Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment, after finding that plaintiff’s 2017 legal malpractice claim was filed beyond applicable two-year limitation period. According to plaintiff, she instructed defendants-attorneys to provide her with future interest in her brother’s share of trust assets, subject to life estate held by brother’s wife, and record showed that she received documents detailing disbursement of trust in 1999. Moreover, while plaintiff asserted that she could not have known in 1999 that defendants failed to follow her instructions until death of brother’s wife in 2015, record showed that: (1) plaintiff signed retention letter that stated that trust assets were being distributed free and clear; and (2) plaintiff should have realized that something was amiss when she received trust principal outright in 2000.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ request to file second motion for summary judgment that raised plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his prison remedies prior to filing instant section 1983 action alleging that defendants used excessive force and failed to intervene on his behalf, under circumstances, where: (1) defendants had previously filed partially successful motion for summary judgment that neglected to raise instant failure to exhaust remedies issue; and (2) instant second motion for summary judgment was filed beyond deadline for filing any motion for summary judgment. While Rule 6(b)(1)(B) permits Dist. Ct. to extend deadlines, defendants merely attributed their failure to timely file instant summary judgment motion to “unknown reasons.” As a result, defendants failed to show that instant delay was due to “excusable neglect,” and thus Dist. Ct. erred in allowing defendants to file instant second motion for summary judgment and then ultimately granting said motion on its merits.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiffs-debtors’ Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claim, alleging that defendant-debt collector’s two dunning letters were misleading because they demanded interest during months that creditor had internally decided to write off instant debt. Applicable limitations period is one year, and instant dunning letters were sent to plaintiff more than one year prior to filing of instant lawsuit. Moreover, while third dunning letter that was sent by defendant to plaintiffs’ lawyer, which plaintiffs contended contained “false” statements about debt, was timely, it was not actionable under FDCPA, since: (1) at time said letter was sent, reasonable competent debt collector would not know that claims for interest made in letter were not enforceable; and (2) claim made in third dunning letter would not have misled competent lawyer, because said lawyer would not deem as “false,” demand made by potential opponent in litigation just because lawyer believes that his client may be able to persuade judge that there is defense to claimed debt.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for want of prosecution plaintiff-employee’s Title VII and ADEA actions alleging that he was victim of race, sex and age discrimination. Record showed that throughout four years of litigation, plaintiff repeatedly failed to appear for his deposition, missed status hearing, failed to follow local rules regarding motion practice, refused to respond to discovery requests despite repeated orders to do so and ignored Dist. Ct.’s orders that his conduct would lead to dismissal of his lawsuit. Record also showed that Dist. Ct. periodically recruited pro bono counsel to act on plaintiff’s behalf and dismissed instant case as sanction after fourth pro bono counsel filed successful motion to withdraw as counsel. Ct. also observed that Dist. Ct. should not have persisted in recruiting successive pro bono counsel to represent plaintiff, given plaintiff’s history of noncompliance with his discovery obligations.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiffs' motion to remand their cause of action to Indiana state court, where defendants had removed to federal court under 28 USC section 1442(a)(1) plaintiffs’ action alleging that defendants or their predecessor entities had polluted soil in and around site of plaintiffs’ later-built residence. Defendants could properly assert that they were entitled to government contractor defense to support removal of plaintiffs' lawsuit to federal court due to contracts they had with government during World War II to produce/supply lead and other pollutants according to government specifications, where at time of said production government had thoroughly regulated use of said pollutants. While Dist. Ct. justified remand to state court on its belief that defendants had only acted under color of federal office for small part of alleged time period at issue in lawsuit, defendants need only demonstrate connection or association between act in question and federal officer. Also, while plaintiffs have raised question about whether defendants’ pollution flowed from their specific wartime production for federal government or from their more general manufacturing operations outside those confines, removal was still proper as long as government contractor defense applied to some of plaintiffs’ claims that pertained to defendants’ wartime activities.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-prison doctor’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s dental infection, where defendant prescribed penicillin and eventually steroids to treat said condition over five-day period, instead of referring defendant to outside medical personnel, who eventually diagnosed plaintiff with Ludwig’s angina and performed multiple surgeries to treat infection in his mouth. Defendant’s experts stated that defendant’s treatment of plaintiff’s mouth was within standard of care, and record showed that defendant neither disregarded plaintiff’s condition nor believed that treatment he was prescribing for plaintiff was known to be ineffective. As such, while plaintiff’s expert opined that defendant ignored obvious risk of progression of infection in plaintiff’s mouth, record established only that there was difference of medical opinion over course of defendant’s treatment, which established at best existence of only negligence as opposed to deliberate indifference.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees incurred on certain common law copyright claims, even though Dist. Ct. had observed that said claims were baseless, where plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed said claims with prejudice. While there is strong presumption in favor of awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants in copyright claims, Dist. Ct. could properly deny defendants’ request for attorney fees, where: (1) plaintiff’s lawsuit that included copyright and trademark infringement claims appeared to have been brought in good faith; (2) defendants had only filed answer with respect to copyright claims and had not filed any substantial briefing or conducted discovery on said claims prior to dismissal; and (3) plaintiffs’ claims had been voluntarily dismissed with prejudice. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could deny instant request for fees even though plaintiff’s copyright claims were baseless.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-prison officials used excessive force against him, where Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his prison administrative remedies prior to filing instant lawsuit. Exhaustion was not required, where prison officials did not provide plaintiff with clear directives to appeal his grievance as part of his administrative remedies. Moreover, although Review Board told plaintiff that his grievance appeal was missing specific documents, it failed to check box indicating that said documents needed to be provided or that some explanation needed to be given for their absence. Also, plaintiff had no reason to believe that anyone was looking into his grievance, and record showed that no prison official ever responded with answer to plaintiff's standard grievance.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs-churches' request for issuance of preliminary injunction in section 1983 action alleging that defendant's executive order limiting size of public assemblies, including religious services, to 10 persons violates their rights under Free Exercise Clause of First Amendment. Instant case is not moot, although defendant subsequently issued executive order that made said limitation only recommendation. However, original executive order did not discriminate against religion, where church services are akin to other congregate functions that occur in auditoriums that have same limitation and have same risks of transmitting COVID disease. Ct. rejected plaintiffs' claim that church services were similar to grocery stores and pharmacies which do not have 10-person limitation.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff-prisoner's Rule 60(b) motion to reopen his case after it had been dismissed for want of prosecution. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff sued defendants-prison officials for alleged violations of his constitutional rights; (2) during pendency of his case, plaintiff was released on parole, but did not notify court of his new address or respond to defendants' motions or discovery requests over seven-month period; (3) Dist. Ct. directed plaintiff in screening order to notify it, as well as defendants, of new address if he was released from prison and warned plaintiff that it would not independently investigate his whereabouts; and (4)) Dist. Ct. dismissed case for want of prosecution after seven months of silence from plaintiff. While plaintiff, who returned to different prison after having his parole revoked, argued that his failure to update his address was excusable "clerical error," plaintiff's lengthy period of inaction, as well as need to reschedule discovery and dispositive motion deadlines if case were to be reinstated, supported denial of plaintiff's motion to reinstate his case. Moreover, plaintiff failed to explain his failure to track status of his case, which did not otherwise constitute excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1).