Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in class action by plaintiffs-condominium owners, who purchased from defendants disclosure documents required for resale of their condominium units, where plaintiff asserted that fees for said documents charged by defendants were excessive in violation of Ill. Condominium Act. Relevant Ill. Condominium Act provision allowing condominium associations ability to charge “reasonable” fee for such documents does not provide plaintiffs with private right of action, and Illinois law does not otherwise imply private right of action for condominium owners, since said Act works for benefit of condominium purchasers as opposed to condominium owners. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ similar Ill. Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act claim, since charging too much for goods or services, standing alone, is not unfair practice under said Act.

Ct. of Appeals entered limited remand for purposes of allowing Dist. Ct. to comply with Rule 65(d) with respect to entry of three orders purporting to impose preliminary injunction. Rule 65(d) requires Dist. Ct. to set forth injunction without referring to any other document, and Dist. Ct. failed to generate document that contained terms of injunction separate from its opinion. Ct. further noted that parties should file new notices of appeal and then file new appellate briefs that covered original injunction, as well as any modifications of original permanent injunction. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-assistant principal’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated her First Amendment rights by retaliating against her for complaining about supervisor’s decision on student discipline issue and violated her due process rights by coercing her resignation. Record showed that plaintiff registered her complaint in her status as employee, as opposed to private citizen, because subject matter of complaint fell within her official duties, and thus First Amendment did not protect her speech. Also, plaintiff failed to establish any due process claim, even though she had protected interest in her continued employment, because employee who resigns and relinquishes her interest in continued employment may not complain about lack of due process. Moreover, although plaintiff could prevail if she showed that her resignation had been involuntary, plaintiff did not show that she had been subjected to constructive discharge, where supervisor merely asked for her resignation, or that her resignation had been coerced, since supervisor, at best, only threatened to fire her.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-City and certain police officers’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant officers violated her 4^th Amendment rights on two occasions when officers entered her home without consent after Airbnb guest reported theft in plaintiff’s home, and when officers subsequently entered plaintiff’s home to help with evacuation of plaintiff’s home after building inspectors discovered 32 code violations. Police had valid consent to enter plaintiff’s home on first occasion when Airbnb guest gave officer code to unlock front gate, and where two other guests allowed officer to enter plaintiff’s home. With respect to second entry, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting officers qualified immunity, where: (1) plaintiff acknowledged that officers’ entry was due to safety concerns; and (2) officers relied on inspectors’ representations that plaintiff’s home was danger to its occupants and to public due to existence of code violations. As such, reasonable officer could have believed that entry into plaintiff’s home was reasonable.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison medical officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoners’ section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his primary lateral sclerosis condition by failing to ensure that he received proper follow-up care after his surgery and by allowing undue delays in his treatment by outside specialists. Plaintiff was required to show that delay in his treatment, as opposed to his underlying medical condition, caused some harm, and that defendants’ actions caused delays in treatment. Moreover, plaintiff failed to make such requisite showing, where: (1) defendant-physician’s decision to wait for test results before referring defendant to specialists was not evidence of deliberate indifference and was consistent with reasonable medical judgment; (2) defendant-physician responded to plaintiff’s changing symptoms and was responsive to specialists’ recommendations; and (3) defendant did was he could within limits of his role in treating plaintiff. Also, plaintiff failed to show that defendant-entity was indifferent to his medical needs, where: (1) plaintiff failed to show that prison’s onsite medical facilities were insufficient to cover plaintiff’s medical needs during periods in which plaintiff was waiting for treatment provided by outside specialists; and (2) plaintiff lacked evidence that defendant entity was on notice that wait times for outside treatment were likely to cause constitutional violations.

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman doctrine to consider and then resolve plaintiffs’ action alleging that defendants conspired to deprive them of several goats and horses, where state-court had previously entered orders finding probable cause to seize said animals and then ordering permanent placement of said animals. Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which precludes lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims seeking review of state court judgments, applied where instant federal action was “inextricably intertwined” with prior state court action, and state court’s finding of probable cause and seizure of said animals produced injury claimed by plaintiffs in instant action. Moreover, plaintiffs had opportunities to litigate instant claims in state court.

Magistrate Judge had authority to dismiss instant section 1983 action filed by plaintiff-prisoner, alleging that defendants-prison nurses were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, where said dismissal occurred at initial screening stage of proceeding prior to time defendants had been served with lawsuit and after Magistrate Judge had found that plaintiff had failed to state viable cause of action. Record showed that Wisc. Dept. of Justice had entered into memorandum of understanding that granted limited consent for Magistrate Judge to conduct initial screenings of civil cases involving prisoners, and plaintiff had given general consent for Magistrate Judge to resolve entire case. As such, Magistrate Judge had authority to screen case and issue instant dismissal order under 28 USC section 636(c). Also, Magistrate Judge could properly find that plaintiff had failed to state viable cause of action, where: (1) allegations in complaint merely showed that defendants exercised medical judgment when examining plaintiff; and (2) plaintiff’s allegations showed, at best, that defendants were negligent in failing to refer defendant to emergency room at earlier time.

Record failed to contain sufficient evidence to support removal of instant state-court class action, alleging that defendant improperly used class members’ photographs to promote defendant’s product, where defendant’s notice of removal merely stated that proposed class “undoubtedly would include at least some undetermined number of non-Illinois and Non-Delaware citizens as class plaintiffs.” Class Action Fairness Act permits removal of proposed class action as long as defendant can show that one member of class is citizen of state different from any one defendant, and defendant’s notice of removal failed to identify said member. As such, limited remand (which would allow defendant to conduct discovery) was required for defendant to identify such class member in order for Dist. Ct. to acquire jurisdiction over case and to allow Ct. of Appeals to consider issues raised by plaintiff class on appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-former employer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-former employee’s defamation action, alleging that defendant’s placement of plaintiff’s name on restriction list and statement that plaintiff was suspended in connection with corruption investigation and that he posed significant and unacceptable compliance risk, falsely suggested that he had engaged in criminal misconduct. Fact that plaintiff had been suspended in connection with corruption investigation was not defamatory because it was true statement. Moreover, defendant’s expression that plaintiff posed compliance risk was not defamatory because it was statement of opinion that could not be proven false.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs-prisoner and former prison psychologist’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants' denial of their request to marry violated their fundamental right to marry. Record showed that both plaintiffs had violated prison rules by engaging in romantic relationship while plaintiff psychologist worked at plaintiff’s prison, and that psychologist had violated code of professional conduct in maintaining said relationship. As such, defendants could properly deny instant request to marry, given defendants’ right to maintain secure prison facility that was capable of monitoring inmate contacts, and given their right to promote respect for prison’s rules. Ct. noted, though, that plaintiff-prisoner was not precluded from making marriage request in future.