Federal Civil Practice

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s $400,000 verdict in favor of plaintiff in plaintiff-school superintendent’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant-school board constructively discharged her in retaliation for registering complaint with police that member of board threatened her with physical violence. While defendant argued that plaintiff’s police report was personal grievance, as opposed to protectible matter of public concern, plaintiff’s report was legitimate subject of public concern that was protected under First Amendment, since potential for physical violence between public officials implies that instant public institution was not working properly. Moreover, instant threat, which was uttered shortly after plaintiff had requested audit of school district’s finances, was matter of public interest, especially where link between audit and threat was reported to police. Ct. noted, though, that defendant had waived any potential issue that report was not protected under First Amendment under Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410, because it concerned on-the-job speech based on plaintiff’s job duties. Ct. also affirmed Dist. Ct.’s  award of $190,000 in attorney’s fees, even though plaintiff had requested $485,000 in fees due to higher than normally charged hourly-rate and “bonus” enhancements, where said enhancements are not permitted under fee-shifting statutes.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officers' motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants used excessive force when they shot and killed decedent during incident in which decedent’s mother called police to conduct welfare check on decedent, who had indicated that he intended to kill himself, and where decedent and defendants eventually engaged in scuffle that resulted in decedent cutting one defendant with knife prior to said shooting. While plaintiff alleged that defendants acted unreasonably because defendants’ actions had agitated decedent and created conditions that precipitated violent encounter, decedent’s actions were intervening cause of deadly force, and situation requiring defendant's use of deadly force was not primarily of their own making, where decedent had cut one defendant twice with knife prior to instant shooting. Fact that plaintiff had alleged that defendant had violated departmental policies during encounter did not require different result, since section 1983 protects plaintiff only from constitutional violations and not violations of local police department. Also use of deadly force was reasonable, where both defendants were subjected to immediate threat of their safety at time of shooting.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-Village’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-Tribe’s action seeking to enjoin defendant from enforcing its ordinance requiring that plaintiff obtain permit to host plaintiff’s annual festival on land that was partially located in Village, but was entirely located on land that was part of Reservation that was formed by 1838 Treaty with Tribe. While defendant argues that said land was no longer part of Reservation, where Congress had allotted Reservation among individual Tribe members and allowed Tribe members to sell said land to non-Indians, Ct. of Appeals, in reversing Dist. Ct., found that under Solem, 465 U.S. 463, and McGirt, 140 S.Ct. 2452, Reservation could be diminished or disestablished only by Congress, and that Congress, through its statutory text, never articulated clear congressional purpose to diminish Reservation, even though it had allowed Tribe members to sell land to non-Indians. As such, entire Reservation as established through 1838 Treaty remained Indian country, such that defendant lacked jurisdiction to apply its ordinance to plaintiff’s on-Reservation activities.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s request for issuance of preliminary injunction in section 1983 action alleging that three policies of defendant-University impermissibly chilled free speech rights of student members of its organization. Specifically, plaintiff sought to enjoin: (1) defendant’s requirement prohibiting without prior approval posting of leaflets about candidates for non-campus elections; (2) defendant from using BARFT and BIP processes to investigate or punish students for bias-motivated incidents; and (3) defendant’s issuance of No Contact Directives (NCD) without procedures ensuring that said directives were consistent with First Amendment. Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge BART and BIP processes or imposition of NCDs, where plaintiff failed to show that any of its members faced credible threat of enforcement or that said policies had objective chilling effect on their speech. This is so, Ct. found, because: (1) bias-motivated speech alone is not student code violation; (2) plaintiff failed to identify specific statements that any student wished to make that defendant’s policies have chilled; and (3) students interactions with BART were optional and BART itself did not have any disciplinary authority. Plaintiff also failed to present any example of defendant issuing NCD  on basis of speech. Moreover, plaintiff’s challenge to prior approval rule was moot, where said rule is now abolished, and where there was no evidence that said rule was ever enforced. (Partial dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state viable claim plaintiffs’ (individuals who had been released on bail) section 1983 action alleging that defendant-Sheriff improperly detained them from three to fourteen days after entry of trial court’s bail release order because he essentially disagreed with trial court’s release order. Plaintiffs adequately alleged claim under Fourth Amendment for wrongful pre-trial custody, where: (1) plaintiffs alleged that in place of court-ordered release on specified terms, defendant substituted prolonged detentions, as well as significant restraints on pretrial release of his own devising; and (2) such decisions to delay release was not defendant’s to make. Moreover, Ct. found that instant alleged delays could not be justified on basis of administrative delay. Also, plaintiffs stated adequate equal protection claim, where plaintiffs maintained that defendant targeted plaintiffs for detention because of their race, and where defendant’s bail review policy disproportionately targeted African-American inmates. Plaintiffs also adequately alleged state-law claim alleging that defendant contumaciously refused to comply with trial court bail release orders that were legally issued to him. While defendant argued that bail orders requiring him to monitor plaintiffs on bail could not be binding on him because he had not agreed to said monitoring, defendant’s argument could not be resolved on pleadings.

Ct. of Appeals imposed $44,329.50 in attorney’s fees against defendant-appellant and its counsel as sanction for filing frivolous appeal in Lanham Act case. While plaintiff-appellee sought over $50,000 in attorney’s fees, Ct. of Appeals reduced instant request for time spent by plaintiff’s counsel after date of Ct. of Appeals’ opinion, including time spent by plaintiff’s counsel preparing sanctions motion. Also, scope of sanctions included defendant's counsel, where motion for sanctions sought sanctions against defendant's counsel, and where opinion cited to actions taken by defendant’s counsel in support for granting sanctions request.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-prison official’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-former prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated plaintiff’s 8th Amendment rights by refusing to give him 97-day sentencing credit for second, pre-trial detention on second drug charge for which defendant was convicted. Defendant believed that she could ignore 97-day credit for drug offense that was committed while defendant was on bail for first charged drug offense, since defendant had been in pre-trial custody for both drug charges at same time, and since she believed that Illinois law only applies greatest of multiple credits (plaintiff had received 255-day credit on first drug charge) when plaintiff was in pretrial detention on multiple charges at same time. However, even if defendant was wrong on instant release date calculation, plaintiff failed to present any evidence that defendant had acted with deliberate indifference when calculating his release date. Fact that defendant did her job by determining release date did not establish any intent to punish plaintiff excessively. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds plaintiffs-Deputy Assessors’ section 1983 action alleging that defendant-Township Assessor violated their First Amendment rights when defendant fired them shortly after he took office as Township Assessor on account of fact that they had supported his political rival and predecessor. Dist. Ct. could properly find under plausibility standard associated with motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity at this juncture of proceeding, where plaintiffs’ allegations stated claim of violation of clearly established law. Moreover, Ct. noted that: (1) no statutes or ordinances confirmed defendant’s claim that Deputy Assessor position involved policymaking input or access to Assessor’s politically sensitive or confidential thoughts so as to allow use of political affiliation to be factor in plaintiffs’ terminations; and (2) reasonable state actor would have understood that firing employee from position that lacked meaningful input into political decision-making violated employee’s First Amendment rights.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that his cell was searched in violation of his First Amendment rights in retaliation for having lodged disagreement over prison procedure regarding pending grievances, as well as threat to file another grievance. Record showed that while plaintiff’s cell was searched nine minutes after telling one official that he might file another grievance due to disagreement regarding status of prior grievances filed by plaintiff, record failed to show that defendant-officer who actually conducted search of plaintiff’s cell had been aware of said conversation to support finding that search was in retaliation for plaintiff’s protected conduct in having lodged disagreement regarding status of his prior grievances. Moreover, officer, who had conducted search, based said search on contraband mentioned in disciplinary report filed two weeks prior to search.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of Article III standing Plaintiffs’ (Democratic Party and several of its members) section 1983 action, alleging that defendants (members of Wisconsin legislature, current Wisconsin Governor and Attorney General and others) violated their rights under First Amendment, Equal Protection and Guarantee Clauses, where state legislature enacted two laws after 2018 election that stripped incoming Democratic Governor and Attorney General of various powers and vested Republican-controlled legislative committees with formerly-executive authority. Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue instant action, where: (1) instant Wisconsin laws did not restrict plaintiffs’ conduct in any way; (2) contrary to plaintiff’s contention, instant action did not dilute their votes, since they were able to vote in 2018 election and their votes were counted; and (3) plaintiffs’ abstract interest in powers of Governor and Attorney General is mere nonjusticiable general interest that is common to all members of general public. Also, Democratic Party lacked associational standing where its members lacked standing to sue in their own right, and where instant laws did not target Party or formally restrict its ability to raise finds or otherwise meaningfully participate in elections. Fact that instant laws were motivated by partisan politics did not constitute federal constitutional injury. Plaintiffs also lacked standing on their Guarantee Clause action, which did not otherwise apply to issues regarding balance of power among branches of state government, where claim did not involve existential threat to republican form of government.