Federal Civil Practice

Ct. of Appeals granted three motions seeking leave to file amicus curiae briefs in instant appeal concerning Dist. Ct.'s dismissal of plaintiff’s action alleging violations of Clean Water Act. While defendant opposed said motions, Ct. of Appeals found that each amicus curiae brief met requirement that brief offered content that was either different, new and/or important from content in parties’ briefs.  Specifically, contents of briefs addressed: (1) history of Illinois groundwater regulations; (2) alternative federal scheme in absence of Clean Water Act regulation; and (3) case law’s application into existing federal scheme involving pollutants at issue in instant case. Ct. further noted that amicus curiae briefs should not merely repeat party’s position.

Ct. of Appeals found that intervenors (Wisconsin Legislature, Republican National Committee and Wisconsin Republican Party), who defended certain statutes that pertained to registration of voters and conduct in this November’s election in action seeking extension of certain statutory deadlines, lacked standing to appeal Dist. Ct.’s order that extended deadlines for online and mail-in registration, as well as deadlines for delivery of absentee ballots and receipt of mailed ballots. Dist. Ct. did not order Republican National Committee or Wisconsin Republican Party to do or forbid them from doing anything, and neither entity argued that new deadlines would violate any constitutional rights of their members. Moreover, state legislature was not entitled to represent Wisconsin's interest in sustaining validity of enacted legislation, since such power belonged exclusively to Wisconsin’s executive branch.

Dist. Ct. did not err in ultimately denying request under 28 USC section 1782(a) by party in foreign private arbitration proceeding for Dist. Ct. to issue subpoena to compel U.S. entity to produce documents for use in London, England arbitration. Ct. of Appeals agreed with Dist. Ct. that section 1782(a) does not permit Dist. Ct. to order discovery for use in private foreign commercial arbitrations, where Ct. of Appeals found that term “tribunal” in section 1782(a) applied only to state-sponsored foreign and international tribunals.

Ct. of Appeals granted plaintiffs’ petition for writ of mandamus after determining that Dist. Ct. had erred in granting defendants’ motion to stay proceedings pending resolution of defendants’ petition for writ of certiorari that had yet to be filed in U.S. Supreme Ct. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff filed challenge to their pre-2008 property tax assessments; (2) Dist. Ct. dismissed said challenge, and Ct. of Appeals reversed, after finding that Dist. Ct. had jurisdiction to consider said challenge; and (3) Dist. Ct. granted defendants’ motion for stay, after reasoning that consideration of challenge would be without effect if U.S. Supreme Ct. had granted certiorari petition and found in defendants’ favor on merits of appeal. Dist. Ct.’s grant of defendants’ request for stay was in direct opposition to Ct. of Appeals’ mandate and conflicted with “mandate rule,” where Ct. of Appeals had reversed Dist. Ct. original judgment and remanded matter for further proceedings, since Dist. Ct. was required to comply with express or implied ruling of Ct. of Appeals’ decision. Fact that defendants had previously and unsuccessfully moved for stay of mandate with Appellate Ct. after said mandate had been issued did not require different result. As such, defendants’ only recourse was to seek stay with U.S. Supreme Ct.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s $13.3 million verdict in favor of plaintiff in his section 1983 action, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated where defendants: (1) used his coerced confession to obtain convictions on murder charges that were eventually vacated via state’s motion after plaintiff had served 21 years on life sentence; (2) fabricated evidence against plaintiff and conspired to violate his constitutional rights; and (3) failed to intervene to prevent certain constitutional violations. While defendants argued that case should have been dismissed as sanction for plaintiff giving two false statements in his deposition, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in not dismissing case, where plaintiff’s false statements about seeing third-party get arrested or about fact that he had never spoken to different individual did not concern core issues in plaintiff’s case and were otherwise fully exposed at trial. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting plaintiff's certificate of innocence, since said certificate was highly relevant to plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim, and jury was otherwise instructed not to decide whether plaintiff had committed charged offenses in criminal case. Also, while Dist. Ct. gave jury fabrication of evidence instruction that improperly failed to explain that plaintiff had burden to prove that said evidence was used at trial and was material to his conviction, said error was harmless, where record showed that plaintiff’s coerced confession and defendants’ fabricated line-up report were actually used at trial, and that said evidence was material to his convictions.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiffs-pre-trial detainees’ request for issuance of preliminary injunction in their section 1983 action, alleging that defendant-Sheriff violated plaintiffs’ due process rights by failing to provide them with reasonably safe living conditions during COVID-19 pandemic. While Dist. Ct. could issue preliminary injunction that covered certain procedures relating to sanitation, diagnostic testing and personal protective equipment, Dist. Ct. could not issue preliminary injunction with respect to plaintiffs’ request to prohibit double celling and group housing/dormitory arrangements to permit adequate social distancing. In this respect, Dist. Ct. failed to consider said requests in view of defendant’s other actions that attempted to address said concerns and failed to give proper deference to defendant’s judgment in adopting policies necessary to ensure safety and security of jail. Moreover, Dist. Ct. cited to incorrect legal standard that required that plaintiff need only show better than negligible chance of success, as opposed to applicable “some likelihood” of success on merits of case, when evaluating request for preliminary injunction as to double celling and group housing concerns.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ request for issuance of preliminary injunction in action challenging under Free Speech Clause of First Amendment defendant-Governor’s issuance of executive order that recommended, but did not mandate that churches limit in-church gatherings, but required for others mandatory 50-person cap on gatherings. Instant executive order is designed to address serious public-health crisis stemming from COVID-19, and Ct. found that: (1) speech that accompanies religious exercise has privileged position under First Amendment; and (2) instant executive order permissibly accommodates religious activities. Moreover, nothing in Free Speech Clause of First Amendment barred defendant from making special dispensation for religious activities. Too, no case law compels defendant to treat all gatherings alike, and defendant could permissibly restrict secular gatherings and not religious gatherings. Fact that defendant had expressed sympathy for people who were protesting police violence and even participated on one protest did not have any effect on text of instant executive order, and record otherwise did not support claim that state-actors have played favorites in enforcement of otherwise valid response to COVID-19 pandemic.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-University officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-student’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his First Amendment rights when they did not select him for temporary student-government position in retaliation for his prior critical stances against members of University administration, including defendants, who worked with student government, and who were involved with instant application process. Defendants explained that plaintiff’s application was rejected because he had not been enrolled in either summer or fall classes at time of application, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, because federal law did not clearly establish that enforcing instant enrollment requirement for student-government position violated First Amendment. Fact that defendants allegedly violated state law in rejecting plaintiff’s application did not require different result, and plaintiff otherwise did not pursue public-employment theory at summary judgment stage of case.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officers used excessive force during plaintiff's arrest, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that plaintiff's gun fell from his body after plaintiff had fled scene, where said evidence was relevant as providing circumstance of arrest and was not unduly prejudicial. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in prohibiting defendant from arguing that defendants had racial bias, since plaintiff had failed to present any evidence that defendants' actions in arresting him were racially motivated. Finally, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for sanctions due to defendants' alleged error in failing to tender nine citizen complaints against one defendant, where: (1) four complaints had been filed beyond timeframe set forth by plaintiff in his discovery request; (2) defendants produced one complaint; and (3) remaining four complaints were not actually complaints, but rather were informational reports. Also, said documents would not have altered jury's verdict in favor of defendants.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-Park District and City's motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs' action seeking to halt construction of Obama Presidential Center in Chicago's Jackson Park, where plaintiffs alleged that defendants' alteration of use of Jackson Park and handing over control of Center's site to Barack Obama Foundation essentially took plaintiffs' property for private purpose in violation to Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment and denied plaintiffs' due process rights under 14^th Amendment. Plaintiffs cannot proceed on either claim, since they have no protected interest in public land, and plaintiffs could not rely on public trust doctrine under Illinois state law to create such interest. Moreover, City's judgment that instant transfer and use of property has public purpose is entitled to deference. Also, plaintiffs' due process claim fails, since plaintiffs failed to identify what greater process they were due, especially where City enacted four ordinances approving aspects of Center that followed multiple public hearings. Ct. further found that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to bring state claims alleging violation of public trust doctrine arising out transfer of park land to Center, where: (1) plaintiffs alleged only that govt. had failed to follow relevant law, while Article III required that plaintiffs to demonstrate injury to their "separate and concrete interests;" and (2) even if construction of Center would damage Jackson Park, relevant showing required plaintiffs to show injury to themselves as opposed to any injury to Jackson Park. Too, plaintiffs could not establish standing as municipal taxpayers, since they could not show that City actually spent tax revenues on any illegal action. Fact that Illinois law would find that plaintiffs had standing to proceed on public trust doctrine claim is irrelevant to any Article III inquiry.