Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction plaintiff’s claims alleging misappropriation of trade secrets regarding plaintiff’s 183-pin connector and unjust enrichment arising out of defendants' alleged acquisition of plaintiff’s 183-pin connector designs from third-party. Record showed that: (1) none of instant defendants were headquartered in Illinois and only two defendants had office in Illinois, but that neither office was involved in production of instant connector; and (2) defendants sold connectors to third-party in China and Texas. Plaintiff conceded that defendants lacked sufficient relationship with Illinois to permit general jurisdiction over defendants, and Dist Ct. lacked specific personal jurisdiction over defendants. Fact that cars and parts containing defendants’ connectors were sold to Illinois consumers did not require different result under stream of commerce theory, since: (1) said theory generally applies only to products liability cases; (2) tort of trade secret misappropriation that involved defendants’ alleged interactions with third-party were not linked to any interactions with Illinois consumers; and (3) defendants’ alleged misconduct did not happen in Illinois.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ motion for issuance of preliminary injunction in their section 1983 action, alleging that State of Illinois’s signature requirements for placing initiatives and referenda on both local and statewide ballots were too onerous, and thus violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights given social distancing requirements adopted by Governor of Illinois in light of COVID-19 pandemic. Relevant statute allows 18 months for plaintiff to collect signatures, and record showed that one plaintiff waited until April 2020 (but prior to filing instant lawsuit) to seek said signatures, while other plaintiffs did not start seeking signatures until after filing of lawsuit. As such, since instant social distancing orders occurred prior to April 2020, plaintiffs were not entitled to any emergency relief, because they had plenty of time to gather requisite number of signatures prior to beginning of pandemic. Also, plaintiff failed to show how social distancing orders limited their speech.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-prison official's motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated his First Amendment rights by refusing to restore certain prison benefits in retaliation for plaintiff successfully appealing imposition of prison sanction. While plaintiff had engaged in protected activity when he filed grievance to appeal said sanction, and plaintiff had established causal connection between his grievance and his alleged deprivations, plaintiff failed to show that said deprivations, i.e., failure to return him to his former cell, failure to reinstate him to his former job, and failure to pay $11.48 in back pay, would likely deter "person of ordinary firmness" from continuing to engage in protected activity. Moreover, record showed that: (1) plaintiff was returned to cell on same cell block as former cell; (2) plaintiff was placed in job that had similar pay as former job; and (3) plaintiff actually received his back pay.

Ct. of Appeals acted on several challenges to recent Wisconsin changes in its election law regarding registration of voters and requirements for absentee voting. With respect to 2013 Wisc. Act 146, which restricted number of hours municipal clerks could offer in-person absentee voting, Dist. Ct. erred in finding that said restriction had improper impact on racial minorities, since said restrictions gave all voters equal opportunity to participate. Dist. Ct. did not err in invalidating Wisc. State section 6.34(3)(a)(7)(b), which required that college and university “dorm lists” include citizenship information, since 20 USC section 1232g precludes states from requiring educational agencies to include citizenship information on certified lists of students who reside in sponsored housing. Dist. Ct. improperly found that statute’s increase in durational requirement from 10 days to 28 days for voting purposes to be unconstitutional, since plaintiffs failed to show that instant 28-day window was more onerous than similar windows in other states. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that requirement that voters produce documentary proof of residence violated Constitution. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in: (1) finding as unconstitutional statute’s prohibition on election officials from sending absentee ballots via email or fax to certain voters; and (2) entering injunction that permitted voter to declare that reasonable efforts failed to yield acceptable voter I.D.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison guard’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant failed to take reasonable measures to abate threat to plaintiff, where; (1) plaintiff told defendant that while she was in shower house, another inmate threatened to beat her up; and (2) defendant took no action following plaintiff’s report, and two days later said inmate attacked plaintiff in dining hall. While Dist. Ct. found that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity because defendant could have reasonably believed that threat to plaintiff had abated once inmates left shower house on day of report, reasonable juror could find that defendant knew that plaintiff had faced ongoing risk of serious harm, where plaintiff had asked defendant not to allow inmate to shower with her and other transgender inmates. Also, defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity, where, under Farmer, 511 U.S. 825, defendant’s alleged inaction violated clearly established right.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment, after finding that plaintiff’s 2017 legal malpractice claim was filed beyond applicable two-year limitation period. According to plaintiff, she instructed defendants-attorneys to provide her with future interest in her brother’s share of trust assets, subject to life estate held by brother’s wife, and record showed that she received documents detailing disbursement of trust in 1999. Moreover, while plaintiff asserted that she could not have known in 1999 that defendants failed to follow her instructions until death of brother’s wife in 2015, record showed that: (1) plaintiff signed retention letter that stated that trust assets were being distributed free and clear; and (2) plaintiff should have realized that something was amiss when she received trust principal outright in 2000.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ request to file second motion for summary judgment that raised plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his prison remedies prior to filing instant section 1983 action alleging that defendants used excessive force and failed to intervene on his behalf, under circumstances, where: (1) defendants had previously filed partially successful motion for summary judgment that neglected to raise instant failure to exhaust remedies issue; and (2) instant second motion for summary judgment was filed beyond deadline for filing any motion for summary judgment. While Rule 6(b)(1)(B) permits Dist. Ct. to extend deadlines, defendants merely attributed their failure to timely file instant summary judgment motion to “unknown reasons.” As a result, defendants failed to show that instant delay was due to “excusable neglect,” and thus Dist. Ct. erred in allowing defendants to file instant second motion for summary judgment and then ultimately granting said motion on its merits.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiffs-debtors’ Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claim, alleging that defendant-debt collector’s two dunning letters were misleading because they demanded interest during months that creditor had internally decided to write off instant debt. Applicable limitations period is one year, and instant dunning letters were sent to plaintiff more than one year prior to filing of instant lawsuit. Moreover, while third dunning letter that was sent by defendant to plaintiffs’ lawyer, which plaintiffs contended contained “false” statements about debt, was timely, it was not actionable under FDCPA, since: (1) at time said letter was sent, reasonable competent debt collector would not know that claims for interest made in letter were not enforceable; and (2) claim made in third dunning letter would not have misled competent lawyer, because said lawyer would not deem as “false,” demand made by potential opponent in litigation just because lawyer believes that his client may be able to persuade judge that there is defense to claimed debt.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for want of prosecution plaintiff-employee’s Title VII and ADEA actions alleging that he was victim of race, sex and age discrimination. Record showed that throughout four years of litigation, plaintiff repeatedly failed to appear for his deposition, missed status hearing, failed to follow local rules regarding motion practice, refused to respond to discovery requests despite repeated orders to do so and ignored Dist. Ct.’s orders that his conduct would lead to dismissal of his lawsuit. Record also showed that Dist. Ct. periodically recruited pro bono counsel to act on plaintiff’s behalf and dismissed instant case as sanction after fourth pro bono counsel filed successful motion to withdraw as counsel. Ct. also observed that Dist. Ct. should not have persisted in recruiting successive pro bono counsel to represent plaintiff, given plaintiff’s history of noncompliance with his discovery obligations.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiffs' motion to remand their cause of action to Indiana state court, where defendants had removed to federal court under 28 USC section 1442(a)(1) plaintiffs’ action alleging that defendants or their predecessor entities had polluted soil in and around site of plaintiffs’ later-built residence. Defendants could properly assert that they were entitled to government contractor defense to support removal of plaintiffs' lawsuit to federal court due to contracts they had with government during World War II to produce/supply lead and other pollutants according to government specifications, where at time of said production government had thoroughly regulated use of said pollutants. While Dist. Ct. justified remand to state court on its belief that defendants had only acted under color of federal office for small part of alleged time period at issue in lawsuit, defendants need only demonstrate connection or association between act in question and federal officer. Also, while plaintiffs have raised question about whether defendants’ pollution flowed from their specific wartime production for federal government or from their more general manufacturing operations outside those confines, removal was still proper as long as government contractor defense applied to some of plaintiffs’ claims that pertained to defendants’ wartime activities.