Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in granting motion for summary judgment by defendant-hospital operated by religious non-profit organization in plaintiff-employee’s ERISA action seeking declaration that pension plans operated by defendants are not eligible for church exemption, and thus were covered under ERISA so as to require that said plans be adequately funded, where said order was entered despite plaintiff’s motion under Rule 56(d) to postpone summary decision so that plaintiff could complete additional discovery. Record showed that instant summary judgment motion was filed long before discovery was to close, and discovery sought by plaintiff was material to summary judgment issue regarding whether plan committees were “principal-purpose” organizations within meaning of ERISA. Ct. further noted that plaintiff established strong record of diligence in pursuing discovery that included generation of pending discovery disputes, and that additional discovery sought in plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) motion would not have been futile.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed appeals of defendants-police officials and interpreter, who challenged Dist. Ct.’s denial of their motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his 5^th Amendment rights by coercing him to say that he killed son in self-defense. Dist. Ct found that plaintiff, who spoke Korean with limited understanding of English, did not understand Miranda warnings that were given in English, and record contained dispute as to whether interpreter accurately informed plaintiff of his Miranda rights. Moreover, police officials’ claim on appeal, that there was no prior case law establishing that their conduct violated 5^th Amendment, was impermissible factual challenge on Dist. Ct’s findings regarding plaintiff’s confusion during two interrogations, as well as impact of plaintiff’s lack of medications and sleep on statements made by plaintiff during said interrogations, that could not be challenged in instant interlocutory appeal. Similarly, defendant interpreter also participated in interrogation of plaintiff and could not challenge in instant appeal Dist. Ct.’s factual determinations regarding his role in alleged coerced interrogations.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiffs-prisoners’ civil actions in which plaintiff sought in forma pauperis treatment, where Dist. Ct. found that plaintiffs had committed fraud on court by failing to list on in forma pauperis application all prior actions that plaintiff had filed. In one case, plaintiff had failed to list two prior lawsuits, which had not resulted in imposition of any “strike,” and plaintiff could have proceeded in forma pauperis in instant lawsuit had he listed said lawsuits. In other case, plaintiff failed to list three prior lawsuits, but had not incurred strike in any of said lawsuits. Ct. of Appeals found that neither omission constituted material misstatement necessary for fraud finding, and plaintiffs’ explanations that they simply forget about said cases did not provide enough evidence to support Dist. Ct.’s belief that omissions were intentional.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for partial summary judgment, in section 1983 action alleging that defendants unlawfully stopped his car in traffic stop and subjected him to false arrest and unlawful search. While plaintiff could receive damages for unlawful stop, since trial court had previously granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on said stop, plaintiff could not receive damages for false arrest and for unlawful search, where plaintiff’s arrest (and subsequent incarceration) was supported by probable cause when defendants found gun and drugs in defendant’s car. Moreover, given jury’s verdict for defendants as to plaintiff’s false arrest and unlawful search claims, plaintiff could only receive damages for his brief seizure occasioned by stop of his car prior to officers seeking production of plaintiff’s driver’s license, and that jury accounted for such brief seizure by awarding plaintiff one dollar in nominal damages on his unlawful stop claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants-jail officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs-pre-trial detainees’ action alleging that defendants violated their 14^th Amendment due process rights, when defendants shut off all water to jail for three days without warning and provided plaintiffs only five bottles of water per day during said time for their personal use. Plaintiffs’ action focused on claim that defendants denied them less than minimal amounts of water needed for necessary activities of life, including drinking water and water to maintain sanitation, and plaintiffs’ claims, if proved, would constitute violation of Constitution so as to support denial of defendant’s claim of qualified immunity. Fact that defendants claimed that shut off was necessary to replace water booster pump did not require different result, where defendants had other options to procure necessary water for its pretrial detainees.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff-bank in action against defendant-attorney, alleging that defendant committed fraud by facilitating sales of condominiums by straw purchasers, who made misrepresentations on loans applications that allowed members of scheme to pocket mortgage proceeds without paying anything on properties. While plaintiff claimed that he was not aware of mortgage fraud scheme, others testified that defendant knew that buyers were part of scheme, and that defendant was aware about misrepresentations in loan applications. Moreover, while defendant asserted that as owner of title company that closed on said properties, he could not be personally liable for torts committed as member of title company, record showed that defendant participated in scheme as both owner of title company and as attorney for sellers, and that plaintiff could pursue instant action against defendant for defendant’s own individual acts. Ct. further rejected defendant’s claim that attorney cannot aid and abet client’s fraud as matter of law.

Record failed to contained sufficient evidence to support defendant-agency’s determination under Food Security Act that plaintiff’s removal of 9 trees from plaintiff’s land improperly converted several acres of wetlands into cropland so as to render plaintiff’s entire farm ineligible for USDA benefits. Agency decision was arbitrary and capricious where it was based on untrue assumptions that said property had been drained through use of tile and was located in depressed area of plaintiff’s land. Moreover, agency consideration of other property to establish that plaintiff’s land was wetland was not proper, since comparable property did not have similar traits to plaintiff’s land. Also, applicable regulation precluded agency from relying on fact that plaintiff had removed nine trees to support finding that plaintiff’s land was now “converted wetland,” and expert had noted that there was only minimal impact on land due to instant removal. As such, agency could not withhold benefits from plaintiff, since subject land never qualified as wetlands that could have been converted illegally into cropland.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his nasal polyps condition, where said dismissal was sanction for plaintiff’s failure to participate in his own discovery deposition. Plaintiff claimed that at time defendants came to prison to take his deposition he had not yet received defendants’ notice to take his deposition that was mailed five days prior to defendants’ appearance at prison, and that he was unprepared to participate in his own deposition at that time. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could not base dismissal on violation of Rule 37(d), since: (1) taking facts most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff had not been served with notice of deposition at time defendants came to take his deposition; and (2) other cases involving prison litigants contained evidence that there is typical delay in distributing mail to prisoners. Also, without plaintiff receiving proper notice of deposition, sanctions were not appropriate under Dist. Ct.’s inherent authority, since defendant was not required to sit for what amounted to be surprise-attack deposition.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-County officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his First Amendment rights by banning him from entering County’s Administration Building, where plaintiff’s employer maintained office, after plaintiff had denied County Administrator’s request to divert some funds in plaintiff’s employer’s budget to help pay salary of probation officer whose job was in jeopardy. Record showed that: (1) instant ban was imposed shortly after plaintiff had PTSD episode that resulted in plaintiff threatening police officer and kicking out window of squad car; and (2) plaintiff’s workplace was not public forum, but rather was mere office building. Moreover, instant ban was viewpoint neutral and reasonably motivated by legitimate safety concerns. Too, plaintiff failed to establish causation element in any retaliation claim, where alleged protected conduct in form of plaintiff’s rejection of county’s money request took place two years prior to imposition of instant ban. Alternatively, plaintiff could not establish any due process violation arising out of defendants’ alleged failure to abide by rules contained in County’s personnel policy handbook prior to imposing instant ban, since plaintiff failed to identify any property interest that attached to said rules.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on res judicata grounds plaintiff’s action alleging breach of contract and forgery on alleged guaranty contract, where: (1) plaintiff had alleged similar claims as affirmative defenses in prior guaranty action filed by defendant in instant case against plaintiff and others seeking to obtain recovery on same guaranty contract; and (2) defendant had obtained default judgment in guaranty action against another individual and dismissed without prejudice its action against plaintiff in guaranty action. While Dist. Ct. found that res judicata applied so as to dismiss instant action because plaintiff should have asserted such claims in guaranty action, Ct. of Appeals found that res judicata did not apply, since: (1) most cases applying res judicata involve plaintiffs in first action bringing same or similar claims in second action, and not where defendant in first action brings independent claims in second action based on affirmative defenses filed in first action; and (2) default judgment in first action applied to different defendant. Ct. further noted that defendant in instant case never had to address plaintiff’s affirmative defenses in guaranty action, and that even if plaintiff prevailed in instant case, defendant’s interest in guaranty action, i.e., its default judgment, would remain in place.