Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in overruling defendant-law firm’s objection to different law firm’s petition to adjudicate and enforce its attorney’s lien in amount of $126,663.66, under circumstances where: (1) law firm had represented defendant for three-month period in underlying attorney’s fee dispute arising out of $4.2 million settlement; and (2) basis for law firm’s withdrawal was fact that, unknown to law firm at time it had agreed to represent defendant, defendant had previously given to different law firm security interest in defendant’s interest in recovery of fees from underlying $4.2 million settlement, which was same source of funds that would have been used for payment of instant law firm’s fees. Law firm could properly pursue its claim under quantum meruit theory, where defendant’s contingency agreement with law firm had terminated at time law firm withdrew as counsel for defendant. Moreover, law firm's withdrawal from representing defendant was reasonable, where: (1) law firm was faced with reality that it would not be paid for its continued representation of defendant due to existence of superior security interest in defendant’s interest in fees from underlying $4.2 million settlement; (2) client’s refusal/inability to pay attorney’s fees during course of litigation is good cause to withdraw from case; and (3) defendant never contested law firm’s claim that irreconcilable differences prevented it from continuing its representation of defendant. Also, law firm’s legal services played vital role in defendant’s recovery of fees in underlying $4.2 million settlement.

Dist. Ct. did not err in instant interpleader action in finding pursuant to contingency fee agreement that plaintiff-attorney and defendant-attorney were entitled to only one-third of $4.2 million settlement as attorney's fees in underlying RICO action, where settlement agreement made no mention of attorney’s fees award to said attorneys, and where contingency fee agreement called for said attorneys to receive one-third of settlement proceeds. Moreover, record supported Dist. Ct.’s award of 60 percent of said fees to defendant-attorney and 40 percent to plaintiff-attorney based upon: (1) co-counsel agreement that, in part, proportioned any fee award based on number of hours worked; and (2) defendant’s failure to document time spent on case so as to establish his claim for greater percentage of said fees. Ct. rejected and found frivolous defendant-attorney’s claim that fee award in underlying action should have been $2.5 million based on alleged oral agreement that was separately negotiated and included in $4.2 settlement figure. Too, Dist. Ct. did not err in sanctioning defendant-attorney for raising frivolous claim that fee award should have been $2.5 million, where said claim was made in spite of clear language to contrary in contingency fee agreement, and where there was no mention of alleged $2.5 agreement in settlement award. Dist. Ct. also did not err in sanctioning defendant attorney for vexatious conduct under 28 USC section 1927, where defendant-attorney: (1) caused continuance of hearing, where defendant-attorney sought permission to appear at said hearing, but could not participate due to ambient noise at location where he made said call; (2) filed second amended counterclaim that contained numerous substantive changes in violation of Dist. Ct.’s order; and (3) made last-minute continuance motion, where defendant waited 58 days to make said motion, and where defendant explained that motion was necessary to obtain hearing transcript.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-Sheriff and County’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-pre-trial detainee’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant’s practice of ignoring medically necessary lower bunk prescriptions violated his 8^th amendment rights, where: (1) plaintiff had such prescription to accommodate his medical condition; (2) defendant nevertheless placed plaintiff in upper bunk bed; and (3) plaintiff subsequently fell off upper bunk bed and injured himself. Plaintiff needed to establish that his injuries arose out of execution of defendant’s policy or custom, and plaintiff failed to establish existence of said policy or custom, where plaintiff could only cite to three to five similar incidents over seven-year period, where inmate who had lower bunk prescription incurred injuries after being placed in upper bunk bed.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of standing action filed by plaintiffs-consultants providing services to nursing homes and long-term care facilities, where plaintiffs alleged on behalf of class of nursing home residents obtaining Medicaid benefits in said homes and facilities that defendants had failed to process timely payments for claims submitted by said nursing homes/facilities to Medicaid managed care organizations. Plaintiffs did not maintain that they had standing to bring instant claims in their own right. Moreover, while plaintiffs argued that it had standing to assert residents rights under 42 C.F.R. section 435.923, Dist. Ct. could properly find that said regulation did not allow plaintiffs to bring civil lawsuit on behalf of residents, and that said regulation only allowed plaintiffs to assist residents in submitting Medicaid applications or renewal applications for said benefits and receiving on behalf of said residents only documents and agency communications regarding Medicare eligibility-related matters.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction plaintiff’s Lanham Act, Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, and Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims, arising out of defendant’s 2016 marketing of its “Diesel Test Red Series” sports nutritional supplement that plaintiff asserted infringed on its “Diesel Test” dietary nutritional supplement that plaintiff had first manufactured in 2005. While defendant asserted that personal jurisdiction was lacking because it was not licensed to do business in Illinois, had no place of business, telephone or mailing address in Illinois, and had no employees or real or personal property in Illinois, Ct. of Appeals found that defendant had formed sufficient minimum contacts in Illinois so as to allow plaintiff proceed on his cause of action, where record showed that: (1) defendant had sold its Diesel Test product to 767 Illinois residents through its website; (2) defendant’s website required consumers to select Illinois among its “ship to” options; and (3) Illinois residents purchasing defendant’s products received thank-you emails for purchasing defendant’s Diesel Test product. Ct. further noted that defendant’s contacts in Illinois related to plaintiff’s infringement claims, and that it would not be unfair to require defendant to defend instant lawsuit in Illinois, where defendant conducted business at nationwide level through its website.

Dist. Ct. erred in failing to grant plaintiff-prisoner’s request to amend his section 1983 complaint alleging that defendants-certain prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by failing to provide him with Cialis to medically rehabilitate his penile function after having undergone surgery to remove his prostate. Plaintiff’s wanted to add to complaint proposed defendant who had actually denied giving plaintiff Cialis, and that plaintiff was unaware of identity of proposed defendant until summary judgment phase of case. As such, Dist. Ct. should have allowed plaintiff to add proposed defendant to complaint. Ct. rejected defendants’ contention that proposed defendant would be able to successfully assert qualified immunity, where court observed that such defense can only be raised by proposed defendant after proposed defendant had opportunity to litigate issue. Moreover, allegation that proposed defendant’s denial of Cialis was based upon prison policy that categorically precluded treatment for erectile dysfunction created question of fact as to whether proposed defendant could assert qualified immunity. Also, Dist. Ct.’s rationales for denying plaintiff’s request to add proposed defendant, i.e. that plaintiff would not allow proposed defendant access to his medical records or that proposed defendant was merely enforcing prison policy, were not supported by record.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering judgment in favor of defendant in section 1983 action against defendants-City and others alleging malicious prosecution and unlawful detention arising out of incident in which police officer had allegedly pushed plaintiff out of window prior to his arrest on charges under Ill. armed career criminal statute. Instant action was precluded by release that plaintiff had given in prior settlement of 1983 action alleging excessive force against police officer involved in instant arrest, where language in release indicated that release covered all claims against defendant City, “including but not limited to all claims under…state or federal law, arising either directly or indirectly” out of incident which was basis of instant litigation. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that scope of release covered only prior excessive force action, where Ct. found that release was designed to resolve all claims related to plaintiff’s arrest and not only ones that plaintiff asserted in first lawsuit. Moreover, claims in instant lawsuit were reasonably foreseeable to parties at time release was generated.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing with prejudice plaintiff-prisoner’s lawsuit, where plaintiff had been granted his petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) under Prison Litigation Reform Act based on contention that he had only $219.36 in assets under circumstances where plaintiff had failed to disclose that he had reached $4,000 settlement with state that had yet to be deposited in plaintiff’s prison trust account. While Dist. Ct. concluded that plaintiff’s failure to disclose $4,000 settlement amounted to fraud upon court, Ct. of Appeals found that dismissal of plaintiff’s lawsuit was improper, because: (1) plaintiff truthfully disclosed all of his assets at time of his IFP application; (2) any failure to report expected $4,000 settlement was at best inadvertent, which did not make IFP application untrue; and (3) actual deposit of $4,000 into plaintiff’s prison trust account approximately one year later constituted adequate disclosure to prison authorities of change in plaintiff’s income. As such, there should not have been any dismissal based on untrue allegations of poverty.

Ct. of Appeals remanded two appeals to Dist. Ct. due to lack of appropriate jurisdictional statement filed by parties that did not comply with court rules. Record showed that both cases were resolved by magistrate judges, but counsel failed to put in jurisdictional statements dates that parties had consented to magistrate judge hearing case as required by Circuit Rule 28(b). Ct. further noted that in one case, parties had failed to mention that decision from which appeal was being taken had been rendered by magistrate judge.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, plaintiffs-taxpayers’ action, alleging that defendant-county tax assessor violated their rights under Equal Protection Clause by assessing their properties at rates mandated by local ordinance while assessing other similarly-situated properties at lower rates. Dist. Ct. found that Tax Injunction Act barred instant claims because plaintiffs had adequate forum in state court to raise all of their constitutional claims. Defendant conceded, though, that Illinois’s tax-objection procedures did not allow taxpayers to raise constitutional claims in state court. As such, plaintiffs could proceed in federal court on instant claims. Ct. further rejected argument that principle of comity precluded Dist. Ct. from exercising jurisdiction over instant claims.