Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s conversion and deception actions, which alleged that defendant had refused to return reusable shipping materials involved in shipment of defendant’s eggs to plaintiff. Record showed that: (1) defendant had prevailed against plaintiff in prior breach of contract action, in which contract called for plaintiff to provide said shipment materials to defendant, but made no mention of defendant returning said material to plaintiff; and (2) prior to filing prior contract action, plaintiff had formally demanded return of said materials and made second demand for said materials one day after filing contract action. As such, Dist. Ct. could properly conclude that: (1) plaintiff was aware at time of filing of contract action that ownership of shipping materials was part of its contract dispute with defendant; and (2) instant tort action arose out of same transaction at issue in prior contract action, such that claim-splitting ban under Indiana law precluded plaintiff from filing instant action.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs' action under Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, alleging that labels for defendants’ aloe vera gel products were deceptive, because: (1) defendants’ products could not be called “aloe vera gel,” since they only had low concentrations of acemannan, which, plaintiffs maintained, was important therapeutic substance for treatment of dry, sunburned skin; (2) defendants’ products did not provide therapeutic effects that one would expect from product marketed as aloe vera gel; and (3) defendants’ labels falsely indicated that product was “100% Pure Aloe Vera Gel,” where fine print indicated that two percent of content was devoted to preservatives. Plaintiffs failed to present evidence to show outside of their own allegations that defendants’ labels were likely to mislead consumers about nature or quality of product or that some minimum amount of acemannan was necessary to render product effective. Ct. rejected plaintiffs' contention that burden was on defendants to prove that their products were effective. Also, defendants' label of “100% Pure Aloe Vera Gel” was not deceptive, since plaintiffs conceded that presence of preservatives in small amounts was acceptable and something that they had expected.

Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in certifying two classes composed of prisoners alleging that defendants-prison medical personnel were deliberately indifferent to their hepatitis C conditions by using protocols that essentially delayed treatment for their conditions, and in granting preliminary injunctive relief that directed defendant to begin HCV therapy for class members having fibroscan greater than two and APRI greater than .7 unless treatment was contraindicated. Certification of two classes was improper, where: (1) there was no identity of class representative for either class or evidence that any potential class representative had received treatment under protocols that resulted in sustained viral response; and (2) because there no identified class representative, there was no way to compare any representative's claims with claims of proposed unnamed class members. Also, Dist. Ct. erred in entering preliminary injunction, where Dist. Ct. found only that substantial risk of liver damage “could,” as opposed to "was likely,” to arise out of treatment under defendant’s existing protocols.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that defendant could properly invoke Exemption 5 in refusing to provide plaintiff with documents relating to 11 certified immigration cases, where plaintiff requested under Freedom of Information Act all communications between Attorney General, Office of Attorney General and any lawyer in Dept.’s Office of Immigration Litigation or Office of the Solicitor General. Defendant could properly withhold said documents on basis of deliberative process privilege, where: (1) plaintiff conceded that withheld documents contained deliberative communications: and (2) documents at issue pertained to discussions regarding different lines of reasoning that would support particular decisional paths and offered suggestions on draft opinions. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that documents could be disclosed because they also contained ex parte communications, since at time documents were generated, there was no litigation pending in any federal court, and attorneys making statements in documents were not advising or assisting Attorney General adverse to noncitizen.

Dist. Ct. did not err in staying under abstention doctrine set forth in Colorado River, 424 U.S. 800, plaintiff’s action seeking to compel defendant to arbitrate parties’ disputes under sales and income agreements, where plaintiff had previously filed similar action in California state court and had filed appeal of said court’s denial of plaintiff’s arbitration demand. Record showed that California and Dist. Ct. actions were genuinely parallel, since they pertained to same parties, same facts and same issues, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that there was great risk of generating inconsistent results and wasteful duplication by allowing both actions to proceed at same time. Moreover, California action has proceeded to appellate court level and was closer to resolution than instant federal court action. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly find that state court could protect any of plaintiff’s federal rights.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff-prisoner’s request for certification of class members consisting of detainees who needed canes, crutches or walkers in area of jail that plaintiff alleged failed to contain grab bars and other fixtures that would allow said detainees to use showers and bathrooms safely, where plaintiff alleged that said failure violated Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards. Dist. Ct. based denial on observation that plaintiff’s request would require that it rule on merits of plaintiff’s case. Ct. of Appeals, in remanding matter back for full consideration as to whether plaintiff’s request for class certification met all requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b), found that Dist. Ct. need not rule on merits of case when determining class certification request.

In action by debtor seeking sanctions against creditor-University for collecting on educational debt after said debt had been discharged in Chapter 7 proceeding, Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant’s appeal of Dist. Ct.’s order that reversed Bankruptcy Ct.’s order that found that said debt was non-dischargeable student loan. Dist. Ct. held that said debt was not student loan, and thus was not excluded from bankruptcy discharge and remanded matter back to Bankruptcy Ct. for proceedings on question of sanctions. Dist. Ct.’s order was not final and appealable, since remand back to Bankruptcy Ct. contemplated more than ministerial acts pertaining to determination as to whether sanctions were warranted for violation of discharge injunction.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to material risk of plaintiff’s life by not responding immediately to his suicide threat. Record showed that: (1) after female guard told defendant that she would write him up for exposing himself to her, plaintiff yelled that he had razor blade and intended to kill himself; and (2) female guard then walked away, and male guard came approximately 30 minutes later, saw that plaintiff had minor scratches on his forearm, seized razor blade and treated plaintiff’s scratches with gauze bandage. Dist. Ct. could properly conclude that plaintiff made only insincere suicide threat to get female guard’s attention. Moreover, while plaintiff focused his section 1983 claim on danger he presented to his life, plaintiff failed to present evidence of recoverable injury, where his injuries were only trivial, and where instant risk to his life was not compensable without evidence of injury.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state viable cause of action plaintiffs-former Sheriff’s Deputies’ section 1983 action alleging that defendants-Sheriff and Merit Board deprived them of due process by: (1) terminating them for disciplinary reasons at time when certain Board members held their appointments in violation of Illinois law; and (2) Sheriff pressuring Board members to make decisions contrary to Illinois law. Violation of state law is not basis for federal due process claim, such that defect in Board’s membership is not basis for federal constitutional claim. Moreover, plaintiffs’ allegations of biased decision-making suggest only that plaintiffs may have suffered random and unauthorized deprivation of their property interest in public employment. As such, plaintiffs’ injuries cannot form basis of federal due process claim where, as here, Illinois state courts offer adequate post-deprivation remedies.

In action alleging that defendants violated Telephone Consumer Protection Act when it faxed unsolicited messages without containing opt-out notices, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants’ motion to strike class definition that included non-Illinois members, where, according to defendants, Dist. Ct. did not have personal jurisdiction over claims of non-Illinois members in proposed nationwide class. While Dist Ct. found that not only plaintiffs, but also all unnamed members of proposed class had to show minimum contacts between defendants and forum state under specific personal jurisdiction rules, and that it had no jurisdiction over claims of unnamed class members who were harmed outside of Illinois, Ct. of Appeals found that while named representatives of class action must be able to demonstrate either general or specific personal jurisdiction, unnamed class members are not required to do so.