Federal Civil Practice

 Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ section 1983 action alleging that defendant-Election Board violated their right to vote, right of freedom to associate and right to petition govt., where plaintiff asserted that defendants’ employees committed fraud and other irregularities when conducting “5 percent” audit of ballots cast in 2016 primary election by erasing tallies at end of audit so as to match preprinted count that had been generated by voting machine. Dist. Ct. could properly find that under operative statute (section 22-9.1 of Election Code) results of audit cannot change result of election, and thus plaintiffs could not allege that defendant deprived them of their right to vote. Ct. further noted that: (1) plaintiffs might have state-law claim for alleged violation of Ill. Election Code; (2) plaintiffs failed to allege freedom of association claim, where plaintiffs failed to assert with whom they were prevented from associating; and (3) record did not support plaintiff’s claim that defendants prevented them from publicly commenting on their concerns at Bd.’s  meeting prior to Bd.’s certification of precinct returns.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated plaintiff's 8th Amendment rights by failing to protect him from attack from his cellmate under circumstances where defendants had been aware that cellmate posed danger to plaintiff. Plaintiff established triable issue regarding defendants’ knowledge of risk to plaintiff and their failure to prevent said risk by presenting evidence that said defendants had been aware that: (1) plaintiff, who sought transfer on three occasions, told said defendants that cellmate was acting crazy, and that he did not feel safe with cellmate; (2) plaintiff was designated “pair-with-care,” which required that defendants consult with others prior to placing plaintiff with cellmate; (3) plaintiff sought help from prison’s psychological services by seeking transfer; and (4) cellmate had been transferred to current cell with plaintiff following assault involving prior cellmate. However, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting two defendants’ motion for summary judgment, where plaintiff failed to present evidence that said defendants were aware of cellmate’s prior history of violence or that cellmate otherwise presented plausible threat of violence to plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison doctor’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant was deliberately indifferent to persistent pain in plaintiff's colon. Record showed existence of triable issue as to whether defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical condition, where, according to plaintiff, defendant continued with knowingly ineffective treatment for plaintiff’s colon pain for more than six months and delayed for three-month period referral of plaintiff to outside specialist, who performed colorectal exam that revealed source of plaintiff’s pain and performed subsequent surgery that alleviated plaintiff’s pain. Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-consulting prison doctor’s summary judgment motion, where plaintiff failed to show that said defendant was aware of plaintiff’s suffering or his persistent complaints and requests for new course of treatment.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing as untimely plaintiff-prisoner’s administrative complaint under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), where plaintiff placed complaint in prison’s mailbox nine days prior to deadline, and where govt. received complaint after statutory deadline had passed. Prison-mailbox rule applied to instant FTCA complaint so as to render it timely when plaintiff placed complaint in prison mailbox.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering injunction that required Indiana to treat children born into female-female marriages as having two female parents, who must be listed on original birth certificates. Under Indiana statute (section 31-14-7-1(1)(A), husband of birth mother is presumed to be child’s biological father who is listed on original birth certificate, and instant injunction provides similar treatment for both women in female-female marriages, so as to satisfy Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Ct. rejected state’s argument that birth mother must provide name of biological father on original birth certificate, and that any all-male or all-female married couples must use “adoption system” on amended birth certificates, where it would be proper to list both same-sex individuals as child’s legal parents. Ct. also noted that instant case did not decide what parental rights and duties biological fathers such as sperm donors have with respect to children of female-female marriages, and Dist. Ct. erred in invalidating section 31-14-7-1(1)(A) in its entirety.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-police officials’ motion requesting dismissal on qualified immunity grounds of plaintiff’s section 1983 action, where plaintiff alleged that defendants used excessive force on decedent by applying too-tight handcuffs behind decedent’s back during his arrest, and where cause of decedent’s death was lack of oxygen caused in part by his obesity, heart condition and placement of said handcuffs. Paramedics came to arrest scene and observed decedent telling them that he had no preexisting medical condition and speaking to them in clear sentences. Moreover, decedent never complained that handcuffs were too tight, and although decedent complained of trouble breathing, he never indicated that his troubled breathing was caused or exacerbated by said handcuffs. As such, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, where defendants were unaware that any handcuff tightness was causing decedent’s injury. Also, plaintiff could point to no prior case that held that decedent had constitutional right as out-of-breath arrestee to not have his hands cuffed behind his back after he had complained of difficult breathing.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state viable cause of action plaintiff-police officer’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-employer and certain police officials violated his due process and equal protection rights by allowing defendants’ “wives and paramours” to cheat on 2015 police lieutenants’ examination so as to deprive plaintiff of promotion to lieutenant. Plaintiff lacked protected property interest in “fair” lieutenants’ examination free from cheating or rigging, since while plaintiff had protected interest in retaining his current position, he had no such interest in unattained higher rank. Also, plaintiff failed to state viable equal protection claim, since, under Engquist, 553 U.S. 591, instant class-of-one equal protection claim is barred in public employment context. Moreover, plaintiff could not establish any protected gender claim, since, although plaintiff asserted that he was discriminated against because he was not in romantic relationship with defendants-executives who allegedly allowed others to gain access to test, any favoritism would not be based on plaintiff’s gender, since disadvantaged competitors could be either male or female who had not engaged in romantic relationship with defendants.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated 4th Amendment by using excessive force when shooting to death plaintiff’s decedent, during incident in which defendants attempted to arrest decedent after witnessing: (1) occupants in car in which decedent was driving fire gunshots at different car: (2) decedent speed through city streets and eventually crash into four cars before crashing into defendants’ unmarked squad car; and (3) decedent ignoring one defendant’s direction to stop before defendants fired shots into decedent’s car as decedent drove toward defendants in attempt to escape. Defendants’ use of deadly force against decedent did not constitute 4th Amendment violation, where use of deadly force was objectively reasonable means to prevent escape of armed and dangerous suspect, and where decedent’s extremely reckless driving supported defendants’ conclusion that decedent posed grave risk of danger to public located nearby. Moreover, defendants could have reasonably believed that there was still one gun in decedent’s car within decedent’s access at time defendants fired shots at decedent’s car.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment filed by certain defendants in plaintiff’s action alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy arising out of police investigation and arrest of plaintiffs-physicians and employees of company that treated individuals with opioid addiction with controlled substance prescriptions. Indiana courts issued arrest warrants for plaintiffs, and defendants otherwise had probable cause to arrest plaintiffs-physicians and certain non-medical employees of plaintiffs’ business, where police investigation revealed that said plaintiffs had dispensed Suboxone that was used to treat opioid addiction without having personally examined patients and in some circumstances issued said prescriptions without patient having seen any physician in contravention to Indiana law. However, reversal was required with respect to claims of one plaintiff, where said plaintiff was not medical provider, and where police lacked any evidence that said plaintiff, who worked in parking lot of instant business, had participated or was aware that other plaintiffs were dispensing prescriptions for controlled substance without patient having seen physician.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on res judicata/claim preclusion grounds instant action alleging that defendant-debt collector violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by failing to notify credit agency that plaintiff had disputed debt asserted by defendant, after defendant had reported to credit agency existence of debt. While plaintiff had previously filed and settled similar claim against defendant that alleged same violation of FDCPA regarding different debt, res judicata did not apply, since prior claim was not identical to instant claim, where defendant’s failure to notify credit agency with respect to each debt constituted separate wrong. Moreover, each alleged failure by defendant to notify credit agency could have caused additional harm to plaintiff’s credit score or peace of mind, and plaintiff was entitled to potential $1,000 statutory damages for each claim.