Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in plaintiffs’ section 1983 action alleging that defendant-police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct Terry stop, after officer had stopped plaintiffs riding in grey car during their investigation of nearby shooting. Officer had received dispatch that shooting involved three black males riding in grey car, and officer told plaintiffs that reason for stop was fact that shooting had occurred earlier that day. As such, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where instant stop did not clearly violate established law. Fact that officer could not remember instant stop, that make of plaintiffs’ car did not match make of car in dispatch, or that shooting occurred hours before stop did not require different result. Also, defendants could use police report to support instant qualified immunity claim, because statements contained in report were not offered for truth of matters asserted, but rather were offered to establish defendants' mind set at time of instant stop.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, where: (1) plaintiff informed defendants that he had Post Traumatic Stress Disorder that required that they not stand directly behind him, because doing so triggered his mental health symptoms; and (2) defendants thereafter stood behind him on increased occasions while patrolling commons areas. Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to show that at time of defendants’ actions there was clear constitutional right to have accommodation of inmate-reported mental diagnosis without confirmation from medical staff or existence of treatment plan. Ct. emphasized that it is essential that non-medical correctional staff comply with orders from medical staff, and instant record reflected that there were no such orders. Result might be different if medical staff had ordered correctional staff to provide accommodation for plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. in four separate cases did not abuse its discretion in dismissing as sanction claims by plaintiff-attorney seeking to collect on judgment that had been entered against his former clients following attorney fee dispute that plaintiff had with his former clients. Record showed that Dist. Ct. Judge had previously disqualified plaintiff from attempting to collect on said judgment, and that plaintiff had willfully defied said order by continuing to collect on said judgment by filing instant four lawsuits. While plaintiff argued that Dist. Ct.’s disqualification order was wrongly decided, defendant had failed to properly appeal said order and could not seek to challenge said order by filing instant lawsuits. Moreover, dismissal as opposed to any lesser sanction was appropriate due to plaintiffs’ continued violation of disqualification order.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison guards’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoners’ section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiffs’ 8^th Amendment rights by discharging their shotguns that scattered buckshot over crowded prison dining hall that injured plaintiffs during disturbance that involved two other prisoners. While defendants claimed that they fired their shotguns as necessary warning to other inmates whom defendants claimed were still resisting efforts to breakup conflict, record contained other evidence indicating that disturbance was over at time shotguns had been fired, and that shotguns had either been aimed at plaintiffs or were aimed at area in ceiling that had likelihood of buckshot ricocheting to prisoners. As such, reasonable jury could conclude that there was no need for any warning shots, and thus there was some evidence that defendants discharged their shotguns with malice and/or sadism, which would counter defendants' claim that they acted in good faith by discharging shotguns to restore order. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-City’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that City and defendant-police officer withheld material impeachment evidence concerning officer’s drug and racketeering crimes in violation of Brady that led to plaintiff’s conviction and subsequent vacatur of said conviction. While plaintiff argued that City could be liable for actions taken by police officer because it had practice of using paid criminal informants, and because it had failed to supervise officer’s use of said informant that played role in officer’s criminal convictions, fact that City used informants did not constitute violation of any federal right. Also, plaintiff failed to show that City engaged in any deliberate indifference to fact that City’s use of criminal informants would lead to officer’s violation of federal law. However, while jury found in favor of police officer, plaintiff was entitled to new trial, where: (1) Dist. Ct. erred in failing to instruct jury to disregard officer’s claim on witness stand that he would “love to testify” but was invoking his 5^th Amendment right due to pending nature of his own criminal charges; and (2) Dist. Ct. failed to properly instruct jury that only time witness can invoke 5^th Amendment is when witness has reasonable fear that truthful answers may incriminate him.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-certain prison medical personnel’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs regarding his hernia condition. Plaintiff’s action against defendant-medical director was time-barred, where instant amended complaint was filed more than two years after medical director left prison. Fact that original complaint was filed within two-year period did not require different result, where original complaint was dismissed without prejudice. Also, summary judgment was properly granted as to defendant-prison nurse, where nurse used her medical judgment to provide reasonable treatment instead of plaintiff’s request for surgery. Too, defendant-entity employing medical personnel was entitled to summary judgment, even though plaintiff argued that entity had policy against providing surgical intervention for prisoners, where actual policy did not contain flat prohibition against surgical intervention, and where entity’s employees testified that they used their own medical judgment on case-by-case basis. However, defendant- medical doctor was not entitled to summary judgment where, if jury believed plaintiff, doctor was aware of plaintiff's pain arising out of his hernia condition for 14-month period and never took actions to address said pain.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials denied plaintiff due process when investigating and prosecuting murder charge against plaintiff by withholding exculpatory evidence, which resulted in plaintiff being convicted of said charge that was eventually overturned in plaintiff’s post-conviction petition. Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of Brady violations committed by defendants to withstand instant summary judgment, where: (1) defendants failed to disclose impeachment evidence indicating that key govt. witness, who had identified defendants as shooters, was actually unaware who had shot victim; (2) state’s case against defendants had no physical or forensic evidence linking plaintiff to instant murder; and (3) one defendant generated false statement for witness to hide fact that said witness had identified another individual as culprit in murder. Ct. similarly noted as Brady violation, fact that one defendant-police officer delayed tender (until eve of trial) of 40 hours of jail telephone calls from key witness, which effectively precluded defense counsel from discovering that said witness had claimed that he had been threatened and coached as to what to say to police. Dist. Ct. did not err, though, in granting portion of summary judgment motion with respect to plaintiff’s claim that defendants had fabricated evidence by coercing witness to generate false statements, where plaintiff failed to presented evidence that defendants knew that said statements, although coerced, were false.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison medical personnel provided constitutionally deficient medical care, where basis for dismissal was finding that plaintiff had obstructed discovery. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff falsely claimed that defendants had failed to adequately respond to plaintiff’s discovery requests; (2) plaintiff failed to answer straight-forward questions regarding his claim during deposition; and (3) plaintiff falsely accused opposing counsel of bringing contraband into prison. Fact that Dist. Ct. did not conduct hearing prior to imposing sanctions did not require different result, where plaintiff had opportunity to explain his conduct in response to order to show cause. Also, dismissal of plaintiff lawsuit was appropriate sanction, where prior warnings were ineffective, counsel was unable to obtain appropriate answers in deposition, and fines would be ineffective given plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in reducing plaintiff’s damages from $420,000 to $300,000 in plaintiff’s Copyright Act and common law claims for trespass and conversion, where plaintiff alleged that defendant wrongfully discarded plaintiff’s artwork and other items in rental storage unit after plaintiff had failed to pay rent on said unit. Jury awarded Plaintiff $120,000 in damages for four pieces of artwork protected under Copyright Act, and $300,000 in plaintiff’s common law claims for loss of all artwork and other belongings stored in rental unit. Instant reduction was proper to avoid plaintiff receiving double recovery, where jury’s damages assessment in common law verdict included same artwork covered under Copyright Act. Dist. Ct. also did not err in allowing defendant to question plaintiff about his 2003 conviction for making false statement to FBI, even though said conviction was over 10 years old. There is no absolute bar to admitting conviction that is over 10 years old, and no reversible error occurred, where use of said conviction did not skew jury’s verdict since plaintiff had obtained partial favorable verdict from jury.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of standing plaintiff-divorced father’s section 1983 action against defendant-psychologist, who concluded that plaintiff had improperly used severe alienation tactics to drive wedge between plaintiff’s children and their mother, where plaintiff alleged that certain provision of Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act were unconstitutional to extent that they allowed state court to change plaintiff’s custody on showing that one parent endangered child’s physical/emotional health. Plaintiff could not use section 1983 action to press his claim, since: (1) defendant sued wrong party since defendant did not enforce any law; and (2) plaintiff could not sue State of Illinois, since State is not “person” for purposes of section 1983 action. Moreover, plaintiff would have preclusion issues even if he had standing to bring section 1983 action, since he could have raised instant constitutional issue in prior state-court proceeding that addressed custody issue.