, alleging that defendants (Sheriff and his deputies) concealed and/or destroyed evidence that decedent's estate could have used to help it pursue claims against putative murderers of decedent. While state court denied plaintiff's (relative of decedent) request to replace existing administrator of estate, record also showed that estate assigned to plaintiff whatever interest it had in instant lawsuit. As such, because of estate's assignment, plaintiff could pursue any damages claims against tortfeasors, and federal law permits assignee to sue on estate's behalf. Ct. of Appeals also observed that defendants did not deny him access to state courts and expressed doubt as to whether any alleged spoliation of evidence claim could supply basis for independent federal lawsuit under denial of access to courts theory at issue in instant lawsuit.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff-prisoner's fourth request for recruitment of counsel prior to reinstating grant of defendants-prison officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's own threats to commit suicide or to otherwise harm himself. Decision to recruit counsel should be informed by realities of recruiting counsel, and instant district used voluntary panel of attorneys, rather than involuntary appointment system, which made it more difficult to convince local counsel to take such cases. As such, Dist. Ct. could consider its scarce resources of volunteer attorneys and how they should be distributed when determining whether to grant request for recruitment of counsel. Moreover, Dist. Ct. adequately inquired into plaintiff's ability to litigate instant straight-forward case and noted plaintiff's ability to send and receive correspondence, make copies, write motions and briefs and perform legal research. Dist. Ct. further noted that: (1) plaintiff's briefs had been carefully edited to include appropriate arguments and citations to evidence; and (2) plaintiff had demonstrated ability to conduct discovery. Fact that plaintiff had been transferred to different prison during pendency of case did not require different result.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury's verdict against defendant-County in section 1983 action, alleging that County was deliberately indifferent to serious risk of harm to plaintiffs-female inmates' safety, when defendant-prison guard subjected them to repeated sexual assaults over three-year period. Record showed that towards beginning of guard's assaults on plaintiffs, complaints surfaced regarding another guard's inappropriate relationship with another inmate, and said guard received only token discipline. Moreover, County is not automatically liable for actions of instant defendant-guard, and County's liability under Monell can only be established when plaintiffs make threshold showing that County's policy caused their injuries. In this respect, plaintiffs satisfied their burden under Monell, where record showed that, although there was written policy prohibiting sexual conduct between inmates and guards, policy failed to address prevention and detection/reporting of said misconduct, and County otherwise failed to provide any meaningful training of guards on said topic. Also, plaintiffs could establish liability under Monell on single violation of plaintiffs' federal rights, as opposed to proof of pattern of said violations. Ct. rejected County's claim that guard's misconduct was unpreventable and/or undetectable so as to preclude any Monell liability. (Dissents filed.)