Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff-prisoner's multiple request for appointment of counsel in plaintiff's section 1983 action, alleging that his filthy cell conditions and constant hallway lighting violated his 8^th Amendment rights. Dist. Ct. properly applied standards set forth in Pruitt, 503 F.3d 647, when denying plaintiff's request for counsel, by noting that plaintiff had prior experience with litigation process and had demonstrated through his pleadings in instant case, which included filing successful amended complaint and prevailing on defendant's motion for summary judgment, that he understood his burden of proof and was fully capable of assembling evidence and marshalling arguments to support his claim. Plaintiff also failed to demonstrate reasonable likelihood that presence of counsel would have made difference in unsuccessful outcome of jury trial, where there was little evidence supporting his allegations of deliberate indifference to his conditions of confinement.

In section 1983 action brought by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that defendants (prison doctor and prison guards) were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in denying several requests by plaintiff for recruitment of counsel and then erred when granting defendant-prison doctor’s motion for summary judgment on merits of claim. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff was competent to prosecute his case based on content of plaintiff’s pleadings, Dist. Ct. failed to conduct particularized assessment of plaintiff’s ability to adequately litigate tasks ahead of him, especially where: (1) jail-house lawyer, who assisted plaintiff in drafting his pleadings, was no longer in plaintiff’s facility; and (2) plaintiff was transferred to different facility, which precluded him from investigating case and interviewing potential witnesses. However, entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants-prison guards was still appropriate in spite of absence of recruited counsel, where plaintiff failed to show that there was reasonable likelihood that presence of counsel would have made difference in case against said defendants, since: (1) plaintiff had history of various mental illnesses that resulted in episodes where plaintiff would self-harm himself in cell; (2) while plaintiff asserted that defendants had failed to protect him from himself, said defendants monitored plaintiff every 10 minutes; (3) on both occasions when plaintiff had self-harmed himself, he received prompt medical care; and (4) plaintiff failed to show that said defendants knew that plaintiff would continue to self-harm himself. With respect to plaintiff’s claim against defendant-prison doctor, record showed that presence of counsel could have made difference in outcome of case (and thus remand was required), where: (1) there was incomplete picture of plaintiff’s medical condition, especially where plaintiff could not take any depositions; (2) plaintiff asserted that prison doctor withheld pain medicine in effort to teach plaintiff lesson about self-harming himself; and (3) recruited counsel could have obtained deposition of prison doctor to explore intent of prison doctor. (Dissent filed.)

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant-police officer’s appeal of Dist. Ct. order that rejected defendant’s claim for qualified immunity in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated decedent’s 4^th amendment rights when defendant fired four shots into car in which decedent was passenger in car that attempted to flee scene of drug sting organized by police. While defendant argued that his actions were reasonable, since his intent when firing into vehicle was to stop threat that vehicle was coming to him, Dist. Ct. identified number of genuine issues of fact regarding what defendant was shooting at when firing his gun and determined that reasonable jury could find that defendant was unreasonable if he intended to hit vehicle or anyone in it, rather than defendant’s claim that he intended to only target driver. Moreover, Dist. Ct.’s finding regarding existence of material facts precluded defendant from appealing Dist. Ct.’s order, where, as here, defendant had not fully accepted plaintiff’s version of facts, when resolving qualified immunity issue.

Dist. Ct. erred in rejecting Magistrate Judge’s pre-trial recommended finding that plaintiff-prisoner had exhausted his administrative remedies for purposes of allowing him to proceed on his complaint that challenged his conditions of confinement. Record showed that: (1) Magistrate Judge held evidentiary hearing and made credibility findings that accepted plaintiff’s version of facts; and (2) Dist. Ct. reviewed record and transcripts, but, without holding hearing, found prison employee’s testimony to be more credible. While Dist. Ct. need not hold separate hearing when accepting Magistrate Judge’s credibility findings, Dist. Ct. must hold de novo evidentiary hearing if it is rejecting Magistrate Judge’s material credibility findings. As such, plaintiff was entitled to remand for new evidentiary hearing before Dist. Ct. to resolve administrative exhaustion issue.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for judgment as matter of law filed by defendant (entity providing medical services to prison) after jury rendered $25,000 in favor of plaintiff-prisoner in section 1983 action alleging that 20-month delay in plaintiff’s obtaining surgery to reconstruct damaged ACL violated his 8^th Amendment rights. Dist. Ct. could properly exclude plaintiff’s proffered evidence regarding delays in medical care attributed to defendant in four other prisoner cases, since circumstances in those cases either did not concern defendant’s “collegial review process” that required off-site physician review of medical file of prisoner seeking off-site treatment, or lacked evidence that requested services were medically appropriate. Moreover, defendant’s collegial review process was not unconstitutional on its face, and instant delay was attributable to medical judgment of off-site physician who initially recommended against surgery until it became absolutely necessary. As such, instant delay cannot be attributable to deliberate indifference, especially when off-site reviewing doctor regularly assessed whether it was medically appropriate for plaintiff to received ACL surgery.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his 4^th Amendment rights by holding him in pretrial detention without probable cause and by ignoring and fabricating evidence to detain him. Record showed existence of probable cause on armed habitual criminal charge, where: (1) defendant’s vehicle was stopped for traffic violation; (2) police found gun next to defendant in car he was driving; and (3) police were aware that defendant had been convicted of two or more felonies at time of his arrest. Police were not required to release defendant, even though defendant claimed that gun belonged to other individual in car. Fact that police may have seen other individual handle gun did not require different result, since police still had probable cause to believe that defendant and other individual jointly possessed said gun. Ct. also rejected plaintiff’s claim that police violated his due process rights by fabricating evidence to keep him confined, since 4^th Amendment, and not Due Process Clause, governs any claim for wrongful pretrial detention.

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that defendant-County’s Christmas display in front of its courthouse that contained nativity scene, as well as secular objects, including Santa’s sleigh, reindeer and striped poles violated Establishment Clause of First Amendment. Supreme Court’s recent case of American Legion, 139 U.S. 2067, displaces purpose and endorsement tests in context of Establishment Clause challenges to nativity scenes in passive Christmas displays on government property. Moreover, Ct. of Appeals found that under historical analysis test as set forth Lynch, 465 U.S. 668, instant nativity scene was constitutional in that it fit within long national tradition of using nativity scene in broader holiday displays that depicted historical origins of Christmas, as well as other symbols of Christmas, including origins of Christmas holiday. Ct. also noted that there was no evidence that government’s historical support of instant Christmas display was either intolerant or discriminatory towards differing views. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff-employee’s request for class action certification in plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant-employer failed to properly calculate overtime pay for its employees. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff’s proposed class of 37 co-workers failed to satisfy Rule 23’s numerosity requirement. While plaintiff’s proposed class came close to threshold number of 40 class members that court in Orr, 953 F.3d 490 recognized as sufficient to satisfy numerosity requirement, Dist. Ct. properly considered proposed class’s geographic dispersion, which indicated that all but two members lived within 50 miles of courthouse where plaintiff had filed lawsuit, as well as fact that plaintiff otherwise failed to produce any evidence indicating that joinder of proposed class members’ claim would be impractical. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly note that statutorily authorized attorneys’ fees would lower barrier to filing suit caused by small damage awards at stake in instant claims.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-prison medical personnel were deliberately indifferent to his medical condition, where plaintiff incurred injuries after defendants allowed him to personally apply caustic medication to treat his genital warts, where language on packaging for said medication advised that said medication should only be applied by physician. Plaintiff’s complaint contained no allegations that would draw inference that defendants actually knew about, but disregarded, substantial risk of harm to plaintiff’s health or safety, and plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that defendants had requisite state of mind were insufficient to state cause of action. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in dismissing on timeliness grounds plaintiff’s negligence claims in 2019 complaint against instant defendants, even though plaintiff failed to allege said negligence claim in original 2015 complaint. Record showed that plaintiff had previously filed motion for voluntary dismissal under 735 ILCS 5/13-217, and instant complaint was filed within one year of said dismissal. As such, plaintiff could bring instant negligence claim, since it arose out of “same transaction” at issue in his timely deliberate indifference claim in original complaint.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant-city manager violated plaintiff’s First and 14th Amendment rights by retaliating against it by recommending that city not go forward with Preliminary Development Incentive Agreement (PDA) that would provide plaintiff with $2.5 million in Tax Increment Financing for redevelopment of hotel property. PDA provided that all contingencies outlined in agreement had to be satisfied prior to city providing financial incentive, and defendant based his recommendation on plaintiff’s failure to complete project with any source of income other than $2.5 million at issue in PDA. Plaintiff based retaliation claim on contention that defendant blocked PDA because attorney member of plaintiff exposed unflattering information about defendant and named him in discovery in connection with unrelated 2017 lawsuit. While plaintiff asserted that member’s representation of client in 2017 lawsuit fell within First Amendment right to petition govt. for redress of grievances, plaintiff failed to state viable retaliation claim, since: (1)  client in 2017 lawsuit, as opposed to plaintiff, had engaged in protected activity; and (2) plaintiff could not rely on another plaintiff to support plaintiff’s own retaliation claim. Also, plaintiff could not establish viable due process claim because PDA and contract for purchase of hotel that was contingent on PDA provided only right to acquire property and not right in property itself. Too, plaintiff failed to establish viable class-of-one equal protection claim, where defendant stated rational basis for recommending that plaintiff not receive financing under PDA.