Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiffs’ request for issuance of preliminary injunction, alleging that Indiana’s law (“Act 442“), which allowed State to immediately remove voters based on information received from third-party database, rather than in response to direct contact with voters violated National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). Plaintiffs-non-profit organizations had standing to bring instant action, where plaintiffs established that they would suffer concrete and particularized injury in terms of diverted limited resources that they would be forced to use to correct erroneous voter removal, which had “real-world” impact on their specific core missions. Moreover, plaintiffs established likelihood of success on merits of case, since new process under Act 442 for removing voters would not comport with NVRA, because Act 442 improperly omits any requirement that State have direct contact with voter prior to voter’s removal. Ct. further noted that accuracy or lack thereof of State’s information concerning voter’s change in residence made no difference under NVRA, and mere fact that voter registered in different state did not constitute evidence that said voter requested removal from Indiana’s voter roll.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s request for issuance of preliminary injunction to ban enforcement of Indiana law that required parental notification of minor’s planned abortion unless judge found in bypass proceeding that such notice was not in minor’s “best interest.” Plaintiff showed likelihood of success on merits of case, where Indiana’s notice law created substantial risk of practical veto over mature, but yet unemancipated minor’s choice to obtain abortion. This is so, Ct. observed, since: (1) parental notification bypass granted to plaintiff’s minor patients had generally been based on juvenile court’s finding that minor was sufficiently mature, which was not basis for excusing parental notice under instant Indiana law; and (2) statute’s effect for mature minors would deter such individuals from even seeking bypass in first place. Ct. further noted that: (1) new parental notification requirement did not address any problem that it was intended to solve; and (2) burden of instant law on minors considering judicial bypass was greater than effect of judicial bypass on parent’s authority. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-jail officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-pre-trial detainee’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants unreasonably denied plaintiff’s request for mattress during day-time hours to accommodate his osteoarthritis condition, as well as violated his due process rights by writing false disciplinary tickets to keep him locked up. Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss his due process claim, since plaintiff had failed to administratively exhaust his administrative remedies, where he never successfully appealed said discipline arising out of said tickets to jail’s administrator as required by jail’s rules. Also, with respect to plaintiff’s medical claim, record showed that defendants diligently attended to plaintiff’s medical needs and adjusted his treatment plan in response to plaintiff’s complaints. Moreover, record established that defendants had provided mattress for his cell, and that plaintiff’s request for second mattress was medically unnecessary.

In action by plaintiff-provider of medication abortions, alleging that various aspects of Indiana’s abortion regime violated 14^th Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses, under circumstances where defendants-state officials had failed to grant plaintiff’s application to operate abortion facility, Dist. Ct. erred in entering preliminary injunction to extent that said injunction would exempt plaintiff from defendant’s licensing requirements, since defendants may use licensing as legitimate means of vetting and monitoring abortion providers. However, issue remains as to whether defendants have used licensing requirements to improperly mask decision to deny all such licensing requests by making unreasonable requests for information. As such, Dist. Ct. could properly conclude that entry of preliminary injunction was necessary because defendants’ handling of plaintiff’s application was unsupported and outweighed by substantial burden state was imposing on women. Ct., however, modified injunction to direct defendants to treat plaintiff as if it had provisional license to operate abortion facility until Dist. Ct. issues final decision on plaintiff’s due process and equal protection claims.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ action, alleging that defendants violated Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, when defendant’s misled plaintiffs to believe that cat food sold by defendants required pet prescription from veterinarian, where said cat food was not materially different from lower-priced nonprescription cat food, and where prescription requirement was illusory. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff’s claim was barred by statutory safe harbor for conduct specifically authorized by U.S. Food and Drug Administration, safe harbor provision did not apply, since FDA issued guidance did not specifically authorize conduct alleged here. Moreover, plaintiffs adequately alleged that defendants’ marketing practices were deceptive, where no prescription was necessary to obtain instant cat food, and where plaintiffs saw specific prescription language when they made their purchases and suffered damages because they paid higher price for said cat food.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment alleging that they were entitled to qualified immunity in plaintiff-transgender prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s repeated requests for sex-reassignment surgery instead of defendant providing cross-gender hormone treatment violated her 8^th Amendment rights because defendants were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs. Plaintiff failed to provide any case law that warned defendants that treating inmates’ gender dysphoria with hormone therapy and deferring consideration of sex-reassignment surgery violated Constitution. As such, defendants were immune from liability. Ct. further noted that it was doubtful that plaintiff could establish case of deliberate indifference, where defendants followed accepted medical standards that recommended that individuals such as plaintiff undergo “real life” experiences as person of their self-identified gender for one year before resorting to irreversible surgical options. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-City’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs’ action alleging that defendant’s ordinance, which required residential property owners to either obtain license from City or hire licensed contractor to repair residential property, but allowed homeowners who resided in their homes to make such repairs on their own without obtaining such license, violated dormant commerce clause, because, according to plaintiffs, said licensing requirement placed impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Dormant commerce clause is not implicated since ordinance treats equally all landlords, whether residing in Indiana or elsewhere, and ordinance can treat differently homeowners who reside in their homes, where landlords are using residential properties differently than homeowners who actually reside in their homes. Also, under dormant commerce clause, ordinance was subject to only rational basis review, and ordinance satisfied said review, where defendant had interest in safety and habitability of homes, and ordinance was legitimate exercise of defendant’s authority to promote that interest.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing without leave to amend plaintiffs’ action, alleging that they were assignees of certain private insurers-Medicare Advantage Organizations (MAOs) seeking recovery of medical costs that MAOs paid on behalf of covered individuals, where defendant, as primary insurer, should have paid said costs. Record showed that different entity to which plaintiffs had no contractual relationship had actually paid medical costs at issue in instant complaint. As such, without evidence that plaintiffs had obtained rights to recover from said entity, plaintiffs had no rights to enforce and no standing to sue. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ third attempt at identifying MAO to which they had received assignment of rights that had actually paid medical costs at issue in instant complaint. However, Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing instant case “with prejudice” where dismissal was based on lack of standing. Too, Dist. Ct. erred in sanctioning plaintiff’s attorneys, where most of alleged misrepresentations were result of honest mistakes concerning complicated corporate arrangements.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff-death row prisoner’s claim under Freedom of Information Act, seeking copy of every document pertaining to his homicide convictions, where plaintiff asserted that defendant could not rely on Exemption 7(C) to redact all personal information, including names and contact information of individuals named in said documents, including reports of interviews, fingerprints and rap sheets of third-parties. Ct. of Appeals found that privacy interests of affected persons contained in said documents outweighed public interest in disclosure of redacted information, where: (1) plaintiff failed to present evidence that would warrant belief by reasonable person that redacted information would uncover govt. impropriety; and (2) prisoner’s interest in attacking his own conviction via FOIA request was not “public interest” sufficient to allow plaintiff’s challenge concerning defendant’s invocation of Exemption 7(C) to go forward.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s action against defendant-self regulatory organization formed under Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, alleging that defendant denied plaintiff’s due process rights by not providing plaintiff with notice of investigation into alleged wrongdoing by one of defendant’s members or opportunity for hearing prior to publication of settlement documents pertaining to resolution of claims against member, where statements contained in settlement documents were allegedly false and defamatory with respect to certain transactions between plaintiff and member. Dist. Ct. could properly find that dismissal was proper, because plaintiff had no Bivens remedy that would allow it to have cause of action against defendant. Ct. of Appeals further observed that plaintiff may have certain administrative remedies under Commission Exchange Act, such as requesting Commodities Future Trading Commission to sua sponte review instant settlement documents. Also, plaintiff’s state-law defamation claims were preempted by Commodity Exchange Act.