Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff-prisoner’s request for certification of class members consisting of detainees who needed canes, crutches or walkers in area of jail that plaintiff alleged failed to contain grab bars and other fixtures that would allow said detainees to use showers and bathrooms safely, where plaintiff alleged that said failure violated Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards. Dist. Ct. based denial on observation that plaintiff’s request would require that it rule on merits of plaintiff’s case. Ct. of Appeals, in remanding matter back for full consideration as to whether plaintiff’s request for class certification met all requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b), found that Dist. Ct. need not rule on merits of case when determining class certification request.

In action by debtor seeking sanctions against creditor-University for collecting on educational debt after said debt had been discharged in Chapter 7 proceeding, Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant’s appeal of Dist. Ct.’s order that reversed Bankruptcy Ct.’s order that found that said debt was non-dischargeable student loan. Dist. Ct. held that said debt was not student loan, and thus was not excluded from bankruptcy discharge and remanded matter back to Bankruptcy Ct. for proceedings on question of sanctions. Dist. Ct.’s order was not final and appealable, since remand back to Bankruptcy Ct. contemplated more than ministerial acts pertaining to determination as to whether sanctions were warranted for violation of discharge injunction.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to material risk of plaintiff’s life by not responding immediately to his suicide threat. Record showed that: (1) after female guard told defendant that she would write him up for exposing himself to her, plaintiff yelled that he had razor blade and intended to kill himself; and (2) female guard then walked away, and male guard came approximately 30 minutes later, saw that plaintiff had minor scratches on his forearm, seized razor blade and treated plaintiff’s scratches with gauze bandage. Dist. Ct. could properly conclude that plaintiff made only insincere suicide threat to get female guard’s attention. Moreover, while plaintiff focused his section 1983 claim on danger he presented to his life, plaintiff failed to present evidence of recoverable injury, where his injuries were only trivial, and where instant risk to his life was not compensable without evidence of injury.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state viable cause of action plaintiffs-former Sheriff’s Deputies’ section 1983 action alleging that defendants-Sheriff and Merit Board deprived them of due process by: (1) terminating them for disciplinary reasons at time when certain Board members held their appointments in violation of Illinois law; and (2) Sheriff pressuring Board members to make decisions contrary to Illinois law. Violation of state law is not basis for federal due process claim, such that defect in Board’s membership is not basis for federal constitutional claim. Moreover, plaintiffs’ allegations of biased decision-making suggest only that plaintiffs may have suffered random and unauthorized deprivation of their property interest in public employment. As such, plaintiffs’ injuries cannot form basis of federal due process claim where, as here, Illinois state courts offer adequate post-deprivation remedies.

In action alleging that defendants violated Telephone Consumer Protection Act when it faxed unsolicited messages without containing opt-out notices, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants’ motion to strike class definition that included non-Illinois members, where, according to defendants, Dist. Ct. did not have personal jurisdiction over claims of non-Illinois members in proposed nationwide class. While Dist Ct. found that not only plaintiffs, but also all unnamed members of proposed class had to show minimum contacts between defendants and forum state under specific personal jurisdiction rules, and that it had no jurisdiction over claims of unnamed class members who were harmed outside of Illinois, Ct. of Appeals found that while named representatives of class action must be able to demonstrate either general or specific personal jurisdiction, unnamed class members are not required to do so.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to compel arbitration of instant breach of contract claim based on arbitration clause. Record showed that: (1) defendant originally moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on other grounds; (2) Dist. Ct. dismissed complaint on jurisdictional grounds; (3) when plaintiff re-filed lawsuit, defendant filed second motion to dismiss based, among other things, on ground that provision in contract made arbitration exclusive forum for instant claim; and (4) plaintiff withdrew portion of motion to dismiss alleging dismissal based on arbitration clause, before filing instant motion to compel arbitration one month later. Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant had waived its right to arbitrate by expressly withdrawing its arbitration demand in second motion to dismiss. Fact that defendant claimed that plaintiff had pressured it to withdraw arbitration demand by threatening to seek sanctions against defendant did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his First Amendment rights by transferring him to different prison facility in retaliation for plaintiff have filed lawsuit and grievance regarding alleged poor conditions of prison and its lunches, as well as having provided statements to local newspaper about alleged poor medical care at prison. While plaintiff had engaged in protected speech, plaintiff failed to show that his transfer was motivated by fact that he had engaged in said speech, as opposed to substance of his complaints, where he presented no evidence that his difficulties with prison’s medical provider, as well as cold conditions and lunch program at prison could not be improved by transfer to different prison, as articulated by defendants. As such, plaintiff could not overcome significant deference owed to defendants’ non-retaliatory justification for instant transfer. Also, plaintiff failed to establish that transfer was adverse act, where: (1) plaintiff was transferred to same type of facility, (2) defendants did not transfer plaintiff into life-threatening situation; and (3) plaintiff could only establish minor differences in policies and conditions between both facilities.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion seeking to reopen lawsuit alleging that defendant had negligently omitted adult suicide risk in label on drug (paroxetine) that played role in suicide death of plaintiff’s decedent, where Ct. of Appeals had previously found that said lawsuit was preempted by federal law governing contents of labels for paroxetine. While plaintiff argued that recent decision in Albrecht, 139 U.S. 1668, constituted change in law with respect to clear evidence standard for impossibility preemption defense for prescription drug labels so as to warrant reopening of case, Ct. of Appeals found that Albrecht merely clarified prior case law on impossibility standard. Moreover, Ct. found that result in earlier appeal would be same under Albrecht, where: (1) prior to instant suicide, defendant had disclosed to FDA relevant data under its desired adult suicide warning; (2) FDA unanimously rejected defendant’s proffered Paxil/paroxetine-specific warning when it mandated that all SSRIs carry uniform class-wide warning label; and (3) plaintiff failed to show that defendant had acquired new evidence after FDA ruling that would have justified change in label. Ct. further found that plaintiff’s filing of Rule 60(b)(6) motion and instant appeal of Dist. Ct's order were not frivolous.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on pleadings in plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant’s request for attorneys’ fees in state-court action violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) on ground that request for attorneys’ fees constituted unfair debt collection practice. Dist. Ct. could properly find that request for attorneys’ fees was not “debt” as defined under FDCPA, where said request did not arise out of any consensual consumer transaction as defined under FDCPA, but rather arose out of  plaintiff’s alleged wrongdoings as condominium association board member at issue in underlying state-court action. Fact that plaintiff had purchased condominium that allowed him to be on condominium association board did not require different result, since fee request was based on his actions as board member and not purchase of his condominium.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on Rooker-Feldman doctrine grounds plaintiff’s lawsuit alleging that defendants-state-court judge and others had conspired to introduce into evidence forged documents during state-court trial that resulted in entry of foreclosure judgment and judicial sale of plaintiffs’ property. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiffs’ injuries in instant case stemmed from prior state-court’s foreclosure judgment, and that plaintiffs could not use instant federal action to set aside order of foreclosure or monetary judgment entered against them, where plaintiffs essentially would require Dist. Ct. to evaluate state-court judgment. Fact that state court foreclosure judgment was not final order did not require different result, where plaintiffs had satisfied state-court judgment by time of filing of instant lawsuit.