Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in remanding back to state court plaintiff’s action, alleging that defendant violated section 15(c) of Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) that precluded defendant from selling, leasing, or otherwise profiting from person’s/customer’s biometric identifier or biometric information, where Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff lacked Article III standing to bring her case in federal court. Burden was on defendant to establish plaintiff’s standing in federal court, where defendant had removed action to federal court, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff alleged only bare statutory violation that did not demonstrate any kind of concrete or particularized injury that would support standing, and where complaint conceded that neither plaintiff nor any class member suffered any injury as result of violation of section 15(c) of BIPA. Fact that plaintiff could have alleged concrete injury arising out of defendant’s alleged sale of her data to others did not require different result. As such, plaintiff was entitled to have her case remanded back to state court, where Illinois standing requirements are more liberal, and choose to have her case rely exclusively on state law.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in action that challenged constitutionality of Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) requirement that plaintiffs (individuals who relocated to Indiana from other states) register as sex offenders, where: (1) plaintiffs were registered as sex offenders under other states’ SORAs; and (2) State of Indiana would not require that its own citizens with similar criminal histories register as sex offenders. Ct. of Appeals found that Indiana’s SORA, as applied to plaintiffs, violated their right to travel between states, where Indiana placed exclusive reliance upon another state’s decision to require plaintiffs to register under that state’s SORA, and where Indiana necessarily uses plaintiffs’ travel to Indiana as trigger for its own registration requirement. Moreover, Indiana’s SORA also imposes obligations on plaintiffs that are not imposed on individuals who committed their crimes as residents of Indiana prior to enactment of relevant portions of Indiana’s SORA, and who had maintained citizenship in Indiana. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in rejecting plaintiff’s claim against defendants-Wisconsin Elections Commission, Governor, Secretary of State and others, that defendants’ manner of appointment of presidential electors, as well as manner of administration of presidential election, including polling place operations, voting procedures and vote tallying violated Electors Clause of U.S. Constitution. Record showed no violation of Electors Clause, where: (1) Wisconsin expressly assigned to Elections Committee responsibility for administration of Wisconsin election law; and (2) Wisconsin lawfully appointed its electors in manner directed by its Legislature. Moreover, allegations regarding Commission’s exercise of its authority are matters of state law, and plaintiff’s delay in bringing instant action until after election day and after certification of votes precluded him from seeking instant relief at this juncture.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant’s motion for remittur or for new trial, after jury awarded plaintiff $1,000,000 in compensatory damages arising out of car accident in which plaintiff sought damages for his physical injuries, but no punitive damages, medical costs, lost wages or emotional damages. Record showed that Dist. Ct. had granted defendant’s motion and gave plaintiff choice of accepting $250,000 or new trial. Plaintiff thereafter accepted new bench trial, but then presented no evidence at second trial and requested award of $0 in damages, which plaintiff described as “verdict of silence.” Record at first trial showed that plaintiff potentially suffered just whiplash and mild concussion, and thus Dist. Ct. could properly find that remittur or new trial was appropriate remedy, since jury’s $1,000,000 verdict was outrageous given limited nature of plaintiff’s injuries and limited nature of his damages request. Fact that plaintiff ultimately received no damages did not require different result since plaintiff in essence requested zero damages at second trial.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff-pre-trial detainee’s request for class action certification of his lawsuit, alleging that defendant’s “paper triage” policy, that required pre-trial detainees to submit health service request form with respect to detainee’s request for dental services, but failed to provide any face-to-face assessment by jail medical personnel of pre-trial detainee’s dental pain prior to detainee receiving care from dentist that occurred between three and thirty days after said request for dental care, violated 14^th Amendment. Plaintiff failed to satisfy commonality requirement for class action treatment, where claims of every proposed class member would not rise or fall based on resolution of whether paper triage policy existed, and where consideration as to whether said policy was objectively unreasonable required individualized, plaintiff-specific assessments. Plaintiff also failed to satisfy typicality element of Rule 23(a)(3), since dental services request of each class action member presented fundamentally unique circumstances.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing with prejudice for failing to state viable cause of action plaintiffs’ state-court actions, alleging that defendants used deceptive labels that advertised their parmesan cheese as “100%” cheese, where ingredients list stated that product contained between four to nine percent added cellulose powder and potassium sorbate. While Dist. Ct. held that accurate ingredients list would dispel any confusion about contents of product, Ct. of Appeals found that accurate fine-print list of ingredients does not foreclose as matter of law claim that ambiguous front label deceives reasonable consumers, and that plaintiffs should have opportunity to show as matter of fact that ambiguous language in label actually misleads consumers, especially where plaintiffs alleged that 85 to 95 percent of consumers understood “100%” Grated Parmesan Cheese” to mean that product contained only cheese without additives. Fact that product was displayed on un-refrigerated shelf did not require different result. Ct. rejected defendant’s contention that instant state-law claims are preempted because federal law permits their labeling. Ct. further dismissed plaintiffs’ appeals with respect to their actions against two defendants, where: (1) Dist. Ct. dismissed all claims against said defendants without filing separate Rule 58(a) judgments as to said cases; (2) 150-day rule as set forth in Rule 58(c) applied so as to render said dismissals final orders 150 days after entry of said dismissal orders; and (3) plaintiffs failed to file notice of appeal within 30 days after 150^th day from dismissals.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison doctors and prison healthcare provider's motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his eye infection that resulted in loss of his eye. While plaintiff contended that defendants breached applicable standard of care by failing to promptly refer him to specialist and failing to provide medications on timely basis, plaintiff failed to show that one treating doctor acted with deliberate indifference, where: (1) plaintiff’s symptoms while in said doctor’s care were consistent with conjunctivitis and that said doctor acted within appropriate duty of care when treating said condition; and (2) expert evidence indicated that any indication of corneal infection that caused loss of eye would have appeared only after plaintiff last saw said doctor. Also, plaintiff’s failure to provide expert testimony about optometrist standard of care precluded him from proceeding on any medical malpractice claim against said doctor. Too, plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against another prison doctor failed, where said doctor timely referred plaintiff to eye specialist on urgent basis and acted appropriately in following recommendations and diagnosis received from other doctors. Moreover, plaintiff could not proceed under Monell theory against private provider of medical services to prison, where plaintiff failed to establish any indifference claim against prison doctor supplied by said private entity.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(2) motion for new trial in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-City and certain police officers had fabricated evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence that resulted in plaintiff’s murder conviction. Original trial resulted in $80,000 jury verdict in favor of plaintiff as to one police defendant and verdicts in favor of all other defendants. In support of said motion, plaintiff alleged that he learned within months after original trial in 2014 that key witness for defendants would not be incarcerated until 2027 as represented by defendants during trial, but rather was released from prison in 2014 pursuant to apparent agreement by witness to provide favorable testimony for defendants. As such, plaintiff’s newly discovered evidence regarding witness’s prisoner status cast doubt on credibility of said witness that would have cut at heart of defendants’ case so as to justify Dist. Ct.’s grant of new trial, which subsequently resulted in jury’s award of $22 million in compensatory damages at second trial against two police defendants and defendant City. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly set aside result of first trial under Rule 60(b)(3) based on finding of either fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct arising out of misrepresentation regarding witness’s prisoner status. Dist. Ct. also properly granted plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion for new trial with respect to defendant-City after finding that Dist. Ct.’s limitation on discovery unfairly prevented plaintiff from obtaining and investigating “street files” held by police department with respect to other defendants that could have supported plaintiff’s claim that City had custom of wrongdoing that withheld exculpatory evidence contained in said files not only in plaintiff’s case but for other defendants facing criminal charges. Too, record supported jury’s verdict against City in second trial, where plaintiff produced evidence that there was systemic underproduction of exculpatory materials to prosecutors and defense counsel. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant's (supervisor at Agency and Disability Resource Center of Marinette County, Wisconsin (ADRC)) motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant violated plaintiff’s due process rights by failing to include plaintiff’s residential care facilities in ADRC’s directory for potential residents to peruse. Record showed that Wisconsin’s ADRC Operational Practice Guidelines provided that directory could not include plaintiff's facilities that had been found in violation of state, federal or municipal law, and plaintiff failed to show that she had protected property interest in ADRC’s listing of her facilities in directory for purposes of asserting any due process rights. Moreover, plaintiff had only non, unilateral expectation that her facilities would be listed in ADRC’s directory. Also, plaintiff could not establish any violation of her equal protection rights, where plaintiff failed to present evidence either that her race played any role in decision to exclude her facilities from ADRC’s directory, or that defendant’s explanation that guidelines prevented her from including plaintiff’s facilities in directory was pretext for race discrimination.

Dist. Ct. erred in remanding to state court plaintiff’s claim under section 15(a) of Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, where Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff lacked Article III standing to pursue said claim. Plaintiff asserted that defendant failed to comply with section 15(a), which requires private entities in possession of biometric data to develop, publicly disclose and implement retention schedule and guidelines for destroying data when initial purpose for collecting said data had ended. Moreover, plaintiff’s section 15(a) claim sufficiently alleged legally protected privacy right so as to support Article III standing, where: (1) plaintiff did not allege mere procedural failure to publicly disclose data-retention policy, but rather asserted concrete and particularized invasion of her privacy interest in her biometric data, where defendant allegedly retained her biometric data after her employment had ended. As such, plaintiff could pursue her claim in federal court. Ct. further noted, though, that instant case raised issue as to whether plaintiff’s section 15(a) claim was preempted by Labor Management Relations Act as suggested in Miller, 926 F.3d 898.