Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated decedent’s 4th Amendment rights by using excessive force during decedent’s encounter with defendant-officer, where record showed that: (1) while officer was investigating reports at 3:30 a.m. that someone was stealing items from cars, decedent picked up hunting knife and approached officer; (2) officer instructed decedent to put knife down and stand still; (3) decedent instead held up knife and came within three feet of officer; (4) decedent threw knife at officer and hit him in arm with knife; and (5) officer fired gun and fatally shot decedent in torso. While plaintiff asserted that decedent posed no danger to officer at time officer shot decedent, physical evidence, such as bullet track, supported officer’s version of simultaneous actions of decedent throwing knife and officer firing gun. Moreover, plaintiff cannot withstand summary judgment by merely doubting officer’s version of events without presenting evidence to support its theory of case, since mere disbelief of only witness to encounter would mean that record is “empty,” and empty record means that plaintiff loses, because plaintiff had burden of production and persuasion. Ct. further observed that officer’s use of force remained reasonable after decedent deployed weapon, did not surrender and remained dangerous when advancing on officer.

In section 1983 action by plaintiff-prisoner, alleging that defendants-police officials violated his 4th Amendment rights by providing false information to obtain search warrant and by executing warrant in unreasonable manner, Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing certain defendants, who had been misidentified or identified through code in original complaint, where Dist. Ct. held improper belief that it was too late for plaintiff to attempt to substitute properly identified defendants. While plaintiff must complete substitution prior to expiration of stature of limitations, said period was tolled by time spent by Dist. Ct. screening plaintiff’s complaint under section 1915A. Moreover, Dist. Ct. improperly attributed said time to plaintiff. Also, remand was necessary for determination under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) as to whether newly identified defendants knew or should have known that they would have been party to plaintiff’s lawsuit but for mistake in filing original complaint.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff-pretrial detainee’s complaint, alleging that defendant-City’s policy of selling or throwing away property surrendered by pre-trial detainees upon entry into jail, where detainee fails to make arrangements to have said property claimed within 30 days after entry into jail, violated his 4th Amendment and due process rights. Plaintiff’s arguments had previously been rejected in Conyers, 10 F.4th 704, where court held that 4th Amendment did not regulate disposition of seized property, and that due process clause was not violated, where defendant provided notice and opportunity to reclaim detainee’s property. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that defendant must serve as unpaid custodian of his property for as long as it takes for him or his designee to retrieve his property.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed as moot appeal by defendant (plaintiff’s father) of Dist. Ct.’s order that remanded back to state court plaintiff’s state court action that had been removed by defendant to federal court, where instant removal had occurred more than one year after state court action had been filed. State court action concerned plaintiff’s attempt to obtain both constructive trust over defendant’s voting shares in corporation, as well as injunction to stop defendant from voting his shares in way that would adversely affect corporation or plaintiff’s interest in said corporation. During pendency of appeal, defendant died. As such, appeal became moot, where: (1) defendant’s death precluded any need for constructive trust, where agreement by plaintiff’s parents required defendant to transfer his shares in corporation to plaintiff at defendant’s death; and (2) there was no longer any need to enjoin defendant from taking any action that might adversely affect corporation.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison nurse and prison doctor’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his knee condition by persisting in conservative treatment of his knee and failing to timely perform complete examination of his knee. Plaintiff’s expert provided un-rebutted opinion that there was critical six-week period to treat plaintiff’s ACL injury to avoid further damage, and although plaintiff was seen by medical personnel at least 15 times for his knee condition and was prescribed different medications and received several x-rays and physical therapy, as well as made no recorded complaints for over one year, jury could still find that defendants’ treatment of plaintiffs’ knee condition was ineffective and delayed proper treatment of his knee condition.. In this regard, record showed that: (1) defendant-nurse failed to perform complete examination of plaintiff’s knee over seven-week period and did not refer plaintiff for MRI, which could have revealed existence of ACL tear; and (2) defendant-doctor also did not complete examination of plaintiff’s knee and persisted in giving plaintiff conservative treatment.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s action under Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that defendants’ strip search of plaintiff in presence of guard who is transgender male, violated moral tenets of his Muslim religion, where defendant-warden denied plaintiff’s request for exemption from future cross-sex strip searches and told him that he would be disciplined if he objected to said searches in future. Record showed that plaintiff’s objection to cross-sex strip searches was both religious and sincere in nature, and burden on plaintiff’s religion was unjustified under RLUIPA’s strict-scrutiny standard. Ct. further rejected defendants’ argument that exemption from cross-sex strip searches would violate anti-discrimination rights of transgender employees either under Title VII (since exemption of plaintiff from cross-sex strip searches would not inflict sufficient adverse act on transgender employees) or equal protection clause. Also, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants’ summary judgment motion with respect to plaintiff’s 4th Amendment claim to be free from unreasonable searches, where Dist. Ct. improperly found that prisoners have no 4th Amendment interest against visual inspections of their bodies.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in his section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-police officers violated his 4th Amendment rights by placing him in handcuffs and frisking him for second time during Terry stop, that was based on 911 call that accused plaintiff of police impersonation during incident in which plaintiff activated his clear strobe lights in his Crown Victoria, where plaintiff had claimed that he was merely responding to dispatch from his private employer to assist stranded motorist. Instant initial Terry stop was permissible, where plaintiff’s vehicle and license plate matched caller’s report. Moreover, while one defendant could properly frisk plaintiff during Terry stop, where nature of charged offense provided reasonable suspicion that plaintiff might be carrying weapon, same defendant exceeded permissible scope of Terry stop by placing handcuffs on plaintiff following initial frisk, where original frisk produced no weapon or contraband, and where facts known to said officer did not establish probable cause to arrest plaintiff on charge of police impersonation. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment with respect to other defendants-officers, who made decision to formally arrest plaintiff on police impersonation charge (that was eventually dismissed two years later), where said defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff based on their conversations with 911 caller, instant 911 dispatcher and plaintiff himself, where defendants could not confirm existence of plaintiff’s employer. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err denying requests for issuance of preliminary injunction in three separate cases, alleging that imposition of certain COVID-19 vaccination mandates on plaintiffs-certain employees of State of Illinois, Cook County Health and Hospital System, City of Chicago and Chicago and Naperville Fire Departments, violated various constitutional rights and state laws, where plaintiffs’ claims were unlikely to succeed on merits. Certain claims of plaintiff, who were employees of Chicago and Naperville Fire Departments were rendered moot, after Governor Pritzker issued 2022 order that removed said plaintiffs from vaccine mandate. Also plaintiffs’ claim that instant state and local COVID-19 regulations violated their substantive due process rights because said regulations interfered with their rights to bodily autonomy and privacy could not proceed, where plaintiffs failed to show that challenged mandates abridged fundamental right. As such, Dist. Ct. could find under rational basis standard that there was no substantive due process violation, where record showed that vaccine was effective to combat COVID-19, and that defendants relied on reasonably conceivable scientific evidence when promulgating contested mandate. Also, defendant-Governor was entitled to 11th Amendment immunity with respect to plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim, where plaintiffs named Governor as defendant in his official capacity, and where said plaintiffs had alleged violation of state law. Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims also failed because plaintiffs had failed to identify what procedural protections they should have been afforded. With respect to plaintiffs’ claim that COVID-19 vaccine mandates violated their right to free exercise of religion and rights under Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act, plaintiffs could not proceed on said claims because plaintiffs never applied for religious exemption that was allowed under said mandates.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support respondent’s denial of petitioner’s (manufacturer of flavored liquids for use in e-cigarette devices) premarket tobacco product application. Applicable standards required respondent to weigh risk of hooking new users into world of tobacco through use of plaintiff’s product against its potential to help existing tobacco users wean themselves from tobacco’s unhealthier forms, and respondent could properly deny plaintiff’s application based on lack of evidence to demonstrate that marketing of plaintiff’s flavored products was appropriate for protection of public health. Ct. also noted that plaintiff had failed to provide bridge between data about other products and its own proposed offering. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that: (1) respondent was required to set forth threshold levels of likelihood that existing users of tobacco products would stop using said products because of plaintiff’s new product; (2) guidance provided by FDA allowed plaintiff to forego product-specific testing in all cases; and (3) defendant based denial on general presumption that e-liquids increase youth tobacco use.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison dentist and medical-services provider’s motions for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s tooth pain by delaying treatment on decayed tooth. Record showed that plaintiff had refused defendant-dentist’s offer to remove tooth and, on second occasion, left appointment to treat tooth to take legal call prior to when treatment could begin. Plaintiff eventually obtained treatment on tooth, but brought instant section 1983 action based on delay in obtaining said treatment. Record did not support claim that dentist had sufficiently culpable mental state, where plaintiff had passed up two opportunities to treat his tooth. Moreover, dentist could not be faulted for not construing plaintiff’s report of tooth pain as urgent, when plaintiff had twice abandoned proffered treatment. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-medical provider’s summary judgment motion, where plaintiff failed to produce evidence establishing systemic and gross deficiencies in care.