Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs=prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that prison’s policy of housing two inmates in single-person cell violated their 8th Amendment rights. While Dist. Ct. based dismissal on belief that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by neglecting to file internal grievance that raised double-cell issue prior to filing instant lawsuit, remand was required because Dist. Ct. failed to consider threshold issue as to whether exhaustion was required, as described in Ross, 578 U.S. 643, where plaintiffs provided some evidence that filing grievance was “dead end,” because other inmates who raised same issue had obtained no response from defendants. Thus, on remand, Dist. Ct. must allow limited discovery to determine whether exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required because no such remedies were “available” to plaintiffs because filing grievance would have been useless act. If so, defendants’ summary judgment motion should be denied. However, if Dist. Ct. finds that administrative remedies were available, then exhaustion requirement would apply to plaintiffs.

Dist Ct. erred in dismissing on merits plaintiff’s action under Illinois Ethics Act, 5 ILCS 430, after finding that defendant-state agency enjoyed 11th Amendment immunity, but not with respect to instant state court action. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff filed certain federal court claims, as well as instant state-court Illinois Ethics Act claim, arising out of his termination from defendant; (2) defendant asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to instant Ethics Act claim; (3) Dist. Ct. found that it had jurisdiction over federal court claims and supplemental jurisdiction over Ethics Act claim. and that defendant was immune under Eleventh Amendment, but that defendant had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity only with respect to state court and not federal court; and (4) Dist. Ct. granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on merits with respect to his Ethics Act claim. Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to defendant from plaintiff’s Ethics Act action in federal court, and Ct. of Appeals, in remanding matter back to Dist. Ct. for entry of order dismissing Ethics Act claim without prejudice, found that when it applies, Eleventh Amendment deprived Dist. Ct. of jurisdiction over claims against immune defendants, and thus lacked power to enter summary judgment on plaintiff's Ethics Act claim.

Dist Ct. did not err in dismissing on timeliness grounds plaintiff-employee’s action, alleging that defendant-employer violated Stored Communications Act (Act) by confronting and disciplining plaintiff after discovering on co-worker’s work computer certain Facebook messages authored by plaintiff that had disparaged plaintiff’s bosses. Relevant limitations period required that plaintiff file instant lawsuit within two years after date upon which plaintiff first discovered or had reasonable opportunity to discover violation of said Act, and appropriate accrual rule required that plaintiff file instant lawsuit within two years when reasonable person would have begun investigation in case. As such, instant lawsuit that was file in March of 2021 was untimely, since: (1) plaintiff was shown by her supervisor screenshots of instant messages in meeting in January of 2019 when supervisor told plaintiff that said messages came from co-worker’s work computer; and (2) said meeting with supervisor was enough to alert reasonable person to investigate supervisor’s knowledge about plaintiff’s Facebook messages, so as to begin applicable limitations period lawsuit untimely. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that her claim accrued at later date, because she was afraid in January of 2019 that she would be terminated if she had investigated violation of Act at that time.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunction in their section 1983 action, alleging that Indiana’s statutory scheme that required abortion providers to dispose of fetal remains by either burial or cremation, but allowed women to take custody of said fetal remains and to dispose of them as they pleased violated First Amendment. Ct. of Appeals found that there was no First Amendment violation, where instant statutory scheme did not require women who obtained abortions to violate any religious or secular belief. Moreover, requirement that physicians and other providers tell patrons about their statutory options does not offend First Amendment, where there is no contention that notice required by statute contained false or misleading information. Ct. rejected plaintiffs’ claim that statutory scheme violated First Amendment, because it implies that fetus is actual person, which is viewpoint that they do not share.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated Brady by suppressing police report suggesting that someone else committed shootings at issue in plaintiff’s criminal conviction that was eventually vacated. Plaintiff’s allegation in his complaint that prosecutor was aware of said report was judicial admission that precluded plaintiff from establishing civil Brady violation with respect to police defendants. Moreover, even without judicial admission, plaintiff could not show that any defendant acted either intentionally or recklessly, where: (1) two defendants were not aware of said report; (2) one defendant who was aware of said report testified that he only mistakenly failed to bring report to prosecutor’s attention; and (3) plaintiff’s ability to cast doubt on said defendant’s version of facts did not produce evidence that opposite of said defendant’s version of facts is true or that he acted intentionally. Dist. Ct. also did not err in failing to grant plaintiff’s motion to file amended complaint that removed allegation that prosecutor was aware of said report prior to trial, where said motion was not filed until after summary judgment motion was filed. With respect to other reports or identifications, Ct. of Appeals found that either prosecution was aware of said evidence, which precluded plaintiff from obtaining recovery under civil Brady claim, or that defendant and prosecution were aware of said evidence, which also precluded plaintiff from recovery.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant subjected him to false arrest on drug distribution charges by arresting him without probable cause. Record showed that defendant arrested plaintiff pursuant to arrest warrant, and thus plaintiff faced uphill battle to overcome presumption of validity accorded to warrant and information underlying it. Moreover, while plaintiff asserted that Myers lied in his warrant application by stating that confidential informant identified plaintiff from plaintiff’s driver’s license photograph as drug seller, plaintiff could only muster bare allegations that defendant had lied on his warrant application, which was insufficient to overcome presumption that arrest warrant was valid and that his arrest was supported by probable cause. Ct. further noted that without plaintiff's driver’s license in record, it could only guess as to whether reasonable officer in defendant’s position would have found plaintiff’s match to drug seller or whether defendant had made false statements in his warrant application.

Dist. Ct. erred in decertifying class action under circumstances where class of disabled inmates who sought use of prison showers and toilets, but could not do so because said facilities lacked grab bars and other fixtures, had previously been certified. Dist. Ct. held belief that certification was not appropriate because some members of class, although using wheelchairs, might not be disabled within meaning of federal law. Ct. of Appeals, though, found that certification was appropriate, since class certification under Rule 23(c0(4) would only resolve legal issue as to whether said prison facilities require grab bars and other fixtures. As such, once instant legal issue has been resolved, Dist. Ct. can resolve whether each class member would be entitled to any relief. Also, Dist. Ct. failed to explain why application of Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards, which require accessible toilets and showers, could not be applied class-wide.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing with prejudice plaintiff-prisoner’s Bivens claims against defendants-federal judges, prosecutor, defendant’s court-appointed counsel and court reporter, alleging that said defendants mishandled his 2014 federal drug crimes trial. Judges and prosecutor were absolutely immune from instant lawsuit, and defendant’s claim against court-reporter for producing transcript with errors did not arise under either Fourth, Fifth or Eighth Amendment for purposes of bringing Bivens claim. Also, plaintiff’s lawsuit against his court-appointed counsel fell outside contours of Bivens action, where said counsel did not act under color of law.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing at pleading stage plaintiff-prisoner’s action, alleging violations of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act, where plaintiff, who was confined to wheelchair and incontinent, defecated on himself on three occasions when he could not use handicapped restroom. Record showed that at times plaintiff attempted to use handicapped restroom, it was occupied by non-disabled inmate, and that each time plaintiff complained to defendants-prison officials about lack of access to restroom, his grievances resulted in prison staff merely saying that they could not reserve restroom time for him or control actions taken by other inmates. Instant complaint was sufficient to allege ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations, where: (1) plaintiff’s confinement to wheelchair and his incontinence rendered him disabled under both statutes; (2) plaintiff plausibly alleged that defendants intentionally denied him prison service or program, i.e., use of handicap-accessible restroom; and (3) plaintiff plausibly alleged that defendants breached their obligation of accommodating his disability by failing to ensure reasonable access to handicapped restroom.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants-police officers’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants had failed to disclose existence of agreement between defendants and non-citizen victim to help victim apply for U visa in exchange for victim’s testimony at plaintiff’s criminal trial. Ct. of Appeals held that finding of qualified immunity was not appropriate at early stage of instant lawsuit, where it was not evident based on allegations in complaint that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, and where discovery was necessary to determine whether defendants had informed prosecution about alleged agreement. In such case, Ct. of Appeals held, defendants could not be liable, since ultimate disclosure obligation would have rested on prosecutors and not on defendants.