Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff's request for $25,293.65 in costs after prevailing in Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claim, where Dist. Ct. had previously entered judgment for plaintiff under Rule 68 for $1,101 "plus costs to be determined by the Court." Plaintiff submitted as costs: (1) $24,137.50 as reimbursement under section 1692k(a)(1) of FDCPA for hundreds of hours plaintiff spent litigating instant action; (2) $156.15 in mailing costs under section 1692k(a)(3) of FDCPA; and (3) $1,000 in "additional damages" costs under section 1692k(a)(2) of FDCPA. Plaintiff also demanded $47,425.02 in punitive damages. Instant damages requested by plaintiff are not part of costs properly awarded under section 1692k(a) of FDPCA, and costs contemplated under FDCPA are simply those awardable under Rule 54(d). As such, costs under FDCPA do not include any kind of damages or compensation that plaintiff sought for his time and mailing expenses.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff's request for $25,293.65 in costs after prevailing in Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claim, where Dist. Ct. had previously entered judgment for plaintiff under Rule 68 for $1,101 "plus costs to be determined by the Court." Plaintiff submitted as costs: (1) $24,137.50 as reimbursement under section 1692k(a)(1) of FDCPA for hundreds of hours plaintiff spent litigating instant action; (2) $156.15 in mailing costs under section 1692k(a)(3) of FDCPA; and (3) $1,000 in "additional damages" costs under section 1692k(a)(2) of FDCPA. Plaintiff also demanded $47,425.02 in punitive damages. Instant damages requested by plaintiff are not part of costs properly awarded under section 1692k(a) of FDPCA, and costs contemplated under FDCPA are simply those awardable under Rule 54(d). As such, costs under FDCPA do not include any kind of damages or compensation that plaintiff sought for his time and mailing expenses.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on standing grounds plaintiff's section 1983 action, alleging that defendants (Sheriff and his deputies) concealed and/or destroyed evidence that decedent's estate could have used to help it pursue claims against putative murderers of decedent. While state court denied plaintiff's (relative of decedent) request to replace existing administrator of estate, record also showed that estate assigned to plaintiff whatever interest it had in instant lawsuit. As such, because of estate's assignment, plaintiff could pursue any damages claims against tortfeasors, and federal law permits assignee to sue on estate's behalf. Ct. of Appeals also observed that defendants did not deny him access to state courts and expressed doubt as to whether any alleged spoliation of evidence claim could supply basis for independent federal lawsuit under denial of access to courts theory at issue in instant lawsuit.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff-prisoner's fourth request for recruitment of counsel prior to reinstating grant of defendants-prison officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's own threats to commit suicide or to otherwise harm himself. Decision to recruit counsel should be informed by realities of recruiting counsel, and instant district used voluntary panel of attorneys, rather than involuntary appointment system, which made it more difficult to convince local counsel to take such cases. As such, Dist. Ct. could consider its scarce resources of volunteer attorneys and how they should be distributed when determining whether to grant request for recruitment of counsel. Moreover, Dist. Ct. adequately inquired into plaintiff's ability to litigate instant straight-forward case and noted plaintiff's ability to send and receive correspondence, make copies, write motions and briefs and perform legal research. Dist. Ct. further noted that: (1) plaintiff's briefs had been carefully edited to include appropriate arguments and citations to evidence; and (2) plaintiff had demonstrated ability to conduct discovery. Fact that plaintiff had been transferred to different prison during pendency of case did not require different result.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury's verdict against defendant-County in section 1983 action, alleging that County was deliberately indifferent to serious risk of harm to plaintiffs-female inmates' safety, when defendant-prison guard subjected them to repeated sexual assaults over three-year period. Record showed that towards beginning of guard's assaults on plaintiffs, complaints surfaced regarding another guard's inappropriate relationship with another inmate, and said guard received only token discipline. Moreover, County is not automatically liable for actions of instant defendant-guard, and County's liability under Monell can only be established when plaintiffs make threshold showing that County's policy caused their injuries. In this respect, plaintiffs satisfied their burden under Monell, where record showed that, although there was written policy prohibiting sexual conduct between inmates and guards, policy failed to address prevention and detection/reporting of said misconduct, and County otherwise failed to provide any meaningful training of guards on said topic. Also, plaintiffs could establish liability under Monell on single violation of plaintiffs' federal rights, as opposed to proof of pattern of said violations. Ct. rejected County's claim that guard's misconduct was unpreventable and/or undetectable so as to preclude any Monell liability. (Dissents filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff's action for failure to establish existence of any damages, where plaintiff alleged defendant's ordinance improperly requiring it to obtain permit to sell magazines on streets adjacent to Wrigley Field. During pendency of action, defendant amended ordinance to eliminate plaintiff's requirement to obtain said permit, and while plaintiff alleged that it was entitled to receive damages to compensate it for injuries prior to defendant's amendment of ordinance, plaintiff, as business entity, could not assert any emotional damages as claimed by plaintiff, where: (1) entity cannot experience any emotional damages on its own; and (2) any alleged damages were attributed only to plaintiff's owner. Also, plaintiff could not receive compensation for time spent by its owner in researching details regarding compliance with original ordinance, where: (1) owner was already paid full-time salary to perform work on plaintiff's behalf; and (2) plaintiff failed to show existence of some other marginal expense connected to litigating instant case. Moreover, plaintiff could not assert any legal fees, where plaintiff had failed to file any affidavit regarding legal expenses incurred in effort to comply with original ordinance.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-prison official's motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action alleging that defendant was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Plaintiff generally cannot  rely on allegations or denials in his complaint, when filing affidavit opposing properly supported motion for summary judgment, especially where, as here, plaintiff is represented by counsel and has engaged in significant discovery. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly invoke sham-affidavit rule to disregard plaintiff's affidavit, where it merely recited allegations in his amended complaint, and where plaintiff's affidavit had contradicted major points in plaintiff's prior deposition testimony. Moreover, while Dist. Ct. improperly excluded affidavit submitted by defendant's mother, who had not made prior conflicting sworn statement, any error was harmless, where substance of mother's affidavit added nothing of importance to case. As to merits of plaintiff's claim, record did not factually support claim that defendant had unreasonably delayed plaintiff's receipt of antibiotics or additional pain medication.

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that plaintiff-class representative lacked Article III standing to pursue claim under section 15(b) of Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), alleging that defendant failed to make disclosures regarding retention of biometric fingerprint identification information, under circumstances where defendant had removed instant case to federal court under Class Action Fairness Act. While Dist. Ct. granted plaintiff's motion to remand case back to state court for lack of federal Article III standing to pursue her case, because, in its view, violations of BIPA were bare procedural violations that caused no concrete harm to plaintiff, Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff had Article III standing to pursue alleged section 15(b) violations, because said violations concerned invasion of personal rights that is both concrete and particularized as to plaintiff. As such, remand to state court was in error, since case could proceed in federal court.  However, plaintiff lacked Article III standing to proceed on her section 15(a) of BIPA claim, alleging that defendant failed to make public any guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers it was storing, since: (1) said duty to disclose under section 15(a) was owed to public generally and not to particular person whose biometric information defendant had collected; and (2) plaintiff failed to allege particularized harm with respect to any section 15(a) violation.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting on res judicata grounds defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's lawsuit, alleging action based on defendant's liquidation of plaintiff's trading account, where plaintiff had failed to meet margin calls, since: (1) defendant had prevailed in prior lawsuit seeking payment from plaintiiff on margin calls based on same transactions, where defendant had accepted plaintiff's Rule 68 offer of judgment to resolve case; and (2) Illinois gives consent judgments claim-preclusion effect if, as here, preclusion otherwise applies. Moreover, Ct. of Appeals held that sanctions may potentially be imposed on plaintiff, where: (1) plaintiff never paid on its Rule 68 offer of judgment in defendant's prior action against it; (2) plaintiff abandoned on appeal its theory advanced in Dist. Ct. that state law was irrelevant on issue as to whether accepted Rule 68 offer of judgment was "final judgment on merits" for purposes of applying res judicata; (3) plaintiff ignored/misrepresented controlling precedent on said issue; and (4) record suggested that plaintiff never intended to pay on its Rule 68 offer of judgment and instead filed instant lawsuit claiming $25 million, and then filed instant appeal of adverse ruling in effort to obtain bargaining chip with respect to defendant's prior judgment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff-prisoner's motion "for leave to represent himself" (after Dist. Ct. had recruited counsel for plaintiff) in plaintiff's section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's serious dental problems. Under 28 USC section 1654, party seeking to assert his statutory right of self-representation must clearly and unequivocally discharge any lawyer previously retained, and plaintiff in instant motion conditioned his request to represent himself on whether Dist. Ct. was persuaded by brief filed by plaintiff's counsel that had been submitted in response to defendant's pending summary judgment motion. As such, Dist. Ct. properly denied plaintiff's motion because it was not unequivocal request for self-representation.