Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs-female prisoners’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated their 4^th Amendment rights by conducting group strip search of between 8 to 10 inmates, where said inmates were required to stand naked next to each other, remove their tampons, spread their buttocks, and then stand on floor that was dirtied with menstrual blood. Ct. found that plaintiffs had only potential 8^th Amendment claim and held that Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss plaintiff’s 4^th Amendment claim, since: (1) visual inspections of prisoners are not subject to analysis under 4^th Amendment; and (2) while 4^th Amendment might apply to procedures that entail intrusions into plaintiffs’ bodies, plaintiff failed to show that prison staff touched any inmate during strip search. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-out-of-state title insurance company’s action alleging that defendant-Commissioner discriminated against plaintiff, where he imposed fines for regulatory violations that were greater than fines imposed on similar in-state title companies. Plaintiff had waived instant issue on appeal, where plaintiff had previously signed agreement to pay said fines that included clause that plaintiff had “waived right to judicial review of the matter.” Fact that lawyer for plaintiff told plaintiff that it faced potential $9.5 million fine if it did not agree to instant $70,082 fine and $42,202 consumer reimbursement did not constitute duress, since there were no threats of violence, and lawyer’s mention of potential $9.5 million fine was accurate statement of law.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in plaintiff’s motion to stay her extradition to Lithuania to stand trial on four charges arising out of plaintiff’s custody battle over her niece, after Magistrate Judge had initially certified plaintiff as extraditable, Secretary of State had granted Lithuania’s extradition request, and plaintiff had filed habeas petition challenging Magistrate’s and Secretary of State’s orders. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff was unlikely to prevail on her challenge to Magistrate Judge’s certification order where: (1) plaintiff failed to show that her custody-related charges amounted to “relative political offenses;” and (2) Magistrate Judge could properly find that said charges were supported by probable cause based on multiple statement of witnesses who observed plaintiff’s conduct while authorities were attempting to obtain custody of plaintiff’s niece. Fact that plaintiff presented video that partially recorded custody incident did not require different result. Ct. also rejected plaintiff’s claims that: (1) Secretary of State violated her constitutional right to hearing before Secretary prior to Secretary’s grant of extradition, or that she would face atrocious procedures and punishments if forced to stand trial in Lithuania; and (2) stay was warranted due to pendency of legislation that would have excluded her from scope of relevant extradition treaty.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiff’s libel claim, alleging that defendant posted on websites certain defamatory statements indicating that plaintiff was “scam and fraud” and “stole money,” even though defendant had updated one posting that was within relevant one-year limitations period. While pro se plaintiff argued that Dist. Ct. improperly failed to offer him opportunity to amend his libel claim and to advise him on how to do so, Rule 15(a)(2) does not require Dist. Ct. to offer parties legal guidance on how to amend their pleadings, since such requirement would force Dist. Ct. to go outside their roles as neutral judges. Ct. further found that updating untimely 2011 posting with timely 2015 post, without changing content of 2011 post, was insufficient to escape “single-publishing” rule that precludes plaintiff from alleging timely defamation claim, since 2015 posting related back to 2011 posting.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff-university student’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-university and university officials violated his due process rights by suspending him, which resulted in loss of Navy ROTC scholarship, after finding that he was guilty of sexual violence against female student, where defendants used unfair procedures to obtain guilty finding. Plaintiff adequately alleged that university deprived him of protected liberty interest to pursue naval occupation, and that university used unfair procedures when determining his guilt, where: (1) university did not disclose its evidence to plaintiff; (2) two of three panel members admitted to not reading investigation report; and (3) decision-makers found that accuser was more credible without speaking to accuser and without accuser supplying sworn statement regarding her claim of sexual misconduct. However, university officials could properly assert qualified immunity with respect to plaintiff’s individual capacity claims, but plaintiff could proceed against said officials on his official capacity claims seeking injunctive relief to obtain reinstatement and expungement of instant guilty finding. Plaintiff also adequately alleged Title IX claim, where he asserted that university discriminated against him on account of his gender, where plaintiff claimed that university had financial motive to find him and other males guilty of sexual assault.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s class action, alleging that defendant, which services plaintiff’s federally-backed student loans, made misrepresentations regarding how plaintiff and others could proceed when experiencing difficulties in paying off said loans, and that said misrepresentations violated Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff’s action was preempted by federal Higher Education Act (HEA), which prohibits state laws that mandate disclosure requirements concerning said loans, instant action concerned alleged affirmative misrepresentations, as opposed to failures by defendant to disclose certain information. As such, any borrower who reasonably relied on said misrepresentations to his or her detriment is not barred by HEA from bringing state-law consumer protection and tort claims against defendant-loan servicer.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiffs-two inmates in defendant-county’s jail, in section 1983 action alleging that defendant-guard sexually assaulted plaintiffs over three-year period during their incarceration, where record showed that guard’s assaults were predatory and criminal, so as to support jury’s $2-million compensatory award to each plaintiff, as well as its $3.75 million punitive damages award to each plaintiff. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in denying county’s motion for judgment as matter of law, where record failed to contain necessary link between guard’s assaults and county's policies. Ct. also rejected plaintiffs’ claims that: (1) defendant’s policies did not provide adequate measures to prevent sexual assaults by its guards; (2) county was deliberately indifferent to obvious need to update its sexual assault policies, even though jail had no prior history of sexual assaults; (3) county promoted toxic culture within jail; and (4) county failed to properly train its guards to avoid sexual assaults. Plaintiff further failed to show that guard was highly likely to sexually assault plaintiffs. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in directing plaintiff’s counsel to pay $66,191.75 in attorney fees to defendants as sanction for defending against defendants’ motion for summary judgment, where discovery on plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim indicated that there was no evidentiary support for such claim. Record showed that: (1) after Dist. Ct. had granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff had failed to produce any admissible evidence to support claims identified by plaintiff on appeal; and (2) Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff’s responses to motion for summary judgment were laden with disingenuous and misleading statements and contained statement of facts that did not comply with Local Rule 56.1 standards. Ct. further noted that counsel’s duty to conduct reasonable investigation into law and facts is renewed at each stage of litigation, including summary judgment stage, and that instant fee award was based on time spent by defendants’ counsel in drafting Rule 11 letters, seeking summary judgment and requesting instant fees. Fact that defendants had not filed formal “motion for sanctions” prior to seeking instant Rule 11 sanctions did not preclude them from obtaining said sanctions, where defendants’ counsel had previously sent letters and emails to plaintiff’s counsel threatening to seek Rule 11 sanctions if plaintiff continued with instant litigation.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison official’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical condition (i.e., lack of left hand) by failing to accommodate or otherwise take any action in his request for lower bunk-bed pass, where said failure led to plaintiff’s slip and fall 11 days later while attempting to climb down from top bunk. While Dist. Ct. found that defendant was not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s condition because defendant had no authority to issue lower bunk pass, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create triable fact on deliberate indifference issue, where record showed that others in prison had authority to issue lower bunk-bed pass, and, according to plaintiff, defendant had failed to make any effort to alert said personnel to allow him to obtain said pass.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison medical officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s back condition by either repeating ineffective treatments for his back or failing to prescribe other, more “better” treatments/medicines because they were too expensive. Plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendants’ treatments/medicines caused him any harm, where plaintiff failed to identify any treatment/medicines that would have been more effective in treating his back.