Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-prison doctor’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s dental infection, where defendant prescribed penicillin and eventually steroids to treat said condition over five-day period, instead of referring defendant to outside medical personnel, who eventually diagnosed plaintiff with Ludwig’s angina and performed multiple surgeries to treat infection in his mouth. Defendant’s experts stated that defendant’s treatment of plaintiff’s mouth was within standard of care, and record showed that defendant neither disregarded plaintiff’s condition nor believed that treatment he was prescribing for plaintiff was known to be ineffective. As such, while plaintiff’s expert opined that defendant ignored obvious risk of progression of infection in plaintiff’s mouth, record established only that there was difference of medical opinion over course of defendant’s treatment, which established at best existence of only negligence as opposed to deliberate indifference.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees incurred on certain common law copyright claims, even though Dist. Ct. had observed that said claims were baseless, where plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed said claims with prejudice. While there is strong presumption in favor of awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants in copyright claims, Dist. Ct. could properly deny defendants’ request for attorney fees, where: (1) plaintiff’s lawsuit that included copyright and trademark infringement claims appeared to have been brought in good faith; (2) defendants had only filed answer with respect to copyright claims and had not filed any substantial briefing or conducted discovery on said claims prior to dismissal; and (3) plaintiffs’ claims had been voluntarily dismissed with prejudice. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could deny instant request for fees even though plaintiff’s copyright claims were baseless.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-prison officials used excessive force against him, where Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his prison administrative remedies prior to filing instant lawsuit. Exhaustion was not required, where prison officials did not provide plaintiff with clear directives to appeal his grievance as part of his administrative remedies. Moreover, although Review Board told plaintiff that his grievance appeal was missing specific documents, it failed to check box indicating that said documents needed to be provided or that some explanation needed to be given for their absence. Also, plaintiff had no reason to believe that anyone was looking into his grievance, and record showed that no prison official ever responded with answer to plaintiff's standard grievance.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs-churches' request for issuance of preliminary injunction in section 1983 action alleging that defendant's executive order limiting size of public assemblies, including religious services, to 10 persons violates their rights under Free Exercise Clause of First Amendment. Instant case is not moot, although defendant subsequently issued executive order that made said limitation only recommendation. However, original executive order did not discriminate against religion, where church services are akin to other congregate functions that occur in auditoriums that have same limitation and have same risks of transmitting COVID disease. Ct. rejected plaintiffs' claim that church services were similar to grocery stores and pharmacies which do not have 10-person limitation.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff-prisoner's Rule 60(b) motion to reopen his case after it had been dismissed for want of prosecution. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff sued defendants-prison officials for alleged violations of his constitutional rights; (2) during pendency of his case, plaintiff was released on parole, but did not notify court of his new address or respond to defendants' motions or discovery requests over seven-month period; (3) Dist. Ct. directed plaintiff in screening order to notify it, as well as defendants, of new address if he was released from prison and warned plaintiff that it would not independently investigate his whereabouts; and (4)) Dist. Ct. dismissed case for want of prosecution after seven months of silence from plaintiff. While plaintiff, who returned to different prison after having his parole revoked, argued that his failure to update his address was excusable "clerical error," plaintiff's lengthy period of inaction, as well as need to reschedule discovery and dispositive motion deadlines if case were to be reinstated, supported denial of plaintiff's motion to reinstate his case. Moreover, plaintiff failed to explain his failure to track status of his case, which did not otherwise constitute excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1).

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-police officials' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' section 1983 action, alleging that defendants denied plaintiffs' constitutional right of access to courts when they engaged in cover-up to protect different defendant-police officer prior to and after plaintiffs began prosecuting said officer in underlying wrongful death claim. Plaintiffs are required to show in instant "backward-looking" access to courts claim that defendants' actions effectively precluded them from obtaining relief in wrongful death claim, and plaintiffs could not proceed at this juncture on their denial of access to courts claim, since: (1) defendants had not caused loss of and/or inadequate resolution of plaintiffs' wrongful death claim, which was still active and pending; (2) any contention that plaintiffs suffered concrete setback in wrongful death claim that was traceable to defendants' conduct was only speculation about event that might not come to pass; and (3) plaintiffs still had discovery process in wrongful death action that provided them with access to information/access to courts. As such, Dist. Ct should have dismissed without prejudice instant denial of court access claim pending outcome of wrongful death claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff's Rule 15 motion to reinstate his section 1983 action against defendants-police officials who had arrested plaintiff on criminal charges to which plaintiff had been convicted by time plaintiff had originally filed his section 1983 claim. Plaintiff's section 1983 claim could have been dismissed based on Heck bar due to fact that his underlying conviction had not been reversed or expunged, but Dist. Ct. dismissed with prejudice plaintiff's section 1983 action due to plaintiff's failure to prosecute his case. However, after plaintiff's conviction had been overturned, plaintiff filed instant motion to reinstate his section 1983 action, but Dist. Ct properly denied plaintiff's motion on ground that Rule 15 did not allow plaintiff to file amended complaint in instant terminated case. Moreover, although Rule 60(b) provided plaintiff with potential avenue to seek relief from terminated case, plaintiff waived any Rule 60(b) argument because he failed to raise it until he filed his reply brief. Also, it was unlikely that plaintiff could have prevailed if he had filed timely Rule 60(b)(6) motion, where plaintiff filed instant motion to reinstate more than one year after dismissal of his case.

Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in granting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint based on newly filed affirmative defense of res judicata, where defendants filed instant motion to assert said affirmative defense almost seven years after lawsuit had been filed. Dist. Ct. held erroneous belief that it was required under Massey, 196 F.3d 727, to allow defendants to assert instant res judicata claim as new affirmative defense where, as here, plaintiff filed amended complaint, and Dist. Ct. must exercise sound discretion under Rules 8 and 15 in deciding whether to allow late addition of new affirmative defense. Here, Dist. Ct. abused its discretion, where, although plaintiff was granted leave to file late motion to amend his complaint, plaintiff's amendments to complaint concerned only minor aspects of case that did not change theory or scope of case, and where said amendments had nothing to do with res judicata defense. Fact that Dist. Ct. had instructed defendants to "answer or otherwise plead" after it had granted motion to amend complaint did not require different result. Moreover, on remand, defendants will not be able to assert res judicata defense, since said defense was untimely, where defendants had waited six years to assert said defense, under circumstances where defendants had conducted discovery and asserted said defense prior to pending deadline for filing any summary judgment motion.

Ct. of Appeals granted plaintiff's motion for sanction under Fed. R. Pro. 38 based on plaintiff's contention that defendants' appellate court arguments that challenged Dist. Ct.'s entry of default judgment in plaintiff's Lanham Act claim were frivolous or destined to fail. Defendants' appellate arguments were contrary to well-established principles governing effect of default judgment and had virtually no likelihood of success. Also, defendants' appellate counsel failed to file complete jurisdictional statement and filed meritless motion to dismiss appeal asserting that appeal was "moot." Fact that defendants' counsel lacked experience in litigating federal appeals did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in vacating default judgment that had been entered in plaintiff's Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) against defendant-entity, where Dist. Ct. had previously granted summary judgment on merits to defendant-chief operating officer (CEO) of defendant-entity, and where Dist. Ct. held erroneous belief that there was legal inconsistency in granting plaintiff's default judgment against defendant-entity and granting defendant-CEO's motion for summary judgment. Dist. Ct. could properly grant defendant-CEO's motion for summary judgment, since he did not fit within definition of "sender" under TCPA, because: (1) he did not personally send any unsolicited faxes; (2) faxes were sent on behalf of defendant-entity; (3) any advertisements in faxes pertained to defendant-entity products; and (4) plaintiff could not base liability only on defendant-CEO's knowledge that defendant-entity was sending faxes. Also. Dist. Ct. had properly entered default judgment against defendant-entity based on entity's failure to obtain appearance from substitute counsel, and record did not show existence of any good cause to support vacatur of default judgment. Too, where, as here, plaintiff alleged joint and several liability against both defendants, entry of default judgment against one defendant and not against another was not precluded, and theories of liability under TCPA did not require uniformity of judgments.