Federal Civil Practice

Ct. of Appeals denied govt.-appellee’s motion for summary affirmance of Dist. Ct.’s order that had dismissed for failure to state valid claim plaintiff’s Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuit, alleging negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, where, according to plaintiff, lead attorney for U.S. Military Commission Defense Organization that, along with plaintiff, represented person charged as al-Qaeda enemy combatant, disclosed to client plaintiff’s gay sexuality and falsely told client that plaintiff was infatuated with client and was pursuing that interest. While plaintiff’s opening appellate brief failed to comply with Rule of App. Pro. 28 by failing to provide either adequate statement of case, legal citations or identification of legal errors associated with Dist. Ct.’s order in argument section, summary affirmance was not warranted, since: (1) sparse briefing alone is not reason to enter merits judgment; and (2) plaintiff’s brief did not rise to level of “incompressible or completely insubstantial” brief. Moreover, Ct. gave plaintiff seven days to request leave to strike his initial brief and file substitute brief that complies with Rule 28.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying U.S. govt.’s motion to dismiss relator’s claim under False Claims Act, where govt. sought to intervene and to dismiss instant qui tam action. Relator alleged that defendants illegally paid physicians for prescribing or recommending Cimzia to treat Crohn’s disease and provided said physicians with illegal kickbacks in form of free education services and free reimbursement support services. Under section 3730(c)(2)(A), govt. has right to dismiss instant action over relator's objection if relator is provided notice and opportunity for hearing, and govt., in its motion to dismiss, argued that dismissal was appropriate because relator’s claim lacked sufficient merit to justify cost of investigation and prosecution and was otherwise contrary to public interest. Ct. of Appeals has jurisdiction to consider denial of govt.’s request to intervene and dismiss, even after govt. had failed to intervene at beginning stage of litigation. Moreover, govt.’s motion to dismiss should have been granted with prejudice as to relator’s claim and without prejudice as to govt.’s claim, since: (1) govt. met all requirements set forth in section 3730(c)(2)(A), where relator received notice and opportunity to be heard at hearing; and (2) Dist. Ct. erred in applying arbitrary and capricious standard to govt.’s motion. Fact that govt. failed to make particularized dollar-figure estimate of potential costs and benefits of relator’s lawsuit did not require different result.

Plaintiff-pretrial detainee was entitled to new trial on his section 1983 action, alleging that defendant-prison officials violated his due process rights by failing to provide him with adequate medical care, where plaintiff presented defendants with suicide risk, and where defendants failed to prevent him from attempting suicide. Although jury found  in favor of defendants, Dist. Ct. gave erroneous jury instruction that required jury to ascertain defendants’ subjective belief as to whether they were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs, rather than requiring jury to determine whether defendants acted in objectively reasonable manner based on plaintiff’s conduct prior to his suicide attempt. Moreover, said instruction likely had determinative effect on jury’s verdict, where defendants based their defense on claim that they did not consciously fail to take reasonable measures to prevent plaintiff’s suicide attempt.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison doctors’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that said doctors were deliberately indifferent to pain he experienced after he had undergone surgery on his ankle, where, according to plaintiff, said defendants altered his schedule to receive pain medication that resulted in him not getting timely doses of said medication. Record showed that defendant prison health manager was unaware of either plaintiff’s treatment or her ability to intervene in it, and other doctors, who either based initial pain medicine dose on medical judgment or revised pain medicine order, did not know either that said change would cause plaintiff serious harm, or that plaintiff would incur delays in receiving said medication. However, Dist. Ct. erred in granting summary judgment for defendant-prison nurse, where there was factual dispute regarding whether on three occasions said defendant ignored plaintiff’s pain complaints and/or failed to consult prison doctor when plaintiff reported extreme pain after his original medication had run out.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider union’s appeal of Magistrate Judge’s order that granted plaintiff’s request for declaratory judgment to allow special master to observe union grievance meetings, where special master had previously been appointed to monitor defendant’s compliance with 1972 consent decree and 1983 judgment order precluding defendant from continuing to favor political allies in employment decisions. While union filed memorandum in opposition to plaintiff’s request for declaratory judgment, union could not appeal Magistrate Judge’s grant of plaintiff’s motion, since union was not party in instant lawsuit. Ct. rejected union’s argument that it should be treated as party because it is bound by Magistrate Judge’s order that allowed special master’s presence at union’s grievance meetings. Moreover, Ct. noted that union could have sought to intervene at Dist. Ct. level to gain requisite party status to file any appeal.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs-female prisoners’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendants’ conduct during mass strip searches of female prisoners as part of cadet officer training violated their 4th Amendment privacy rights, where searches were allegedly conducted in intrusive and degrading manner. While Dist. Ct. found no 4th Amendment violation because plaintiffs lacked privacy interest during visual inspections of their bodies while in prison, Ct. of Appeals, in en banc decision, found that Fourth Amendment protects in severely limited way inmate’s right to bodily privacy during instant visual inspections. As such, remand was required for determination as to whether defendants’ mass strip searches were reasonable in light of realities of incarceration, that include consideration of scope of particular intrusion, manner in which it is conducted, justification for initiating searches and place in which they were conducted. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in denying motion to intervene filed by two holders of permit to build $500 million electricity transmission line in lawsuit filed by plaintiffs-two environmental groups seeking to invalidate instant environmental permit issued by defendant-Commission. While Dist. Ct. based its denial of intervention motion on belief that defendant adequately represented intervenors’ interests in lawsuit because defendant and intervenors had same goal of dismissing plaintiffs’ lawsuit, defendant and intervenors had interests that were independent of each other, where intervenors had financial interests in maintaining permit and had obligations to their shareholders, while defendant had only obligation to general public. Moreover, defendant regulated transmission companies like intervenors, but did not advocate for them, and transmission companies cannot be forced to rely entirely on defendant to protect their investments in construction projects. As such, intervenors satisfied prerequisites for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2), where, under lenient default standard, intervenors established that they had interest in property at issue in lawsuit, that defendant’s representation of their interests might be inadequate, and that defendant and intervenors had different interests and different defenses to lawsuit.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying motion by one class member seeking disgorgement of $130,000 in settlement proceeds that three other class members received in compensation from proceeds that class had received in settlement of class action, where said class members had objected to terms of class action settlement, had appealed denial of their objections, and had dismissed said appeals in exchange for instant settlement payments. While Dist. Ct. found that objectors had not intended or committed illegal act nor taken money out of common fund by taking money in exchange for dismissal of their appeals, Ct. of Appeals, in reversing trial court, found that settling objections to proposed class action settlement where objections asserted class’s rights in return for private payment to objectors is inequitable, and that disgorgement is most appropriate remedy. Moreover, said objectors who settle their objections for amounts in excess of their shares as class members are not paid for anything they actually owned. As such, objectors’ settlement proceeds belonged in equity to class.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s class action alleging that defendant-insurance company, which issued group long-term insurance policy to plaintiff’s employer, breached its contract, committed torts and violated consumer protection laws by raising his premiums dramatically. While Dist. Ct. based its dismissal upon defendant’s affirmative defense that plaintiff could not prevail because Washington State Insurance Commissioner had approved instant premium, remand was required, where: (1) defendant failed to identify that instant rate-filed affirmative defense came from either state or federal law; and (2) Dist. Ct. failed to resolve instant choice-of-law issue, where record contained at least two potential (either Washington D.C. or State of Washington) laws that could apply to plaintiff’s claim. As such, there needs to be finding as to which forum’s law applies to plaintiff’s case before there could be any valid dismissal. Ct. further noted that there was presumptive rule in group insurance settings that would apply law of employer’s principal place of business (Washington D.C.) as opposed to plaintiff’s residence in State of Washington, and that there was no guarantee that court in Washington D.C. would defer to findings of Washington State Insurance Commissioner. Also, remand was required, since it was unclear as to whether filed-rate affirmative defense as recognized by State of Washington would apply to instant factual setting. 

Dist. Ct. erred in transferring back to Dist. Ct. of Eastern California portion of plaintiff’s action arising out of employment contract, where plaintiff alleged violations of Fair Labor Standards Act, as well as various violations of California Labor Code, and where said contract contained forum-selection clause providing that plaintiff must bring claims against defendant in either Indiana state court or Indiana federal court. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff had originally brought instant lawsuit in California state court; (2) defendant successfully removed action to Dist. Ct. of Eastern California, which granted defendant’s motion to transfer case to Dist. Ct. of Southern Indiana based upon forum selection clause; and (3) Dist. Ct. of Southern Indiana thereafter transferred portion of case back to Dist. Ct. of Eastern California. Ct. of Appeals, in granting defendant’s petition for writ of mandamus, found that Dist. Ct. of Southern Indiana should have retained entire lawsuit pursuant to forum-selection clause, which, according to Ct. of Appeals, should be given controlling weight in all but most exceptional cases. Moreover, Dist. Ct. of Southern Indiana improperly: (1) placed burden on defendant to justify keeping case in Indiana; (2) held belief that transfer was warranted because Dist. Ct. of Eastern California was more familiar with applicable California law; and (3) failed to acknowledge that delay in bringing instant case to trial was longer in California than in Indiana.