Federal Civil Practice

In action under section 43 of Lanham Act, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff-beer manufacturer's request for injunction to prevent defendant-rival beer manufacturer from misleading consumers by saying that plaintiff's beer "contains corn syrup." Plaintiff identified corn syrup as one ingredient of its beer, and some of plaintiff's own managers acknowledged that its beer "contains" what is on its ingredients list. Accordingly, where word such as "ingredient" has multiple potential meanings, plaintiff cannot enjoin defendant's statements about presence of corn syrup, since it is neither "false" nor "misleading" for seller to say or imply of business rival something that rival says about itself.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action alleging that defendant-prison medical provider was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, when it failed to approve surgery to remove cataracts in one of plaintiff's eyes, where defendant had policy to refuse such surgery when inmate had some visual acuity in other eye. While Dist. Ct. based dismissal upon its finding that plaintiff did not file standard grievance after his two prior grievances had been denied emergency status, plaintiff had done enough to exhaust his administrative remedies, even without resubmission of  his grievance, since relevant rules prior to 2017 Amendment did not instruct that inmates filing emergency grievances need to formally resubmit their complaints as ordinary grievances if warden concluded that they did not present emergency.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering permanent injunction precluding enforcement of U.S. Attorney General's conditions for plaintiff's receipt of federal Byrne JAG grant monies earmarked for local law enforcement to help fight crime, where said conditions required local authorities' cooperation with federal authorities seeking federal immigration enforcement in terms of: (1) providing federal agents with advance notice of alien's scheduled release date and time from custody; (2) providing federal agents with access to aliens in custody; (3) certifying that local authorities did not prohibit their agents from communicating said information to I.N.S. or that local authorities did not have in effect any law/rule that would impede exercise by federal officers of authority under 8 USC sections 1357(a), 1226(a) or (c), 1231(a), 1366(1) or (3). States do not forfeit all autonomy over their own police power merely by accepting federal grants, and while federal executive has significant powers over immigration matters, "power of purse" is not one of said powers to force compliance with federal laws. Ct.  remanded matter for determination if any other injunctive relief was appropriate in view of court's determination that section 10153 cannot be used to incorporate laws unrelated to grants or grantees. (Partial dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officer and City's motion for summary judgment in plaintiff's section 1983 action alleging that defendant-police officer used excessive force during attempt to apprehend plaintiff's decedent. Record showed that prior to shooting, police officer received dispatch: (1) requesting assistance in apprehending decedent, who allegedly had arrest warrant for strangulation and suffocation; and (2) notifying officer that decedent had taken vehicle without consent and was known for violent tendencies. Thereafter, officer spotted decedent in vehicle, and decedent led officer on car chase that ended with decedent crashing his car into tree and decedent fleeing scene into car repair shop, where officer and decedent confronted each other between parked SUV. Officer thereafter shot decedent in repair shop six times. Officer was entitled to qualified immunity, since officer could reasonably use deadly force, where record showed that: (1) decedent had refused every opportunity to surrender during chase and during confrontation in car repair shop; (2) decedent chose to become aggressor and had dared officer to shoot him; and (3) officer reasonably believed that decedent's actions placed him in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.

Dist. Ct. erred in entering judgment in defendant's favor at close of plaintiff' case in bench trial on qui tam action, alleging that defendants violated Anti-Kickback Statute by paying co-defendant $5,000 on monthly basis for access to records of co-defendant's medical patients for purpose of permitting defendants to gain access to contact information that would allow defendants to solicit said patients to purchase services provided by defendants. While as Dist. Ct. noted there was no evidence indicating that co-defendant directed its patients to defendants, instant file-access could constitute improper referral under Anti-Kickback Statute under certain circumstances. As such, remand was required, where, as here, Dist. Ct. made necessary ultimate finding that agreement with co-defendant was not intended to induce referrals, yet had failed to make subsidiary findings necessary to reveal its chain of reasoning. Dist. Ct., though, may reach new findings of fact and conclusions of law on existing record or may reopen record to receive additional evidence.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action, alleging that defendant-prison doctor was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's serious medical needs, where plaintiff, who was transferred to different prison prior to resolution of his prison grievance regarding said matter, failed to submit grievance to Administrative Review Board (ARB) prior to filing instant action as required by operative regulations. Fact that plaintiff submitted grievance to ARB after he filed instant lawsuit did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff's motion for default judgment and entry of damages,as well as injunction in plaintiff's Lanham Act claim, alleging trademark infringement, false advertising, dilution and unfair competition arising out of defendant's unauthorized and unlawful sale of plaintiff's products bearing Prevagen trademark. Ct. rejected defendant's claim that Dist. Ct. had failed to make requisite findings under Rule 52(a) to support instant judgment, since said Rule does not apply to rulings on motions for default judgment. Moreover, record supported Dist. Ct.'s entry of order enjoining defendant from selling stolen Prevagen products, since such fact was contained in complaint, and thus was established when default judgment had been entered. As such, no further comment or fact-finding on said issue by Dist. Ct. was required.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff's motion for 2-day extension of time to file notice of appeal, where: (1) plaintiff explained delay by stating that he was out of town on business trip, and that his mail had been re-routed due to recent move; (2) Dist. Ct. could look to lack of prejudice when resolving request; and (3) plaintiff provided plausible bases for granting his extension request. As to merits, Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss instant complaint on claim preclusion/res judicata grounds, where Dist. Ct. in 2017 had rejected identical lawsuit filed by plaintiff that asserted that Illinois's bigamy laws were unconstitutional under First Amendment and found that defendant lacked standing to challenge Illinois's adultery and fornication statutes, where such laws were no longer being enforced.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials' motion for summary judgment in plaintiff's section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his First Amendment rights by arresting him on traffic charges in retaliation for his news reporter activities and subjecting him to malicious prosecution on said charges, arising out of incident in which plaintiff, as reporter, took pictures and exposed identity of police officers during police prostitution sting that involved police chase of plaintiff from scene. Existence of probable cause defeats claim that plaintiff's arrest was in retaliation for speech protected by First Amendment, and defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff on charge of driving wrong way on one-way street. Moreover, plaintiff failed to show that defendants rarely made arrests for driving wrong way on one-way street so as to fit into exception to instant probable cause rule as set forth in Nieves, 139 S.Ct. 1715. Also, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, where at time of plaintiff's arrest, U.S. Supreme Ct. had previously stated that it had never recognized First Amendment right to be free from retaliatory arrest that is supported by probable cause. Too, plaintiff could not proceed on his malicious prosecution claim, where plaintiff failed to demonstrate that nolle prosequi order dismissing his traffic charges was termination favorable to him, since mere entry of nolle prosequi order did not compel inference that there was lack of reasonable grounds to pursue criminal prosecution.

Court of Appeals dismissed objector's appeal of Dict. Ct.'s denial of her claim for attorney's fees and incentive award for raising objection to proposed class action in Telephone Consumer Protection Act claim. Dist. Ct. found that: (1) objector was not class member; and (2) because non-class members cannot be compensated in class action, plaintiff had no standing to object or receive fees for incentive award. Only parties to lawsuit and those that properly become parties may appeal adverse judgment, and Ct. of Appeals found that because objector did not challenge Dist. Ct.'s finding that she was not class member, she was not party in lawsuit, and thus lacked standing to appeal, where she did not otherwise ask to intervene for purposes of appealing any unwelcome rulings.