Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in vacating arbitration panel’s decision that reversed plaintiff’s award of contract to operate vending facilities at certain govt. facilities to third-party under Randolph-Sheppard Act, which provides blind persons with employment opportunities. In July of 2011, plaintiff awarded bid to third-party at two sites based on scores generated during interviews with all applicants. Defendant-applicant appealed plaintiff’s decision to arbitration panel. However, during said appeal, plaintiff invited applicants to re-interview for contract for both sites and eventually awarded contract to said sites in 2013 to same third-party, under circumstances where defendant-applicant did not participate in said process. Dist. Ct. could properly vacate panel’s decision, where: (1) panel used wrong standard of review, i.e., substantial evidence, instead of preponderance of evidence to reverse plaintiff‘s decision, where defendant-applicant had burden of proof to show that plaintiff’s bid award to third-party violated law; (2) panel’s findings of fact that plaintiff’s use of 2013 profitability data in bid awarding process, as well as plaintiff’s failure to consider defendant-applicant’s six-sentence letter of recommendation were prejudicial to defendant-applicant were not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) panel’s award of contract to defendant-applicant was arbitrary and capricious, especially where defendant-applicant had not participated in 2013 re-interviewing process.

Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing sanctions in amount of $271, 926.92 for defendants’ costs and fees spent in defending instant action seeking royalties under withdrawal agreement, under circumstances where various arbitrators had previously found that third-party alone was responsible for said royalties. Dist. Ct. could properly find that prior arbitration holdings were binding and final on plaintiffs, given fact that withdrawal agreement required that all disputes be submitted to arbitration and that instant lawsuit was premised on same foundational issues previously decided in arbitrations. Moreover, sanctions were proper, where instant lawsuit was precluded, and language in withdrawal agreement rendered instant lawsuit frivolous. Also, amount of sanctions was reasonable, where: (1) although hourly fees of defendant’s counsel, i.e., $973 and $1,092, were above median rate, record showed that counsel’s clients actually paid them; and (2) plaintiffs failed to overcome presumption that amount of time spent on matter was reasonable, where defendants actually paid counsel $271,926.92 at issue in instant sanctions order.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-employer and other police officials’ motion for summary judgment, alleging that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity in plaintiff-police employee’s action, asserting that defendants violated her Second Amendment rights by terminating her because she had shot third-party in self-defense during off-duty physical altercation with third-party. Defendants based termination on plaintiff’s violation of personnel rules prohibiting city employees from discharging firearm that result in injury to another person, and plaintiff claimed that her termination violated her Second Amendment right to use her firearm in self-defense. However, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, since, although relevant case law recognized constitutional right to possess firearm, no case law has recognized Second Amendment right to use firearm for self-defense. Ct. further rejected plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, where relevant collective bargaining agreement that allowed plaintiff to grieve her termination provided plaintiff with sufficient post-deprivation due process to address her termination.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated decedent's 4th Amendment rights by using excessive force when causing decedent’s death during encounter in which defendants attempted to detain decedent to protect himself and others and to take decedent to hospital for evaluation of his mental heath. On day of encounter in 2016, defendant police-officer held belief since 2010 that decedent had mental health problems, and decedent seemed disorientated and incoherent when officer approached decedent. After decedent began to flee, three officers gave chase and eventually subdued decedent by grabbing his shoulder, bringing him to ground, placing him in handcuffs and, after decedent continued to struggle, wrapping his legs. Shortly after decedent’s legs were subdued, officers determined that decedent was not breathing and attempted CPR, but decedent eventually died. Autopsy determined that decedent died from cardiac arrhythmia, and medical evidence showed no other cause of death that related to claim of excessive force. Defendants acted legally to detain decedent and used reasonable force in response to decedent’s continued resistance. Also, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, since defendants’ conduct was similar to use of force displayed in Estate of Philips, 123 F.3d 586, during similar encounter with mentally ill person. Too, while defendants’ use of force, when combined with decedent’s other health problems, resulted in decedent’s death, defendants’ use of force did not constitute “deadly force,” because force used by defendants did not carry substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm. Defendants were also entitled to absolute immunity under section 4-102 of Ill. Tort Immunity Act with respect to plaintiff’s state-law claims, since defendants were attempting to obtain mental health detention of decedent at time of encounter.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin defendants’ enforcement of Indiana statute that limited circumstances for extending election polls’ closing hours, even though plaintiff argued that said statute burdened right to vote by creating multiple step process that left voter unable to petition court to extend poll hours. Defendants were entitled to stay of injunction pending appeal, since there was likelihood that defendants would succeed on appeal, since: (1) instant statute did not place burden on any Indiana resident’s constitutional right to cast ballot; and (2) nothing in instant statute restricted voters’ right to file section 1983 action to seek redress for any constitutional right to vote. Ct. also observed that Dist. Ct. should not have entered any election-related injunction only five weeks prior to November election day, especially where instant statute had been enacted more than one year prior to filing instant lawsuit.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-former girlfriend and two police officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully evicting him from former girlfriend’s home, where, according to plaintiff, said eviction constituted unreasonable seizure of his possessory interest in former girlfriend’s home. Plaintiff failed to adequately allege that he had possessory interest in former girlfriend’s home to support any Fourth Amendment claim, where plaintiff had paid no rent over six-year period, had no lease and asserted that he had no ability to prevent former girlfriend from going through and mingling with his property within her home. As such, plaintiff held only revocable license to remain in former girlfriend's home, and former girlfriend could revoke his license to remain in her home at any time, such that plaintiff was trespasser at time former girlfriend called police to remove him from her home. Fact that former girlfriend had previously been told by other police that she needed court order to remove plaintiff from her home did not require different result. Ct. of Appeals also entered order directing clerks from district courts to return plaintiff’s unfiled civil pleadings for two-year period as sanction for plaintiff having filed series of frivolous actions.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiffs’ request to enjoin defendants from enforcing Indiana rule that counted absentee ballots only if they were received by noon on Election Day. While Dist. Ct. found that said rule was unconstitutional because pandemic created risk that absentee ballots mailed close to Election Day would not be received on time, Ct. of Appeals found that there is no constitutional right to vote by mail, where, as here, state provided ability of voters to vote in person. Fact that some people are unwilling to vote in person did not make otherwise-valid voting system unconstitutional, and state had rational basis to require absentee ballots to be received by Election Day, just as in-person voting ends on Election Day. Ct. further noted that Dist. Ct. should not have entered injunction so close to Election Day.

Ct. of Appeals granted defendant’s-Wisconsin Legislature’s motion to stay injunction imposed by Dist. Ct. that essentially extended certain deadlines for online and mail in registration, enforcement of requirement that clerk mail all ballots and receipt of mailed ballots. Wisconsin Legislature has standing to represent State of Wisconsin’s interest in validity of state laws (as found by Wisconsin Supreme Court), and Dist. Ct. should not have entered instant injunction only six weeks prior to November election. Moreover, Ct. observed that: (1) although pandemic has had consequences on elections, instant extension of deadlines was difficult to justify, where voters have already had long time to cast ballots while preserving social distancing; and (2) decisions on how best to cope with difficulties caused by pandemic are principally reserved for elected branch of government as opposed to courts. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs-voters’ request for issuance of preliminary injunction in action alleging that Indiana statute’s extension of absentee ballots to elderly citizens, but not to all citizens, violated Twenty-Sixth Amendment by abridging younger citizens’ right to vote. Indiana’s absentee-voting regime does not affect plaintiffs’ right to vote, since all citizens can vote on election day or during early election period. Also, fact that COVID-19 pandemic might affect plaintiffs’ determination as to whether to cast in-person ballot on election day did not violate equal protection clause. Also, fundamental right to vote concerned only ability to cast ballot, but not right to do so in manner preferred by voter, and state had rational basis for extending right to cast absentee ballot to only elderly citizens.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing without prejudice under derivative jurisdiction doctrine, plaintiff’s amended complaint seeking to have defendants reinstate plaintiff as Social Security payee for his daughter. Plaintiff filed original complaint in state court, and defendants removed said action to federal court under federal officer removal statute (28 USC section 1442) and then moved to dismiss instant action under derivative jurisdiction doctrine, which provides that if state court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s complaint, federal court did not have subject matter jurisdiction upon removal. Moreover, plaintiff did not contest that state court lacked jurisdiction over his complaint, and fact that plaintiff filed amended complaint that invoked for first time federal jurisdiction under 28 USC section 1361 after case had been removed did not require different result. Ct. of Appeals further observed that party seeking to assert derivative jurisdiction doctrine must do so within 30 days from removal, which defendants did in this case.