Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-City’s motion to vacate $1.24 million jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff in his section 1983 action alleging that defendant was deliberately indifferent to risk that two of its off-duty police officers would violate defendant’s policy by using excessive force when confronting plaintiff at local tavern. In order to prevail against defendant in instant Monell action, plaintiff must show that municipal policy or custom caused plaintiff’s injuries, and plaintiff did not establish causation element, where: (1) defendant had policy that prohibited said officers from performing law enforcement function while having alcohol in their blood; (2) police officers, who physically assaulted plaintiff while drinking at tavern, actually violated defendant’s policy, where confrontation with plaintiff was not result of any emergency situation; and (3) defendant’s policy was not moving force of officers’ assault on plaintiff. Moreover, instant causation requirement supports notion that municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under section 1983 for constitutional torts committed by their employees.

Plaintiffs filed defamation action against defendant-newspaper, arising out of article that described state-court judicial proceeding that recounted that several trust beneficiaries successfully removed plaintiff as de facto trustee of $3 million fund. In state-court proceeding, court concluded that plaintiff violated his fiduciary duties, and although it did not determine whether plaintiff had committed criminal act, it ordered him to pay beneficiaries’ litigation expenses because his conduct “amounted to something of bad faith, fraud or deliberate dishonesty.” While plaintiffs asserted that article was defamatory in four areas, Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaint5iff could not proceed in three areas, where article was substantially true and was largely protected by judicial-proceeding privilege in said areas. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly grant defendant’s summary judgment motion with respect to claim that article improperly implicated that plaintiff committed elder abuse, where Ct. of Appeals held that: (1) any implication of elder abuse arising out of plaintiff’s handling of elderly man’s trust was substantially true; and (2) reasonable jury could not conclude that article’s observation about relationship between plaintiff’s conduct and elderly abuse constituted false statement.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction defendant-police officer’s appeal of Dist. Ct.’s order that denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant used excessive force during plaintiff’s arrest, where Dist. Ct. had rejected defendant’s claim of qualified immunity. Plaintiff claimed that defendant had slammed him down face first and knocked out tooth, while plaintiff was talking to different off-duty officer. Dist. Ct.‘s denial was based on unappealable finding that genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to whether plaintiff had resisted police officer, as well as nature of defendant’s takedown of plaintiff, which precluded summary judgment on issue of qualified immunity. Moreover, while defendant insisted that he used reasonable force, defendant did so only in reliance on his own version of facts. As such, Ct. of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to consider instant interlocutory appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on failure to exhaust administrative remedy grounds plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs when defendants withdrew necessary pain medication for his knee condition. Prison rules required that plaintiff file formal grievance within 10 days of incident, and that he make attempts at informal resolution of grievance prior to filing formal grievance. Moreover, record showed that plaintiff filed formal request after expiration of said 10-day period. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that 10-day period for filing formal grievance should be excused because prison had not responded to his informal grievance, since plaintiff did not need response to his informal grievance attempt prior to filing formal grievance.

Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding plaintiff $1,889,278.26 in attorney’s fees plus pretrial interest, when evaluating propriety of Bankruptcy Ct. award of $1,944,354,26 in attorney’s fess arising out of plaintiff paying for its own defense in underlying lawsuits filed by female athletes who claimed that Larry Nasser, who was affiliated with plaintiff, had sexually abused them. Prior to calculation of attorney’s fees, plaintiff had prevailed in action alleging that defendant had duty to defend plaintiff in said female athletes’ lawsuits, and instant request by plaintiff for attorney’s fees represented its costs in defending itself in underlying lawsuits. Bankruptcy Ct. and Dist. Ct could properly find that plaintiff was entitled to presumption that plaintiff’s requested fees were reasonable and necessary, where defendant had breached duty to defend plaintiff in said lawsuit, and where plaintiff had paid 70 percent of requested fees. Ct. rejected defendant’s contention that presumption did not apply because plaintiff: (1) did not request write-offs of billed fees and rarely asked questions about fees in invoices that it had received; (2) did not pay fees in full; and (3) had received grant money from other organizations during litigation period, which removed any incentive to drive down legal costs. Also, Bankruptcy Ct. could properly use “total value” approach, as opposed to “task approach,” when determining whether fees were reasonable and necessary.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-City’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-café’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by issuing public health violations and scheduling hearing to revoke plaintiff’s food and drink license in retaliation for plaintiff’s brief posting of sign that encouraged patrons to take off their masks prior to entering café in response to defendant’s issuance of COVID-19 mask mandate. Fact that defendant eventually canceled hearing and dismissed citations did not render plaintiff’s lawsuit moot, where plaintiff experienced concrete injury beyond issuance of citations and cancellation of hearing, since plaintiff was forced to move locations because of defendant’s actions. However, plaintiff could not establish viable Monell First Amendment claim, where plaintiff failed to plead prior pattern of similar misconduct against other businesses resulting from any policy maintained by defendant.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting petitioner-Dept. of Labor’s petition for enforcement of its subpoenas seeking documents relevant to its investigation of alleged cybersecurity breaches at respondent-company, which provided administrative services for employers who sponsor healthcare and retirement plans. Ct. of Appeals rejected company’s argument that Dept. lacked authority under ERISA to investigate company or cybersecurity incidents generally. Moreover, company failed to argue that subject-matters contained in subpoenas were unclear, and Dist. Ct. found that subject-matters of subpoenas were reasonably relevant to investigation of company’s compliance with ERISA. Also, for purpose of company’s complaints that subpoenas were too burdensome, company failed to provide estimates of numbers of documents at issue in subpoenas, cost of providing said documents, hours required to produce said documents, or how compliance would threaten normal operations of company’s business. Too, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying company’s request for protective order, where company failed to show how disclosure to Dept. would result in information being disclosed to third-party.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-state’s attorney and police investigators violated his First Amendment rights by bringing criminal charges against him in retaliation for his previous unsuccessful campaign for state’s attorney. Dist. Ct. could properly find that applicable two-year limitations period had expired since said period began to run on date plaintiff was indicated and not when he was acquitted of said charges. Also, plaintiff could not seek appeal of Dist. Ct.’s dismissal of his 4th Amendment claim, alleging that he was subjected to pretrial detention without probable cause, where defendant conceded in his brief that under governing law, his claim was not timely, where it occurred more than two years prior to initiation of his lawsuit. Fact that Court in Thompson, 142 S. Ct. 1332, subsequently indicated that litigant needs to only show in 4th Amendment claim that his prosecution ended without conviction did not require different result, where defendant’s concession essentially waived issue on appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds plaintiffs’ action seeking declaratory, monetary and injunctive relief against defendant-former employee, where, among other things, plaintiffs alleged that defendant had violated certain contractual obligations. Relevant contract contained mandatory forum selection clause designating certain California courts as exclusive venues for litigation of disputes arising out of contract. Dist. Ct. could properly find that forum selection clause applied to all three plaintiffs, especially where plaintiffs had sued under clause’s contract. Moreover, all of plaintiffs’ claims arose out of contract, and forum selection clause was mandatory, where it provided that any dispute “will be heard and determined” before certain California courts. Dist. Ct. could also find that application of forum selection clause best served convenience of parties and interests of justice, where California was adequate and available alternative forum, and where California law governed disputes under contract. Also, Dist. Ct. had no duty to consider plaintiff’s preferred forum given mandatory nature of forum selection clause.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing portions of plaintiffs qui tam action under False Claims Act, alleging that defendants-hospital and certain debt collectors submitted false claims to government for collection of “bad debts” that patients owed under circumstances where, according to plaintiffs, said debts were submitted before time they could be considered bad debts that were eligible for reimbursement by government. Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead that defendant-hospital had declined to conduct its own collection efforts so as to establish that hospital failed to comply with applicable regulations. Moreover, with respect to defendants- hospital and two of three debt collectors, plaintiffs failed to provide specific examples of defendants’ submission of bad debts that were not eligible under applicable regulations for reimbursement as bad debts. However, plaintiffs could proceed against defendant-third debt collector, where plaintiffs alleged three examples of debts being submitted for bad debt reimbursement without compliance with relevant regulations. Also, two plaintiffs stated valid retaliation claims against defendants-debt collectors, where there were sufficient allegations to support inference that it was objectively reasonable for plaintiffs to believe that their employers were committing fraud against government, and that their complaints to their employers resulted in their terminations.